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MODERN AGE

A CONSERVATIVE REVIEW

Volume 5

WINTER 1960-1961

Number 1



David J. Dallin—
The New Class in Russia

Richard M. Weaver—
Lord Acton: The Historian as Thinker

Labib Zuwiyya-Yamak—
Liberty, Equality, and Democracy

Thomas Molnar—
De Gaulle: A Portrait of the General
*Clare Boothe Luce—*America's Image Abroad

*Robert V. Jones—*Understanding the Ruble

Robert Beum—
The Life and Death of Orpheus

Ross J. S. Hoffman—
Burke and His Native Land
*Walter Sullivan—*Order and Modernity

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MODERN AGE

A Conservative Review



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Mr. Dallin among the Scholars

DAVID J. DALLIN, whose article "The New Class in Russia" appears in this issue, is a historian of remarkable gifts and the reception his books have received in academic circles in this country seems worth considering. Three of them appeared during the war—*Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942*, *Russia and Post-War Europe*, and *The Big Three*. In them Mr. Dallin told some new things to American readers—for example, the terms of the secret treaty of August 1939 between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, although the documents which he accurately described came to light only in 1946 during the first Nuremberg trial. Mr. Dallin had not seen them but he knew they had to exist to account for the

frictionless division of the newly occupied territories and the respective spheres of interest of Russia and Germany after the conquest of Poland. Mr. Dallin also wrote that Russia, when the war was over, would bring into its orbit a portion of Germany, which would then become a claim—as the true People's Republic—on the non-communist part of the country. The pattern Mr. Dallin had discerned when Russia had recognized the so-called Finnish Karelian Republic, which had promptly called upon Soviet troops to liberate the rest of Finland from its imperialist exploiters.

These extraordinary insights accumulated in Dallin's books as he clearly saw the direction and purposes of the Soviet policies

that were so baffling to so many in high places. And not only were they mysterious at the time; some of their former supporters were determined to keep them enigmatic. When for example, postwar writers pointed out the patent misconceptions of Russia on the part of Mr. Roosevelt and many of his advisers, what was said was likely to be dismissed by tried and true reviewers among the academic critics as "Monday morning quarterbacking." The circumstance that people like Mr. Dallin had diagnosed the plays on Saturday afternoon was studiously ignored.

Dallin, although he had never been a Communist, knew from a lifelong concentration on Russian policies how the men in the Kremlin thought and acted. A theorist in the search for a new social order, he had been in exile in England before the Russian revolution (when Litvinov, too, was there) and had returned to the Soviet Union, as a member of the Moscow Soviet, for the brief period when the Bolsheviks had permitted an opposition to function. He managed to leave before the early quasi-tolerance faded and the GPU looked after any opposition.

Despite the evidence with which he supported his analyses, the reception of his books in academic circles was always less than enthusiastic. Although he had scattered admirers among the professoriat he had far more opponents, who ranged from the violently hostile to those who merely called him anti-Soviet and who said in effect that even if he was right he made the future look too grim, that we must try to see a better face on our Russian allies or they would never have one. Even in 1947, when *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia* (which he had written with B. I. Nicolaevsky) was published, the academic furors did not subside. On the contrary, when Vishinsky denounced the book in the United Nations, professors in some of our foremost institu-

tions of higher learning joined with him or shook their heads over the carefully arrived at findings that ten to fifteen million slaves were working in the Soviet economy. Subsequent investigations and the testimony of survivors of the system so strongly corroborated the book, forced labor became such a liability in the propaganda wars for a regime representing the workers of the world, that for once the men in the Kremlin were affected by public opinion and the institution of the forced labor camps was whittled down. It is not too much to say that thousands of people owe their freedom to the events set in motion by this book. But it had made its way against the academic procession.

What are the causes of this *trahison des clercs*? Why did these scholarly books arouse the wrath or passive resistance of scholars? And not only scholars. A conservative businessman once told me Dallin could not be right because—unlike so many accredited travelers—he had not been in the Soviet Union since 1921. What image of respectability for himself and for the Soviet Union had come into the head of this solid citizen and how had it got there?

Enthusiasm for the wartime ally is not enough to explain this benevolence, which existed with fluctuating intensity before the war and has continued after it despite Korea, the East German rising, the Hungarian revolt, the unremitting attacks on the United States. Churchill, long the symbol of resistance to tyranny, himself became a dubious figure for many intellectuals when he made his Fulton, Missouri, speech about the Iron Curtain and two worlds. The myth of the Chinese agrarians which was cherished in academic circles as it was in American high policy was part of this image making, and the cadres of the communist conspiracy could never have achieved their successes without the eagerness to believe they encountered among

the intellectuals. Hitler-Stalin pacts were waved aside or explained as part of a wily long-range plan of the Kremlin to come to grips in due course with the arch enemy (an explanation that, incidentally, is the same as the one Hitler used to justify his attack on Russia); the shooting down of unarmed civilians in East Germany and Hungary was followed by mass meetings of protest and then by demands for America to sit down and talk over our right to stay in Berlin as with a partner seeking a reasonable solution. Any sign of joviality is seized upon as evidence of latent friendship and the two standards of judgment emerge: one for what Khrushchev says and does, the other for the men of the West. The bonhomie of MacMillan or Eisenhower or even de Gaulle would be no cause for flights of optimism.

For reasons which we shall pursue in future issues of *Modern Age* too many intellectuals have consciously or unconsciously placed their hopes for the good society in a totalitarian system that has betrayed these docile admirers over and over again. They discover new phrases to find the Soviet Union better than before—it is reaching a new stage in its development, it has been won over to the idea of two worlds and peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev is not Stalin. . . . It is no wonder that the explanations of the Communist *Apparat*, of the full-time purveyors of opinion in the Kremlin, find these people ready to see their enemy, not in the perverters of truth, but in the Dallins—without whom the security and assurance with which they themselves write would be more endangered than they will ever know.—E.D.

MODERN AGE

A Conservative Review



The rôle of the intelligentsia in the East.

The New Class in Russia

DAVID J. DALLIN

The Eastward Path of the Social Revolution

THE EARLY SOCIALISTIC THINKERS, those whom Marx and Engels had termed "utopians," had expected that the good will of national rulers would help to establish the new society and that the transition would not involve a political upheaval. According to their thinking, any country—but especially England or France—could be the first to achieve the Great Transformation. But in the nineteenth century there emerged the notion of the socialist movement as a political struggle, and the transition was viewed now as a social revolution of the greatest depth and dimensions.

If a revolution was the only way to set up the perfect society, who could rival France as the country most likely to be the first to reach such a goal? France was the classic land of revolution—1789, 1830, 1848, 1870. Nowhere else had revolutionary passion reached such heights, and nowhere else had revolutionary skill attained such perfection. That violent revolutionary of the 1790's, Gracchus Babeuf, had been the first bearer of the new trend, and his So-

ciety of Equals had carried the revolutionary message far and wide. Socialist voices had been loud in the developments of 1848, when the moderate Louis Blanc was the new socialist political leader. Then came Louis Blanqui, the conspirator, and his followers in the Paris Commune. France was far ahead in the competition for first place among the countries to achieve the social revolution when Marx's First International was founded.

But France's eastern neighbor, Prussia-Germany, had been rising to a position of contention since the middle of the nineteenth century. There, too, a crop of outstanding revolutionists, devoted socialists, was growing up. Although fiercely fighting one another, they received an impressive response to their appeal. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Ferdinand Lassalle, and especially the young leaders August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, combined revolutionary passion with German *Gründlichkeit*; and their efforts to create a mass movement, in contrast to a conspiracy, turned all socialist eyes on their country. Was it possible that socialism would enter through the German gate? Yes, said Marx; France was

perhaps destined to ignite the first spark, but Germany would carry the torch:

"I am firmly convinced," Marx wrote Engels in 1870, "that though the first impulse will come from France, Germany is much more ripe for a social movement and will leave the French far behind. It is a serious mistake and self-deception on the part of the latter still to consider themselves a chosen people."¹

A few months after this letter was written, revolution broke out in Paris, and the Commune was set up. For a while it seemed that France had won in the socialist contest with Germany. But the Commune did not last, and in the subsequent decades French socialism retreated, disintegrating into groups and factions and losing much of its force and passion, while Germany marched ahead as the leading country of Marxism and revolutionary zeal.

The significance of this transfer of grace from France to Germany lay in the fact that at the time—more than a century ago—France was considered to be generally far ahead of Germany on the path of human progress. In poetry and *belles lettres*, in political institutions, in breadth and richness of historical horizon, and in economic standards of living France was a "developed" country compared with the tiny nations across the Rhine with their smell of the Middle Ages and their petty kings and princes. France, the capital of human civilization, could, it appeared, have only one rival—England; but in terms of being the heart of a socialist revolution England was far behind.

Thus, the socialist star began to move to the east, stopping first over the land of Bismarck and Bebel.

"The French will start, the Germans will finish," was the way Lenin interpreted Marx's views. Lenin and his party became the ablest and most obedient pupils of the teachers and leaders of German socialism.

The adoration of the Russian leaders for German Marxism was boundless. Karl Kautsky became the supreme authority, philosopher, scientist, and prophet. Congresses of German socialists were hailed, attended, and applauded by the Russians. The French socialists, with their un-Marxist ("petit bourgeois") factions, were unimportant in the eyes of Russian Marxists.

It was during this time that the Russian Marxists acquired their excellent knowledge of German. Emigré Russian leaders in France and Switzerland spoke German, followed the German press, studied German economics, and found in German statistics abundant confirmation of their concepts of capitalist centralization, capitalist pauperization of the masses, and revolutionary trends. The generation of Lenin, which is now rapidly disappearing—Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, and a few others are left—were of this old pro-German breed; they bequeathed their sentiments and thoughts to their younger followers and to the new crop of leaders.

Russia was the least likely pretender to the role of leader of the world revolution. How could poor, backward Russia, this—in Lenin's words—"serfdom-ridden, hibernating, patriarchal, pious, and submissive Russia" challenge the advanced nations? In April 1917, departing from Switzerland for Russia, Lenin said, in a farewell "letter to the Swiss workers": "The idea that the Russian proletariat is a chosen revolutionary proletariat among the workers of the world is absolutely alien to us." No one was more surprised than Lenin, the engineer of the November revolution, that Russia was winning out in the competition, and he believed that if Russia alone won the revolution it would be only to lose it again, that Russian socialism would be only a historical symbol, like the Paris Commune.

Time passed and the "socialist revolution" was carried out. Lenin still doubted the ability of his country to head the world movement. Russia, he believed, would soon have to relinquish the leading role to a more advanced country. During the remaining years of his life he was never able to reconcile his theories with the unexpected fact of Russia's having been the first to achieve the revolution.

*The Star Over the Kremlin or
Over Peking?*

THUS THE STAR of revolution had moved farther to the east to shine over the Kremlin. Lenin's heirs now abandoned their teacher's humiliating philosophy of Russia's unworthiness and claimed for Russia the right to lead. Under Stalin the question was definitely settled: the star was there to stay; Russia was worthy, and any who questioned this must be punished.

"The whole world knows now," wrote Stalin in 1930, "that the center of the revolutionary movement has been transferred from Western Europe to Russia. The revolutionaries of all countries look with hope upon Russia as the heart of the liberation struggle of the workers of the entire world, acknowledging it as their only fatherland. The revolutionary workers of all countries unanimously applaud the Soviet working class and, first of all, the *Russian* working class, the vanguard of the Soviet workers, as their acknowledged leader, carrying out the most revolutionary and the most active policy that the proletarians of other countries have ever dreamt of carrying out."²

This Soviet claim, accepted almost universally by the Communists of the world, was the ideological basis of Russia's supremacy.

But was this supremacy definitely and firmly established? In the 1950's another

eastern nation, poor, backward, even more "underdeveloped" than Russia, advanced to challenge the Soviet pattern of Communism and dispute Moscow's superiority. That nation was China. Was the Soviet system of differential wages consistent with the ideals of Communism? Could not the Soviet system of economically graded kolkhozes, with their private trade and the abyss created between city and village, be converted into an agricultural program with a more truly Communist countenance? Was the Soviet slogan of "coexistence" with the West not actually a kind of appeasement of capitalism? In posing these challenges, Chinese Communism was proclaiming that China must and would be free of these lamentable remnants of the old unjust world, that its system would be a nobler and more equitable one than Russia's. The star that in a period of a hundred years had moved eastward from France through Germany to Russia must continue on its eastward path: it must shine over a country and a people that were marching faster than the standard-bearing Russians on the road to progress. That country and that people would soon overtake Britain, and—ever accelerating—overtake not only the United States but Russia itself, and finally would assume a place worthy of the most populous and ablest people in the world. "China is moving," said Jenmin Jihpao, "with lightning speed. Until recently fifty-year-old peasant workers worried whether they would live to see the wonderful age of Communism. Now even eighty- and ninety-year-olds are sure that they will still be able to enjoy the good fortune of Communism."³

The Semi-Intellectuals

WESTERN LITERATURE more than once has pointed out the disparity between Marxian theory and Communist practice. In theory

it is the advanced industrial and capitalist nations of the West that have created the preconditions of socialism. In practice, however, it has been the less developed countries—Russia, China—that have provided the most fertile soil, while the advanced nations, after some flowerings, have proved barren. If revolutionary Marxism is a working class movement, as is claimed, how did it happen that China, with little more than 3 per cent of her population in the ranks of industrial labor, became a fortress of Communism, while England, with 60 to 70 per cent of her people in the ranks of labor, and the United States, remained impervious to Communist revolution? Why do millions in Indonesia flock to Communist meetings and vote Communist, while in all of Scandinavia a bare few thousand manifest sympathy for the movement?

It is an error to identify political movements such as communism, democracy, anti-communism, or fascism with an economic group or "social class." Too many politicians and writers in the West have accepted the comfortable philosophy that Communism is a working-class movement. As a matter of fact, Communism is not a labor movement, nor is it a peasant movement, a farmer-labor movement, or a movement of any other economic class. Despite the efforts of the Communist movement to justify theory by identifying the party with the class, workers do not constitute the main substratum of the powerful Communist movement.

At the roots of modern Communism lies the great phenomenon of our times: the huge cultural revolution that has taken place in all corners of the world, the emergence of millions of benighted human beings into the light of science and knowledge. At the beginning of this century 90 per cent of India's population were illiterate; in Egypt 92 per cent were illiterate, in

Serbia 86 per cent, in European Russia 70 per cent. In only a minority of the countries of the world—the Western countries—was literacy more or less general. Since the end of the nineteenth century, especially during the last sixty years, there has been a rapid rise in literacy in the hitherto culturally backward countries. The increase in literacy, the growth of the daily press, and the advent of radio and television have helped transform the human condition in many countries. This development, which still continues, has created new social strata that are of special significance.

The new strata when they emerged were only half educated; their students were poorly prepared, and their intellectuals were only semi-intellectuals. Their colleges and universities, while growing rapidly, were sites of universal semi-knowledge.

The Russians were the first to apply to this large stratum of half-educated people the term "semi-intelligentsia," which carries a derisive overtone. The scorn however is not appropriate. There is no other way to raise the backward majority of mankind to new levels without going through the various stages of education; there can be no skipping of stages.

It is the semi-intelligentsia of the initial stages that constitutes the substratum of Communist movements in the East and South. Revolutionary Marxism in its extreme, Leninist interpretation is well suited to the quest of the semi-intellectual for the perfect philosophy with the answers to all questions—the source of evil, war, and poverty; the road to the perfect society; and the new Jihad, the holy war to exterminate the enemies of a paradise on earth.

In stating that Marxism in its primitive interpretation is well suited to the initial spiritual needs of young men and women receiving the A B C's of education in backward countries, I do not mean that the entire stratum joins the extreme revolution-

ary movement in their country. The great majority go about their own business and remain outside political struggles; they are the "nonvoters" of their time. It is always a minority among the new intellectuals, usually a small one, that embraces the new faith, but it is this vocal and colorful minority that is characteristic of its era.

In the West a stratum of genuine intellectuals had been forming gradually since the Renaissance. It was already in existence in the nineteenth century, when the rapid growth of education extended to the West. The spiritual soil of the Western countries already contained a kind of antibody to primitive philosophies. This is why the experiments in France failed in 1870-71, and it why German Marxism faded in the first decades of the twentieth century.

The general psychological differential between the initial and the higher stages of cultural growth is the presence of *doubt* at the higher stages in the thinking of man. The ability to swallow entire ideologies, philosophies, political theories, and programs without question is a sign of the initial stage. As the new generations in the underdeveloped countries grow and mature, the poison of criticism—this trademark of civilization—begins to erode the rapidly embraced and rapidly assimilated new faith. Questions are asked. The overwhelming dynamism which is the product of an uncritical state of mind begins to weaken. When this process reaches a certain stage, a high-level intellectual crust forms which is endowed with both knowledge and skepticism, and when this new crust becomes large enough the primitive *Weltanschauung* enters its period of decline.

And this is why the star of revolution had to travel to the east. While there existed in Russia, in the fifty years before the revolution, a tiny stratum of high-level intellectuals, they were neither able nor inclined

to try to stop the growth of new philosophies; besides, because of the extremes of autocracy in Russia, many outstanding leaders of Russian thought themselves embraced Marxian philosophy.

RECOLLECTIONS OF my own experience may help to illustrate this process of spiritual evolution. During the last decades before the upheaval of 1917 in Russia, revolutionary movements were growing and engaging the interest of very young men and women. Underground "groups" and "circles" served as a kind of preparatory school. Among the youthful members were university students, technical school students, students in the higher grades of high school, and young salesmen, sometimes workers or craftsmen. Often these young people came from families in which the parents had had little or no education. The "circle" was not a party "cell," nor was it in general a political organization; it was, rather, a school for future revolutionists and was viewed as such by the party (Social-Democratic or Social-Revolutionary) that sent its "lektors" to guide the particular groups. Meetings were secret and were usually held in private apartments. There were from ten to fifteen persons in a "circle."

I belonged to Marxist "circles" in St. Petersburg and Vilno, having first joined at the age of about seventeen. All of us were painfully aware of the gaps in our knowledge and were impatient to learn. Instruction was rapid; it had to be comprehensive enough to solve all our problems at once. The political air was electric, the revolution was the order of the day, and we were anxious to be given something that would replace religion, monarchy, capitalism, and family, and that would tell us explicitly what we had to do to achieve the Millennium.

We had two textbooks. One was a Russian

translation of Julius Lippert's *History of Culture*, which, in somewhat oversimplified evolutionary terms, described the steps in the progress of humanity from the ancient past to modern times; it was also a kind of refutation of all religious philosophies. The other was *Political Economy*, by two Russian Marxists, A. Bogdanov and I. Stepanov, which contained the main theses of "scientific socialism." We were taught the nondeistic origin of the universe, Darwin's theory of the evolution of species, "utopian" and "scientific" socialism. There were jokes about the all-embracing program of our "circles"—they stretched, it was said, "from the stars through the apes to socialism."

The theories expounded in our textbooks and the speeches delivered by our "lektors" fell on eager ears. It would be wrong to say that we were "indoctrinated." Rather, we craved doctrine and were perhaps more eager to get it than our teachers were to teach it. After the courses we felt ourselves to be—and our young "lektors" so viewed us—knowledgeable and educated men now able to carry the torch forward. We were materialists in philosophy, Darwinians in science, Marxists in sociology. What we knew or presumed to know was definite and certain. Our stratum was the culture medium for revolutionism—primitive, strong, and uncompromising.

It took many years before the worm of doubt began to attack our tree of knowledge and we began to realize how little we really knew. But as our extreme dynamism evaporated, new waves of beginners came in to replenish the numbers and the power of the semi-intellectuals.

A SIMILAR PROCESS, it appears, was taking place while Chinese Communism was putting on flesh and muscle. In Yen-an, headquarters of Mao Tse-tung during the civil wars, a number of schools for Chinese

youth were organized—the institutes of Youth Cadres, a Women's University, and a number of other *sui generis* high schools. The youth flocked to Yen-an through the barriers of the war fronts to get revolutionary Marxist wisdom directly from the mouth of the high priest. The difference between China and prerevolutionary Russia was only that in Yen-an education could take place openly and without the need to divide the operation into small "circles." Mao Tse-tung has more than once confirmed how great has been the significance of the "revolutionary youth" to his movement, how important it was in forming the cadres of his future government and his armies. Although details of this educational operation are lacking, it is evident that among the young students in Yen-an there were few, if any, Chinese workers; the great majority were of "petit bourgeois" origin, mainly from families of city merchants, peasants, and government officials; Mao himself came from a family of Chinese officials.

Chinese Communism has been a classic party of the semi-intelligentsia. Mao Tse-tung has never admitted this state of affairs; an orthodox Marxist, he has viewed his party as a labor movement and has offered the sophisticated interpretation that it "represents the interests" of the "Chinese proletariat"; whether or not the "Chinese proletariat" was in agreement with this thesis was a secondary matter.

Lenin and his successors had faced the same problem. Lenin realized—and said in writing—that the light of revolutionary socialism in Russia had been kindled in the main by nonworkers; in fact, his "cadres" were often recruited from among members of the gentry or well-to-do capitalist families; a number of his most trusted lieutenants and fighters came from these social groups. But he insisted that his party was a workers' party, not one among others, but

the workers' party *par excellence*. Lenin's Central Committees, elected in 1905, 1912, and 1917, were composed of intellectuals, with almost no workers added. The qualifications for the great task of leading the movement included prowess, devotion, and at least a minimum of knowledge necessary for the task; and workers with these qualifications were not available. For display purposes, however, Lenin made use of another kind of leader—the "pure proletarian." Such, for instance, were the Bolshevik members of the Duma (the prerevolutionary assembly), whose personalities, speeches, and political attitudes were widely discussed. From abroad Lenin gave instructions during the electoral campaign to nominate workers and to see to it that the Bolshevik faction in the Duma presented a strong image of a workers' party. In rejecting nonworkers as candidates, Lenin was depriving his future faction in the Duma of better leadership, but so important did the great symbol of a Workers' Party appear to him that he took this in stride.

The issue of creating "cadres" of an allegedly workers' party continued to bother the Soviet leadership for a long time after the Soviet revolution of 1917. Strenuous efforts were made to increase the percentage of workers in the party's membership; special recruitment drives were carried out in which only "workers from the bench" were accepted into the party. And then, regularly, the worker element dropped out as workers who had joined the party advanced to posts in the administration and lost their proletarian status. So hopeless had the situation become in the early 1930's that Stalin ceased to publish statistics on the social composition of his party in order to conceal the fact that it was becoming a middle-class political organization.

The New Middle Class in Russia

THUS, IN THE COURSE of a few decades, a new social stratum emerged in Russia, a new middle class whose role has been determined not so much by its size—it probably numbers twenty million today—but mainly by the weight it exerts politically, which is greatly out of proportion to its numbers. When united in its sentiments, the middle class is a powerful force. Its real significance is often hidden under standard phrases—"workers' interests," "toilers' movements," "popular enthusiasm," and such.

The Soviet middle class embraces practically everything and everybody of importance in Soviet society. The scientists, inventors of Sputniks, generals and marshals, members of the government from Khrushchev down to the last "acting second assistant," ballerinas, singers, painters, and editors are segments of a single milieu. Their problems are comparable; they understand one another; they spend their leisure time together, study together, intermarry, and live the life of neighbors in every sense. Not all are members of the Communist Party, although most of the "elite" are. Dependence on Party orders is not always to the liking of all, but all submit. In Stalin's time this class could say of itself what Abbé Sieyès said on the eve of the revolution: "What is the Third Estate? Everything. What has it been hitherto in the political order? Nothing. What does it desire? To be something." Today the Soviet middle class is already "something"; under Khrushchev it has advanced.

The shortening of working hours has given them a shorter office day. Old-age and veterans pensions have aided them substantially. The refrigerators, television sets, and automobiles which they so eagerly desire are given priority in production over some more vital needs of the workers

and kolkhoz peasants. The new apartment buildings serve primarily the housing needs of this class (that is why the government does not release statistics on the social composition of the privileged new tenancy).

With the passing of the decades the Soviet middle class has risen to a somewhat higher level of education and intelligence. A quarter of a century ago Stalin and his circle could tell the nation that nearly all its Communist leaders had been foreign spies who had "sold out" to foreign secret services, and many of the middle class believed it. They were told that the culprits—the Zinovievs, Bukharins, Rykovs, and others—had confessed, and they believed this. They were told that old Russian professors had turned to wrecking, poisoning cattle, flooding coal mines, and taking measures to augment famine, and they believed this. Stalinism would have been impossible without this unique readiness of the middle class to accept uncritically what they were told.

As the new middle class began to assert itself, the spiritual level rose. Criticism was tolerated although freedom of thought was limited to certain fields of knowledge—engineering, physics, and some other sectors of science; it did not, of course, extend to history and political affairs, fields strictly controlled by the Party. It became impossible to forbid travel to and contacts with the West; it became impossible to tell student audiences that Trotsky had been a German-British spy; it became impossible to maintain the theory that war is "inevitable" and that violent revolutions are the only way to progress. These myths could now find acceptance in China (where, in fact, they have persisted for longer than they did in Russia) but not among the new generations in the Soviet Union.

Some historians and observers apply the

term "bourgeoisie" to the millions-strong class which the Communist governments and leadership consider their "intelligentsia." Whether or not the term "bourgeoisie" is appropriate,⁴ the evolution of this group over the decades—in Russia over more than forty years—and its growing influence mark one of the most important and basic developments in the history of the countries of the East.

The changes that have occurred in the Soviet Union have brought a modicum of improvement, and it might appear that this improvement will be reflected in Russia's international relations. It might appear that a better climate in Soviet-American relations may be expected to develop in the new era, that the cold war may soon end and normal relations begin to prevail.

This will not necessarily be the case. To understand the attitude of the new middle class in Russia toward foreign-political issues we must consider its relation to Party politics, its Great-Power sentiments, and its ambition to achieve superiority. We will see that, although bent on material well-being and a "no-war" course for Russia, it is too weak and too divided within itself to oppose the course of the "strong men" at the helm and paralyze their tremendous offensive dynamism.

⁴K. Marx and F. Engels, *Sochineniya (Works)* (Moscow: State Social Economic Publishing House, 1931), Col. XXIV, Part 3, p. 291.

⁵J. Stalin, Letter to Damyan Bodnyi, December 12, 1930, *Sochineniya (Works)* (Moscow: Ogiz, 1946), vol. 13, pp. 24-25.

⁶Quoted in *Politische Studien (Monatsschrift der Hochschule für Politische Wissenschaften)*, Munich, 1959, No. 116, p. 907.

"Bourgeoisie," a term derived from Marxian ideology, seems to me associated with private property, competition, class war, "big business," and so on. But the large stratum of government employees, technicians, teachers, policemen, artists, scientists, and students is a new phenomenon, and I prefer to call it a "middle class" rather than a "bourgeoisie."

*How Acton's view on "the realization of liberty"
apply to his time and ours.*

Lord Acton:

The Historian as Thinker

RICHARD M. WEAVER

REPORTING A CONVERSATION he once had with Lord Acton, James Bryce gave the following description: "He spoke...as if from some mountain summit high in air, he saw beneath him the far winding path of human progress from dim Cimmerian shores of prehistoric shadow into the fuller yet broken and fitful light of modern time." The eloquence was great; the penetration even greater. "It was as if the whole landscape of history had been suddenly lit up by a burst of sunlight." That now, after the lapse of nearly a century, Acton does not appear any less Olympian is testimony to his stature as historian and thinker.

To the work which was to make him famous Acton brought the gift of an extraordinarily cosmopolitan background. He was descended on the one side from an old Catholic family of English country squires. On the other he came from the ancient German family of Dahlbergs, whose members had been knights of the Holy Roman Empire. A branch of the English family had settled in France and later in Italy. His grandfather, John Francis Acton, so raised himself in the esteem of the Queen of Naples that he became

prime minister of that kingdom, and it was in Naples that Acton was born, in 1834. His antecedents and the course of his later life combined to make him, it has been said, an expression "of German learning, of French thought, and of British and American experience."

After an early period of schooling in France, he was sent to England, to the Catholic school at Oscott, so that he might prepare for Cambridge. But Acton was not destined to become a part of Cambridge until more than forty years later, when he was made professor of modern history at that university. Legally he could have been admitted, but anti-Catholic feeling was still high, and he was denied entrance by three of its colleges.

This failure now looks providential, since it led to a favorable turning point in his life. He decided to continue his education in Germany, and by 1850 he was in Munich, settled in the household of Dr. Johann Ignaz von Dollinger, a priest and a famous theologian and church historian of the University of Munich. Dollinger proved the person to excite his idealism and his intellectual passion. What fired the imagination of Acton, who had come

from an environment slack in comparison with this, was the enormous industry and learning of his new teacher, and the abstemious habits of life which seemed to mark these as a kind of dedication. But crowning even this was the fact that Döllinger was a leader in the Catholic Renaissance in Germany, which naturally made an immediate appeal to him because of his heritage, his own experiences, and a love of the church which never deserted him through many trials and disillusionments. Here in Munich he began the immense reading which was to make him, in the opinion of many, the most learned man of his time. One fact may convey an idea of his voracious appetite for print. During his first few weeks in Munich, he later told some one (and we may note that at this time he was sixteen years of age), he read through the fifty-five volumes of the *Biographie Universelle*.

The thing of greatest value and consequence which he learned from Döllinger was a concept of history and of what it means to be historically minded. Döllinger, along with other German scholars of his group, had become convinced that the meaning of Catholic Christianity was not to be found merely in the study of dogma and doctrine but also in the study of historical change and development. Acton was in close association with this master for the next eight years, although time was taken out for travels, which included one journey to the United States and another to Russia. Then in 1858 he returned to England, filled with determination to stir up English Catholicism.

The means he chose toward this end was magazine journalism. He was connected, either as editor or regular contributor, with four journals in succession, *The Rambler*, *The Home and Foreign Review*, *The Chronicle*, and *The North British Review*. In the course of his work for these he

wrote articles on a wide variety of historical, political, and ecclesiastical subjects, which displayed in a man still in his twenties an extraordinary sense of historical fact and a feeling for the inner impulse of movements which other historians could but treat from a distance.

Among the things which made him distinctive as an historical writer and which continue to mark him as a prophet in his own time none was more compelling than the idea of freedom. "When Acton speaks of liberty, there is always a ring in his voice," G.P. Gooch was later to write. This was the dominant focus of his thinking, an intellectual and a moral preoccupation which never ceased to influence his way of looking at events. In his view the achievement of liberty was the thread of progress to be discerned in human history. That progress was not steady; it was not without dark nights of absolutism and oppression; yet it was there, and it justified the sacrifices that compose so much of the human story. Fairly early in his career Acton projected the writing of a "History of Freedom," a work for which he above all men seemed equipped by training and by temperament to attempt. But for one reason and another—partly because of the immensity of the task and partly because of his own conscientiousness about the method of execution—the book was never produced. Even so, we can be grateful that two essays, "The History of Freedom in Antiquity" and "The History of Freedom in Christianity," were completed, for these allow us to see how he was conceiving a problem at once so universal and so intricate as the realization of liberty.

Acton's concept of liberty grew originally out of his reflections upon religion and the state. It seems characteristic that the essay on "The History of Freedom in Antiquity" should begin with this sentence: "Liberty, next to religion, has been

the motive of good deeds and the common pretext for crime, from the sowing of the seed at Athens two thousand four hundred and sixty years ago until the splendid harvest was gathered by men of our own age." Then he continued by way of further prologue: "It is the delicate fruit of a mature civilization.... In every age its progress has been beset by natural enemies, by ignorance and superstition, by the lust of conquest and the love of ease, by the strong man's craving for power, and the poor man's craving for food. At all times sincere friends of freedom have been rare, and its triumphs have been due to minorities that have prevailed by associating themselves with auxiliaries whose objects often differed from their own...." Then he went on to note that liberty is the essential condition and guardian of religion. The greatest source of danger to liberty is the state, which sometimes injures it by doing too little and at other times by doing too much.

The idea of liberty, Acton held, was born among the Israelites, whose government was a federation founded upon voluntary consent. The Hebrew prophets constantly testified that the laws, which were divine, were paramount over sinful rulers. In doing this they set up the distinction between the nation and the higher law which has been the seedbed of freedom down to our own time.

In Greece the idea of liberty was born with the reforms of Solon. Solon gave the poorer classes a voice in the election of magistrates. This change, slight though it may seem to us, contained a principle that transformed the basis of the Greek state. "It introduced the idea that a man ought to have a voice in selecting those to whose rectitude and wisdom he is compelled to trust his fortune, his family, and his life." The revolution thus inaugurated by Solon was completed by Pericles, whose reforms,

though right in essence, required a higher type of leadership than appeared after his decease.

The Romans in securing their freedom faced the same problems and went through the same experiences as the Greeks. There the struggle was between the aristocrats, who had wrested power from the kings and were determined to keep it, and the plebs, who demanded a share in it. But whereas the Greeks were able to reach their solution in a short while, the Romans required two centuries. The achievement itself, however, was much longer lasting. But in Acton's view the ancient free states had one radical defect: they were both state and church in one. Religion, morality, and politics were lumped together. The state did much for the citizen but little or nothing for the man. "What the slave was in the hands of his master," he wrote, "the citizen was in the hands of the community." It was inevitable that, lacking one vital element, the ancient governments should have collapsed into despotism. That vital element was introduced by Christianity. This was belief in the sacredness of the person and thus in a center of power distinct from the state. What the pagan philosophers in all their brilliance had not been able to do, that is, set effective barriers to the power of the state, was done in response to that injunction: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the thing that are God's." This instituted a basis of freedom upon which the world since that time has been able to build. It was to the working out of this principle that Acton turned in his second essay, "The History of Freedom in Christianity."

When the Roman Empire was subverted by Teutonic barbarians, civilization lapsed for a period of five hundred years. Yet even this catastrophe brought with it certain seeds of freedom which were destined

to grow. The barbarian invaders had lived under a tradition of freedom. Kings they had had at intervals, but sometimes these were elected and sometimes they were deposed. Their chief office was to lead the people in war. The supremacy of the popular will was in general acknowledged. These primitive peoples were rather rapidly converted to Christianity, and eventually there grew up in Europe side by side a political hierarchy and an ecclesiastical hierarchy. Out of the long struggle between the two arose the modern concept of civil liberty. This was not the object of either, as we know—and here one may recur to Acton's observation that liberty is sometimes won by minorities working with auxiliaries which have other objects in view. The historical fact was that each side called the nation to its aid in the name of liberty. "If the Church had continued to buttress the thrones of the kings whom it had anointed, or if the struggle had terminated speedily in an undivided victory, all Europe would have sunk down under a Byzantine or a Muscovite despotism." The weight of the church, especially that of the papacy, was thrown into the struggle against the indefeasibility of the right of kings. The growth of national states especially at the time of the Reformation placed liberty in jeopardy again by greatly increasing the scope of what the state thought it should do. And the trend in this direction was not arrested, in terms of political theory, until the American Revolution.

Acton was formulating these thoughts at a time when nationalism was proving the dominant force in Europe. The Italian risorgimento and the wars of unification which occurred at short intervals apart in Switzerland, in Italy, and in Germany were to show the force of the trend. An historical movement so widespread and so full of promise and of danger could hardly

escape the attention of a philosophic historian—especially of Acton, always alert to detect those developments which bore favorably or unfavorably upon his cherished ideal of freedom. Here was a case in point, for nationalist movements usually arose under the banner of freedom and independence, but whether they actually resulted in the gaining of these or in their subversion was an arguable question. As early as 1862 Acton published in *The Home and Foreign Review* a sixty-page essay on the topic of nationality. Although this was a product of his early period, it represents the main stream of his political thinking, and it has been perhaps the most widely studied of all his writings. Of special interest is the fact that it brings together his philosophy of freedom and his view of the then rampant nationalisms of Europe.

The essay opens with some general observations on revolution and reform. Practical evils often give rise to theoretical systems which are designed to cure them. These systems frequently contain large errors because they do not conceive the problem in the right way or do not provide relief of the right kind or in the right measure. Nevertheless, they may contribute something, because they point out the direction in which reform needs to move. And hence, Acton declared, "false principles which correspond with the bad as well as with the just aspirations of mankind are a normal and necessary element in the life of nations." The modern period has witnessed the appearance of three of these in particular: equality, communism, and nationality.

The French Revolution constitutes a dividing line in history, before which the modern concept of nationality did not exist. "In the old European system, the rights of nationalities were neither recognized by governments nor asserted by the

people." Frontiers were determined by the interests of ruling families. Absolutists cared only for the state and liberals only for the individual. The idea of nationality in Europe was awakened by the partition of Poland.

This event left, for the first time, a nation desiring to be united as a state—a soul wandering in search of a body, as Acton put it. The absolutist governments which had divided up Poland—Russia, Prussia, and Austria—were to encounter two hostile forces, the English spirit of liberty and the doctrines of the French Revolution. These two forces supported the nascent idea of nationality, but they did so along different paths. When the absolutist government of France was overthrown, the people needed a new principle of unity. Without this, the theory of the popular will could have broken the country into as many republics as there were communes. At this point the theory of the sovereignty of the people was used to create an idea of nationality independent of the course of history. France became a Republic One and Indivisible. This signified that no part could speak for the whole. The central power simply obeyed the whole. There was a power supreme over the state, distinct from and independent of its members. Hence there developed a concept of nationality free from all influence of history.

This was in contradiction to another concept of nationality, which maintained that certain natural and historical forces ought to determine the character and the form of the state. When the new nation of France embarked on a program of conquest, it was opposed by this second concept. Napoleon, by attacking "natural" nationality in Russia, by engendering it in Italy, and by governing in spite of it in Germany and Spain, called into being forces which were to make nationalism po-

tent throughout the nineteenth century. Those ideas and institutions which had suffered most at his hands—religion, national independence, and political liberty—all contributed to movements directed against the French Revolution. The ensuing uprisings were essentially popular in nature because the people opposed French supremacy as hostile to their freedom.

But the spirit of nationality which had emerged received a hard blow at the Congress of Vienna. The liberals of the day were interested only in liberalism in the form of French institutions, and the powers which formed the Holy Alliance were interested only in restoring absolutism. "The governments of the Holy Alliance," he wrote, "devoted themselves to suppress with equal care the revolutionary spirit by which they had been threatened and the national spirit by which they had been restored."

The revolution of 1848, though unsuccessful, promoted the idea of nationality in two ways. Austrian power was restored in Italy in a more centralized and energetic form, and this produced a feeling among the people that there was no hope of relief except through national freedom. The second way was through the restoration of the democratic principle in France. This brought in again the notion of the sovereignty of the people, and to it the idea of unity and nationality seemed essential. A nation imbued with this notion cannot allow a part of itself to be owned by another state nor can it allow itself to be divided up. "The theory of nationality, therefore, proceeds from two principles which divide the political world—from legitimacy, which ignores its claims, and from the revolution, which assures them; and for the same reason it is the chief weapon of the last against the first."

At this point a distinction emerges explicitly which has been implicit from the

beginning. Acton is here differentiating between the *theory* of nationality and the *right* of nationality. The two views correspond to the French and the English systems. The first sees the state as resting upon a unity which is in reality fictitious and which "crushes all natural rights and established liberties for the purpose of vindicating itself." It is capable of subverting governments, of oppressing minorities, of exercising what amounts to a foreign domination over lesser national elements within the state. The idea of the right of nationality, which is the English conception, recognizes that national minorities are entitled to certain liberties because, as a matter of empirical fact, they are united by language or race or geography, or culture or any combinations of these. It obeys the laws and results of history and tends toward diversity. It sees the fact of nationality as an essential but not the supreme element in determining the form of the state. This view makes possible a union of nations, and "the presence of different nations under the same sovereignty is similar in its effect to the independence of church and state."

The theory of nationality, as contrasted with the right of nationality, Acton regarded as a backward step in history. In explaining this point, he reintroduced the thought with which he started. Nationality tends to arise in opposition to something which should not have existed in the first place. It must be seen therefore as a corrective; and it must contribute to that which the theory itself condemns—the liberty of separate nationalities under one sovereign community. It is thus one of these "false ideas" or "extremes" which are able to accomplish what nothing else could accomplish. But it becomes arbitrary and subversive because it surrenders the individual will to the collective will and then makes the collective will subject to

conditions which are independent of it. What can be said for nationality is that it had a mission in the world and that in its period it worked successfully against the two forces which are the worst enemies of civil freedom, absolute monarchy and the revolution.

In a period when the peoples of Asia and Africa, of various levels of culture, are placing naïve hope in the power of nationalism to redeem them, these sober words should be full of warning, both for those who are tasting the heady wine of national independence for the first time and for those of the West who are, with seemingly equal naïveté, urging them on.

It is of special interest that Acton brought these considerations to bear upon the American crisis of 1861. He had made one visit to the United States, and he possessed a detailed knowledge of, and—what was hardly characteristic of the Englishmen of his time—a great respect for, American history. His ecumenical point of view enabled him to take the story of American sectional conflict and place it in the wider frame of French revolutionary nationalism and the ensuing movements toward unification. For Acton therefore the great debate over the nature of the American union and the Civil War was not a unique event, but part of that political spasm, if the term be permitted, which was then affecting Europe and erupting in military struggles. (Although he does not mention it, the European struggle most closely analogous with the American one in the ideologies involved and in the nature of the two alignments was the Swiss Civil War of 1847.)

Acton addressed himself to the problem in a long essay on "The Political Causes of the American Revolution," which appeared in *The Rambler* in May 1861. Although this antedates by a year the essay on nationality, it is evident that both proceeded

from the same course of thinking. By "the American Revolution" Acton meant the American Civil War, then on the verge of breaking out. His essay was a causal exposition of the forces which had made this a crisis of nationalism.

To appreciate the force of his reasoning, one should know that he had an almost unbounded admiration for the founders of the American government. He regularly spoke of them in superlatives. In political science, he declared, "there are at least six Americans on a level with the foremost Europeans." He knew in intimate detail the literature of the Constitutional Convention, which he regarded as having produced the most perfect form of democracy seen in the world. But it was admirable in a special sense which he stressed: it was "armed and vigilant less against aristocracy and monarchy than against its own weakness and excess." It was this thought that underlay his admiration for American federalism. "Whilst England was admired for the safeguards with which, in the course of many centuries, it had fortified liberty against the power of the crown, America appeared still more worthy of admiration, for the safeguards which, in the course of a single memorable year, it had set up against the power of its own sovereign people." Acton was thus clearly a constitutionalist, and he regarded the long sectional struggle which preceded the Civil War as a contest to decide whether the federal principle was going to be preserved.

He begins this essay also with a series of generalizations. It is the innate tendency of monarchy to become more free, but democracy has a similar tendency to become more arbitrary. The latter is true because power is already in the hands of those who seek to subvert and abolish the law. The real test of democracy, therefore, is whether it can remain law-abiding; that is, "whether it can adhere to the constitu-

tional limitations laid down at the beginning." "The strict principle of the sovereignty of the people," he observed, "must . . . lead to the destruction of the state that adopts it, unless it sacrifices itself by concession."

"The greatest of all modern republics has given the most complete example of the truth of this law. The dispute between absolute and limited power, between centralization and self-government, has been, like that between privilege and prerogative in England, the substance of the constitutional history of the United States. This is the argument which confers on the whole period that intervenes between the Constitution of 1787 and the election of Mr. Davis an almost epic unity." Following this comes a long series of quotations from speeches made at the Constitutional Convention. Madison, Gerry, Wilson, Hamilton, Sherman, and others are cited to show the apprehension that was felt of an unbridled democracy.

He then proceeded to trace the history of the United States through Jefferson's embargo and the Hartford Convention, through the disputes over the tariff and nullification and other issues of sectional controversy. His deepest admiration was reserved for the ideas which Calhoun introduced into this debate. The arguments of Calhoun in defense of the nullifying ordinance he pronounced "the very perfection of political truth" because they took into account "the realities of modern democracy" and "the securities of medieval freedom." He reproduced a long quotation from Calhoun's *Disquisition on Government*, describing it as "so profound and so extremely applicable to the politics of the present day that we regret we can give only a feeble notion of the argument." "Webster," he declared, "may have been the truest interpreter of the law; Calhoun was the real defender of the Union." This

judgment, which will sound very odd to some, must be understood with reference to Acton's view of a viable democracy. His approval of Calhoun centers really on one point: Calhoun had seen that the real essence of a constitution lies in its negative aspect, not in its positive one. It is more important for a constitution in a democracy to prohibit than to provide. The will of the majority would always be reaching out for more power, and unless this could be checked by some organic law, the end of liberty would come when the federal authority became the institute of the popular will instead of its barrier.

It has seemed strange to some that Acton, the great apostle of freedom, should have been a defender of Calhoun and Southern secession. But for him slavery was an unfortunate circumstance which did not touch the heart of the issue. What was being hammered out in the American quarrel was the ancient question of unrestricted power to rule. The American government, as he saw it at this time, was being destroyed by the "spurious democracy of the French Revolution," which was endeavoring to elevate simple majority rule to the status of divine right.

Running through all of these observations—the reflections on freedom, the account of nationality in modern European history, and the commentary on the course of democracy in America—is one consistent principle. It is the idea of political pluralism. Acton believed that the preservation of liberty depended on the maintenance of different centers of power, authority, and influence.* Of power Acton had a mortal distrust, and monolithic power was absolutist, whether it tried to sanctify itself by the name of church, mon-

archy, or democracy. The remark of Acton's which has been most widely quoted has to do with the evil effects of power. In an exchange of letters with Mandell Creighton, another English historian, he said: "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Accordingly the contest for liberty was one long struggle against concentration of power. That is the ground for his insistence upon a free church in a free state. It explains his defense of the Southern states in invoking the principle of secession. The United States had originally been based as a nation upon federalism, which was, in Acton's own phrase, "the supreme political principle." This principle had been eroded away in the battle of contending interests and sections until the result was the threat of a centralized democracy operating by simple majority rule—the tyrannical principle of the French Revolution. It explains his defense of those traditions, institutions, classes, corporations, and nationalities which are barriers to uniformity and centralization. "Diversity," he noted, "preserves liberty by supplying the means of organization." It explains why he was often suspicious of those movements which appeared under the claim of "rights" and were ostensibly seeking the redress of wrongs. Nationality, which had been born of a wrong done to Poland and which was the major force in ending the domination of Europe by Napoleon, became itself an irrational and domineering force, disinclined to respect rights which had a different but a real basis. Socialism and liberalism were pointed in the same direction. Setting out as programs to "liberate" people, they discovered that they were more interested in ruling them. Though Acton thought of himself as a liberal, some of his most severe strictures are directed against what he considered to be perversions of the liberal creed. "Foreign liberalism," he wrote, "demands

*This is the real meaning of his otherwise puzzling reference to "the securities of medieval freedom." The medieval world was organized into various corporate bodies with sharply defined and recognized areas of liberties.

not freedom but participation in power." And further: "No despotism is more complete than that of the modern liberals. . . . The liberal doctrine subjects the desire of freedom to the desire of power, and the more it demands a share of power, the more averse it is to exemptions from it."

Everything in Acton's thinking, therefore, tends to polarize around this conviction: absolute power is not to be trusted to any individual, institution, or form of government. The rights of minorities as centers of protest must be guaranteed. "It is bad to be oppressed by a minority, but it is worse to be oppressed by a majority." "Government by a majority is more likely to be a government of force. Government of one or a minority is not a government of force, but in spite of force, by virtue of some idea. The support makes up for the inferiority of brute strength." The ultimate principle of history is ethical, and this cannot be worked out in the absence of freedom, of which a pluralistic political organization is the only effective safeguard.

Acton's special quality as an historian arises from the depth of his insight and from his courage in making judgments. One might add that it also depends upon his recognition of a strain of tragedy in history. He was not, by the usual outward tokens, a great figure among historians. He never published a single outstanding work to make his name memorable. He was not a great narrator. Until his last few years he held no influential teaching post. He has not won and seems destined never to win a wide audience of readers as did Gibbon or Macaulay. But he has impressed posterity as having something profound to say in his own right upon the materials of history. In reading him, one encounters a reflective mind constantly casting flashes of illumination upon these materials, never deserting them long enough to go on speculative voyages, but

on the other hand probing into their meanings, philosophical and moral. It seems fitting therefore to ask finally what Acton thought about the uses of history itself.

One might begin the answer by saying that for Acton history was a lesson in pessimism—or, if that is putting it a bit too strongly, history was a solid rebuke to sanguine presumptions about the nature and the future of man. Out of this vein of feeling, he could write: "No historian thinks well of human nature." And he recorded another somber observation: "Neither paganism nor Christianity ever produced a profound political historian whose mind was not turned to gloom by contemplation of the affairs of men." Moreover, he thought there were things in history which must remain unforgivable—that is, inexcusable by an appeal to the nature of the times or to temperament or to circumstance. What then was the purpose of studying the painful and often sanguinary story?

The purpose of the study of history, according to Acton, is to heighten conscience. Reflection upon what man has done makes sharper in us that faculty by which we distinguish between good and evil. Let me suggest in this connection that the word "conscience" signifies in its root meaning something very much like recollection. To have conscience is to remember what we are and what we have been; it is a presence of knowledge to the mind which tells us what we ought and ought not do—not in the form of simple precepts, of course, but through an accumulated awareness of the past reminding us that some kinds of actions have produced good and others harm. Nothing was more repugnant to Acton's thinking than the belief that historical events are self-justifying. Even Edmund Burke, whom Acton in his early period described as "the teacher of mankind" in politics, he later became uneasy

with. Burke appealed too much to expediency. "Burke," he said, "loved to evade the arbitration of principle. He was prolific of arguments which were admirable but not decisive." Ranke also fell under his condemnation. "Ranke's dogma is impartiality," he wrote. "Ranke speaks of transactions and occurrences when it would be safe to speak of turpitude and crime." Thus history should arm conscience. The historian is not only the interpreter of the past; he is also in a sense the guardian of morality. It is his duty to trace all the currents of thought "which jointly weave the web of human history," to discern what strengths and weaknesses they possessed and to pronounce accordingly. Unless he

does this, "... history ceases to be a science, an arbiter of controversy, a guide of the Wanderer, the upholder of that moral standard which the powers of earth and religion itself tend constantly to depress. It serves where it ought to reign; and it serves the worst cause better than the purest. . . ." For Acton, nothing could take the place of the sovereignty of the developed conscience. It was this which enabled the historian to contribute something to that advancement which he believed humanity had made and possessed the power to go on making. "If the past has been an obstacle and a burden, knowledge of the past is the safest and surest emancipation."

Liberty, Equality, and Democracy

A fresh inquiry into some paradoxes of freedom.

LABIB ZUWIYYA-YAMAK

IT IS commonly argued that the problem of the relationship between liberty and equality is crucial to an adequate understanding of democracy. As posited, the argument implies to some thinkers, such as de Tocqueville, that a maximization of equality necessarily leads to a maximization of uniformity and therefore, by definitional inference, to a minimization of liberty. In this case, the argument continues, the door is left wide open for totalitarianism to be established, for individual liberty to be sacrificed for equality. As de Tocqueville puts it, "Equality awakens in men several propensities extremely dangerous to freedom." Men tend "to despise and undervalue the rights of private persons. . . . The rights of private persons among democratic nations are commonly of small importance, of recent growth, and extremely precarious; the consequence is that they are often sacrificed without regret and almost always violated without remorse."¹ But that is not all, for, continues de Tocqueville,

"the principle of equality begets two tendencies; the one leads men straight to independence and may suddenly drive them into anarchy; the other conducts them by a longer, more secret, but more certain route, to slavery."²

It is clear from the last quotation that the principle of equality is inimical to both individual and societal well-being since it leads either to anarchy or to servitude. In other words, no true democracy can obtain in a context of maximum equality. The logical conclusion of this argument is that, in order to have true democracy and thereby preserve liberty, equality must be minimized.

The defenders of equality, on the other hand, retort by asserting that unless individual differences (social, political, and economic) are absolutely minimized, democratic government cannot operate, regardless of individual freedom. Indeed, they maintain, it is this unlimited freedom of the individual which spells the doom

of democracy. For, Tawney argues, "society is divided, in its economic and social, though not necessarily in its political, relations into classes which are ends, and classes which are instruments. Like property, with which in the past it has been closely connected, liberty becomes in such circumstances the privilege of a class, not the possession of a nation."³ Thus, if only a few or even some are free, the society cannot be described as democratic.

These two arguments have been advanced in their rudimentary form by way of an introduction to the discussion which follows. The problem is no doubt crucial, not only because it is related to our understanding of democracy but indeed because it raises a fundamental issue that involves the very being of man. Democracy, to be sure, is a form of government, and as such it is only a means—as dictatorship, aristocracy, and monarchy are. What is of significance and, I like to say, of great significance, is the end that democracy or any other form of government serves. It is only when we have a clear conception of the end that a critical analysis of the different forms of government can be both meaningful and useful. Therefore, what I propose to do is to discuss the relationship of liberty and equality to democracy in the light of what I assume and also believe to be the end of man's political activity.

WE ARE involved in a problem of relationship, and the relationship between liberty and equality may be puzzling. But, we should note, the content of the puzzle is not mathematical. We seek its solution not because it gives us mental satisfaction, but because it answers a crucial and an infinitely existential human problem: the end of government or, in existential terminology, the destiny of man.

The Aristotelian dictum, *Man is by na-*

ture a political animal, is somewhat ambiguous. Its ambiguity stems from the phrase "by nature." If we say, *man is a political animal*, we are merely describing man factually. This is similar to saying that the board is made of wood or the door is open. The predicate in these statements describes the subject and tells us something about it. And while the term "political" is more emotionally charged than "made of" or "open," it still does no more than describe a state of being of man, just as "made of" and "open" describe a state of being of the board and of the door.

When we add the phrase "by nature," the ambiguity arises. Thus the statement *man is by nature a political animal* cannot have the same meaning as *man is a political animal*. For, to use a fashionable term, a new variable, which is bound to influence the meaning of the statement and our understanding of it, has been introduced into the factual description. Without getting too much involved in circumlocution I should like to refer to the statement *Man is a political animal* as being factual and to the dictum *Man is by nature a political animal* as being ethico-factual. The latter not only describes a fact but it also implies that, because of his being political, there ought to be and can be a good and just body politic. In other words, it is the duty of man, because of his nature, to seek the Good Society. Politics is, therefore, intrinsically involved in ethics.

When we speak of the body politic, we mean what Maritain calls "the order of society, even society in its highest or 'perfect' form."⁴ We must not confuse the state, which is no more than "a set of institutions combined into a topmost machine"⁵ with political society, which is both natural—i.e., required by nature—and achieved by reason. In this sense the body politic is the most "perfect" human organization because it essentially implies a rational order.

However, it is not completely self-sufficient and independent. Political society relies for its existence on the moral law. And man, though he belongs to it, also tries to transcend it by seeking the ideal. By transcending political society man transforms and changes it.

Underlying this description of political society is the belief that man belongs to two worlds—one social and finite, the other spiritual and infinite. The impetus in the finite (social-political) world comes from the participation of man in the spiritual world. The ends of human life and its values are rooted in this supraterrrestrial world and govern the actions not only of persons but also of societies. According to this conception of human existence, man (each and every man) has dignity and worth by virtue of his being created after the image of God. In other words, as far as men are persons, i.e., creatures with souls, they are equal. This is the fundamental basis of equality, that people, being essentially equal in dignity and human worth, should not be so discriminated against as to have only a few enjoy independence while the multitude suffer dependence.

This argument is often used to combat anti-egalitarian tendencies. If all people are equal in essence, if "there is neither Jew nor Greek ... neither bond nor free ... neither male nor female, for ye are all one in Christ Jesus,"⁶ why then should there be any inequality among men? If natural law considers all men to be equal why are they not equal in the eyes of positive law? The argument seems plausible, but there is actually a flaw in it. Measured against an absolute standard—God or Natural Law—men are equal in essence but not in existence. If all men obeyed God in the same way or followed the precepts of natural law in the same manner, then there would be no difference between Jew or Greek,

bond or free. But they do not. They are not equal in their achievements—and this relates to their existence not to their essence.

As long as there are goals to be achieved, men shall be equal in proportion to their achievements. If the desired end is to treat men equally, then the condition *sine qua non* for this kind of treatment is an equal degree or level of achievement. If instead of "equally" we substitute "proportionately"—namely, in proportion to their achievements—then we have indeed justified the use of "discriminatory" measures. And it seems to me we have to accept this conclusion if justice is to retain its noble meaning.

Yet there is another part to this argument. If we are going to judge people on the basis of their achievements, then they must be equipped with the same tools; they must all start the race from the same point; they must all be given the same opportunities. Again the appeal here is to a sense of justice and fairness—that only those who have started the race with equal opportunities should be treated equally on the basis of their achievements. This seems to me to be the principal tenet of egalitarianism: equal opportunities to all to develop their potentialities. Let us see how this works in society and more particularly in democratic society.

It is indeed an accepted fact that there is no place in this world for absolute equality or absolute liberty. No political movement, no matter how revolutionary it is, except possibly anarchic nihilism, demands absolute equality. This seems to indicate that absolute sameness and independence or total uniformity is neither achievable nor desirable. Even communism, egalitarian and totalitarian as it is, believes in some diversity arising from differences in achievements. Stalin once said that "whoever draws up wage scales on the principle of equality and ignores the difference be-

tween skilled and unskilled labor is at loggerheads with Marxism and Leninism. . . . Equalisation in the sphere of consumption and personal life is reactionary petty bourgeois nonsense, worthy of some primitive set of ascetics but not of a socialist society."⁷

It is clear therefore that the egalitarian ideal is not one of total uniformity and similarity, not absolute equality but a certain measure of it. The crucial question is therefore one of limits. What are the limits of the egalitarian ideal? It is not sufficient, we must insist, to say a certain measure of equality must obtain in society. We must define its substance. Here, as will be shown later, is one of the important differences between democracy and other forms of government.

Let us for a moment look at the problem in its historical setting. The egalitarian ideal, with its origins both in Stoicism and Christianity, antedates the democratic movements of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the advent of democracy marked the restatement of the egalitarian ideal. Man is born free, said Rousseau; all men are *ipso facto* essentially equal in freedom. The American Declaration of Independence proclaimed the equality of all men to be a self-evident truth. In that great age of individualism, democracy (or republicanism) was vindicating individual rights—the natural rights of all individuals against those who ruled by Divine Right. But clearly this equality that Locke and Rousseau spoke of, that the American Fathers considered self-evident, and that the French Revolution sloganized was, if anything, the old Stoic-Christian ideal in *form* only. For no sooner had the French Revolution gotten under way than the Babouvist movement was destroyed and the road was cleared for the advent of 19th century liberalism which paid lip service to equality.

Since the democratic movement of the 18th century was a reaction against absolutism, it had to emphasize liberty. Thus, according to Niebuhr, democracy is a form of social life in which both freedom and order are coexistent and maintained in some kind of dialectical relationship.⁸ He also considers it, and very rightly, a fruit of a bourgeois civilization that "was established to give the individual freedom from the traditional, cultural, social and political restraints of the feudal medieval world."⁹ This freedom was in fact the declaration of man's sovereignty over the universe, including himself. This was the substance of the tradition of the Enlightenment, which, by declaring man free, absolved him of all his sins and completely amoralized him. He was in no need of Grace or Election; his reason was to be his only guide to action. In the 19th century through the Industrial Revolution his faith was strengthened in himself and in his power to shape the world according to the dictates of his reason or, as Schopenhauer later on put it, according to his will.

Thus by emphasizing liberty the democratic movement relegated equality to the background, and the 19th century, at least until socialism became dominant, witnessed the success of the free individual. But if man's freedom is his "right to stand on his own feet, to face problems by himself, and to use his own reason to find his way,"¹⁰ in practice and through the doctrine of *laissez-faire*, this came to mean that some were more free than others and therefore not their equals. *Laissez-faire* was therefore the negation of the egalitarian ideal of the American and French revolutions. Politically it came to mean in fact the freedom to manipulate one's fellow citizens. Economically it emphasized man's absolute freedom (except as limited by the laws of competition) to do as he pleased.

So we notice that the trend after the French Revolution went in the direction of emphasizing the ideal of freedom, and the two values liberty and equality became worlds apart. Socialism could thus be interpreted as representing the swing of the social (ethical) pendulum in the direction of equality.

The foregoing discussion suggests that liberty and equality are mutually exclusive and that a maximization of one necessarily requires a minimization of the other. But is this really—existentially—the case? Before we answer this question, let us by way of reformulating it give a rapid survey of the history of man's freedom.

In the pre-Christian era (i.e. prior to the Judaeo-Christian tradition) man was not free in any positive sense because not only he but also the gods were governed by their Fates. Hegel would say that in such periods—and he refers particularly to the Oriental empires—only one man, the king, was free. Then with the advent of Christianity (and indeed all revealed religion) man became free, for he could then choose between salvation through faith and obedience of the law, or damnation. This, however, was the main doctrine of the Middle Ages. But the Reformers, and particularly Calvin, had an utterly different point of view. Man was not free, they proclaimed. His salvation was not dependent upon his belief in God only. He was declared powerless and deprived. His salvation could result only through Divine Grace, which would befall a few—the chosen.

The 18th century, after casting away religion, declared man to be free and rational, and therefore capable of knowing his own good and of seeking and achieving it. But the 19th century, though characterized as the century of progress, reversed the judgment of the previous century. Man was declared again to be not free. He was a product of his environment and condi-

tioned by his heredity. Knowledge of the environment alone would not free man in the sense of the 18th century tradition. But such knowledge was necessary in order for man to live. His freedom would then consist in acting according to the necessary laws of the environment. Nineteenth century man, therefore, could not be a free moral agent. The evil in society was the product of environmental conditions, not of man's transgressions. Change the environment, Owen would say, and you would change man. Once the inexorable laws of the dialectics were known (and obeyed), a Marxist would intone, society would be free. In fact Engels defined freedom as "control over ourselves and over external nature which is founded on knowledge of natural necessity."¹¹

This historical survey of man's freedom points out one very important fact: man's existential involvement in freedom. Without prejudicing my argument I would venture to say that the case has not been the same with regard to equality. Man is more preoccupied with the problem of freedom because his whole ethics depends upon it, and also his ideal of equality. Let us put it this way. Ethically egalitarianism is an extension of the sphere of liberty, so that not only a few but all—or nearly all—can be free.

Now let us return to our original question. Are liberty and equality mutually exclusive? Is a democratic society free but not equal or equal but not free? In order to answer these questions adequately we need first of all to answer another question, namely, what is the nature of man? For every political theory is in the final analysis a theory about human existence.

Man is a social being by nature. This we have defined as meaning not only that he lives in society (as when we say that man is gregarious) but that he seeks society and communion with others. This is his

nature, i.e., his essence. Thus society is not a product of human will and the outcome of a contract between sovereign individuals, but it is a natural state of existence into which man is born and through which he develops his potentialities. The body politic is the temporal world of existence where "every individual person bears the same relationship to the whole community as the part bears to the whole."¹² The rights that accrue to man in society derive from his dignity and worth as a rational being created by God and destined to God. He therefore belongs to two worlds, a temporal and an eternal. It is by virtue of his belonging to the latter that the ideals of freedom and equality have any meaning and substance.

As a social being man "aspires naturally to social life" as a "whole which seeks to be united to other wholes in spiritual exchanges of intellect and will."¹³ It is therefore natural for society to seek a common good. But the common good with its values and ideals is not a product of society in the sense that its values are terrestrial or rooted in society itself. On the contrary, these values are rooted in God. Contrary to what Sartre maintains, man does not create his own values, in the sense that he causes them to exist. He actualizes them by infusing his actions with them. But these values, we must emphasize again, are not self-subsistent as Plato maintained, but rather depend for their existence on God and for their articulation on man. In other words they belong to an order which is beyond society, but one which governs the actions of persons and society.

Thus man as a social being does not exist in society only but seeks the good society. This is very natural since, being what he is, he seeks the ends which his nature demands. In political terms these ends express the common good. Therefore in seeking the common good each person

will be seeking those ends which his nature demands, and which make him human.¹⁴

No man can alone express the common good, not even if he embodies the general will. If, however, for the sake of argument, it is assumed that one person can legislate and decide for the whole community rather than have the community arrive by a long and strenuous process of deliberation and discussion at an interpretation of the common good, this should not be allowed to get established. I say should not be allowed because each individual ought to bear the responsibility for his own actions. His cross is his own. This is the essential realm of freedom; once abdicated the result is tyranny.

One further point needs to be added here, and that is that the common good as an ideal to be striven for is to be taken for granted, not to be questioned and scientifically defined. To quote Hallowell, "Politics is the art of the possible not a science of perfection."¹⁵ Therefore, the significance of public debate and deliberation is in reality the choice of means for the achievement of the common good. But as the common good is fundamentally moral, since it refers to the essential potentialities of man as defined in this essay, the means for its realization must likewise be moral. Deliberation, it must be emphasized, does not create the common good; it only brings it about. For in the realm of human activity there is no creation *ex nihilo*. Depending upon the degree of his moral awareness, man gives content to the ideal.

Now let us examine the values of liberty and equality more closely. Their history shows very clearly that they are ethical ideals for which men have striven, fought, and died. They could not have exhorted man to struggle for their achievement if they had been sheer abstractions or mental constructs and if they had had no reference to human existence. The human involve-

ment in their realization is therefore existential. Not even socialism could be excluded from the implications of this statement. Scientific as Marx was, he was also a moralist. To be sure, he was interested not in reforming the social conditions but in changing them. But for what purpose, we may ask. And the answer is: in order to put an end to the exploitation of the many by the few, of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie; in order that men could live as they ought to live in a society whose law is "from each according to his ability to each according to his need."

However, though liberty and equality are not abstract values, it does not follow that they are empirically measurable. Indeed, the most superficial observation can lead us to the conclusion that men are unequal and not free. And such observations have been made long before the scientific method came into its own. Certainly men are not equal physically and psychologically, nor are they free if freedom means only the absence of constraint. Nevertheless the whole history of man could be written around these two ideals. Is not the socialist ideal to free the proletariat (the people) from bondage (the class-structured society) in order that they may enjoy liberty in a classless society? How about the Stoic and Christian ideal of the brotherhood of men? The French ideal of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, or the American ideal as embodied in the Declaration of Independence? None of them when stipulated was empirically verified. But can we deny their effectiveness or the fact that they have been and will continue to be operative? The question is: given the empirical fact of inequality and the relative absence of freedom, what happens to the absoluteness of these ideals? Is it a mere fantasy? The answer is most emphatically *No*.

Liberty and equality, especially the latter, "cannot be appraised" as Johnson

says, "in factual terms at all, but must be regarded as an ethical imperative."¹⁶ They must be looked at as values whose content is continually replenished by relevant substance reflecting the degree of the moral awareness of man. Neither equality nor liberty should mean the absence of inequalities or constraint. Only a naïve philosophy will define values, particularly these two values, in terms of their negations. Any doctrine of equality which rules out excellence is contrary to the history of man and civilization.

But in order that excellence may not be judged arbitrarily, some measure of equality of treatment and opportunity should be allowed. For differences in achievement, it must be noted, do not result from differences in religion, race, or color. Thus when we emphasize equality of educational opportunity, for instance, we do not do so in the interest of absolute uniformity, but rather in the interest of inequality of achievement above a certain level. Equality, therefore, actually makes for inequality; but it is the desired inequality without which no cultural development is possible.

It is only as "ethical imperatives" that equality and liberty can have any influence on the conduct of human life. Without these "ethical imperatives" it may be extremely difficult if not altogether impossible to explain social change. For social change is a function of human activity which is motivated by new interpretations of the imperative ideals. Values are existential not abstract. Though they exist beyond society, they find their realization in society. Man is impelled to action by them. He interprets them, but he does not create them.

Equality is not similarity or sameness, nor is liberty license or irresponsibility. If we emphasize the undifferentiatedness and similarities among men, then we are undermining the basis of democracy and paving the way for the advent of totalitarian-

ism. For in order to neutralize the effect of differences, society will have to become more centralized. As de Tocqueville put it, "In democratic communities the rule is that centralization must increase in proportion as the sovereign is less aristocratic."¹⁷ One hundred years later Harold Laski said the same thing but meant something else. "The basis of democratic development is . . . the demand that the system of power be erected upon the similarities and not the differences between men."¹⁸ The difference between the two views is obvious: Laski's ideal maximizes standardization; that of de Tocqueville minimizes it.

In its present setting the problem is the following: If democracy means the rule of the people through representative government and the majority principle, the egalitarian ideal cannot but represent the equal rights of the people to dissent. The moment it denies a minority—no matter how small it is—the right to be heard and to have its share in interpreting the common good and becoming a majority, the egalitarian ideal becomes at war with itself. For it will then be abridging the equal rights of the minority. The egalitarian ideal would be a sham if it did not maintain that all men are equally free and have a right to seek and interpret the common good.

Man's freedom is not his power to do whatever he wants. For he does not exist in a vacuum. He exists in and belongs to society, and it is in it that his personality flourishes. But both he and society pertain ethically to a higher order which governs their actions. Society is not an end in itself; it is only a means to satisfy man's craving for the other—a craving which stems from the very spiritual nature of man. Each man seeks the other; therefore each man seeks the whole of society. This is what Maritain calls "personalistic society." It differs from the so-called liberal individual type in that there is no contradic-

tion between it and the person. It exists for him, and he exists in it. Liberal individualism creates a society which is subservient to the individual because he is free to do as he pleases. Marxism, on the other hand, creates a society that reduces the individual to a state of utter servility. The former makes of the individual a little god, the latter hardly pays attention to him.¹⁹

But as a little god man is responsible to himself only. He recognizes no authority above his own reason. Even the common good has no meaning outside of his will and intellect. He becomes the source of all values and the measure of all things. And so we may ask: What happens to society? What is left of it? And with Camus we answer, "If this world has no higher meaning, if man is only responsible to man, it suffices for man to remove one single human being from the society of the living to automatically exclude himself from it."²⁰

Moreover, to the individual who is a little god equality means independence. If each man is free, then all men are equal—but only in so far as freedom means absence of constraint, namely, freedom *from*. But is all freedom negative? Is there not a positive and more enduring content—a freedom *to* or a freedom *for*? Freedom from hunger is necessary because hunger negates life. But freedom from hunger is not sufficient; it is not an end in itself. Certainly man's existence requires food. But man eats in order to live; he does not exist in order to eat. Equality in terms of the material conditions of life is no doubt necessary, along with political, social, and legal equalities, but only so far as they make for inequalities of achievement. Otherwise, if standardization and undifferentiation are maximized, these equalities would stifle liberty and lead to totalitarianism.

Deliberation in a democracy should be founded on the belief that the equal dignity of all men precludes the majority from

"compelling the minority to be free," i.e., to conform. This is possible only if the belief system of the society is such that its roots are in a transcendent realm. If this realm is denied, freedom and equality become a function of caprice and independence. Or as Polanyi says, "When the spiritual foundations of all freely dedicated human activities...are summarily denied, then the State becomes, of necessity, inheritor to all ultimate devotion of men. If truth is not real and absolute, then it may seem proper that the public authorities should decide what should be called the truth."²¹

If all man needs is bread and peace, as the Grand Inquisitor claims, then he needs a totalitarian institution that relieves him from the anguish of being himself. But the irony of the legend of the Grand Inquisitor lies in the fact that the totalitarian master is an answer to man's craving for the absolute. "So long as man remains free," says the Grand Inquisitor, "he strives for nothing so incessantly and so painfully as to find someone to worship For the secret of man's being is not only to live but to have something to live for."²² Rooted in the human order, the "absolute" will inevitably be totalitarian and relative. Man's dignity will be defined each time the question is raised. It is only when the "absolute" is transcendent that human dignity has any meaning or value.

Earlier we spoke of the limits of the egalitarian and libertarian ideals. How are these limits established? First of all, it should be noted that the limit does not refer to a golden mean. For by definition a golden mean is a point equidistant from the two poles and is necessarily static. The realm of values is not static but dynamic. The values in their inter- as well as intra-relationships are hierarchical and dialectical. The hierarchy is one of ascendance and the dialectic is one of end-means relation-

ship. Thus in the realm of the social, i.e., in the body politic, we agree with Niebuhr that "there is no moral value which may be regarded as absolute Every action resolves a certain competition between values, in which one value must be subordinated to another."²³

As the articulation of the common good is dependent upon deliberation, which presupposes free discussion and all the rights—political and economic—attendant to it, the problem of limits stems therefore from the realization of certain existential needs of the community. Translated into practical institutional form, this realization is reflected in the rule of the majority. But in setting the limits of liberty and equality the majority does not set absolute limits. On the contrary, these limits are dynamic and shift as new conquests in the spheres of liberty and equality are made.

It is only in this existential-dialectical relationship that the ideals of liberty and equality are compatible. Only when equality does not preclude inequality and liberty is not only freedom *from* are the two values compatible. If, however, we let our social thinking be determined by what Kierkegaard calls the Law of Large Numbers, then the sphere of individual liberty in the sense of freedom *for* will be contracted, and mass society—egalitarian (but only in a superficial sense) and unfree—will prevail. Government will be merely by number, and the mass will determine truth.

"Politics is not religion," says Camus, "or if it is, then it is nothing but the Inquisition. How would society define an absolute? Perhaps everyone is looking for this absolute on behalf of all. But society and politics only have the responsibility of arranging everyone's affairs so that each will have the leisure and freedom to pursue this common search."²⁴ It is important to note that Camus asks for a definition, not the

creation of the absolute; for an interpretation that is the task of all society, not just of the majority.

It is a truism that man is imperfect, that evil is rampant in human society, and that justice is not done on earth. Classical religion—most certainly Christianity—is criticized for promising a better world but doing nothing about this one. This demands faith from the people. "But," Camus goes on to say, "suffering exhausts hope and faith and then is left alone and unexplained. The toiling masses, worn out with suffering and death, are masses without God."²⁵ But if they are without God, it is not because He has deserted them but because they have followed the Grand Inquisitor who promises them bread and peace at the expense of their freedom. And here let us ask this question: What philosophy of life offers man immediate rewards? Is not even dialectical materialism futuristic? Does it not demand faith and sacrifice?

Democracy is not only a form of government; it is also a system of social ethics. It is not just representative government, or government *by* the people, but also and more importantly government *for* the people. Equality and liberty as "imperative ideals" should keep the body politic dynamic. And the minority viewpoint, while it must not be extended as a compulsory measure to all, should be denied to no one.²⁶

To be operative, the ideals of democracy should be rooted in the spiritual order. For if God is dead, as Nietzsche says, and everything is permitted, then man will become the measure of all things. And man here means either the individual or society. If it is the former, the result is anarchy—*bellum omnium contra omnes*. If it is the latter, the individual loses any dignity that is otherwise intrinsic to him. He becomes a servant of the Leviathan, a mere unit, and indeed an automaton. In either case,

not only democratic government is ruled out, but the whole of life becomes unbearable. If God is dead, not only everything is permitted, but—and more importantly—everything is lost.

¹Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Vintage Edition; New York: Knopf, 1954), Vol. 2, pp. 343-45.

²*Ibid.*

³R. H. Tawney, *Equality* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1939), p. 224.

⁴Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (Phoenix Edition; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 9.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁶*Galatians* III:28.

⁷As quoted in D. Thomson, *Equality* (Cambridge: University Press, 1949), p. 8.

⁸Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York: Scribner's, 1944), p. 1.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁰Massimo Salvadori, *Liberal Democracy* (New York: Doubleday, 1957), p. 42.

¹¹Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, tr. by Emile Burns and ed. by C. P. Dutt (London: Martin Lawrence, 1934), p. 128.

¹²Maritain, *The Rights of Man* (London: Centenary Press, 1945), p. 11.

¹³*Ibid.*, *Freedom in the Modern World* (New York: Scribner's, 1936), p. 49.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, *Man and the State*, pp. 84-94.

¹⁵John H. Hallowell, *The Moral Foundation of Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 108.

¹⁶F. Ernest Johnson, "The Concept of Human Equality," *Aspects of Human Freedom*, A symposium by the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, Vol. 15 (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 25.

¹⁷de Tocqueville, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

¹⁸Quoted by Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹⁹Maritain, *Man and the State*, pp. 76-107.

²⁰Albert Camus, *The Rebel* (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 281.

²¹Michael Polanyi, *The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 47.

²²F. Dostoevski, *The Brothers Karamazov*, tr. by Constance Garnett (New York: The Modern Library, 1937), pp. 263-64.

²³Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Scribner's, 1941), p. 174.

²⁴Camus, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶David Spitz, *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1949), p. 253.

Man of destiny or of an interlude?

De Gaulle: A Portrait of the General

THOMAS MOLNAR

FOR TWENTY YEARS, in the eyes of the world, General de Gaulle has dominated public life in France, either by his presence or his absence, his activity or his retirement, as a consecrated or a clandestine leader. His big frame and his stature as leader and statesman have, in a very real sense, covered France like a huge screen, to the point where his figure somehow coalesced with the nation for good and for evil.

Yet this almost mystical union of de Gaulle and France, "the Madonna in the frescoes," is compatible with the essential aloofness of the man who, even as a public figure par excellence and charismatic hero, gives the impression of carving his personality and role into a monument *aere perennius*, beyond the existence and destiny of his nation. While he bears this destiny "as the hair shirt which tears the penitent at each step," the elaborately ex-

plained mission, assumed in broad daylight, creates a certain *malaise* in those who are invited to admire it. A condisciple of de Gaulle at the *Ecole de Guerre*, General Chauvin, recalls¹ that one day as he predicted to his tall and taciturn friend the great things he was to accomplish, the latter answered, while "his eyes were fixed on the far horizon": "Yes, you are right. I too foresee them." And this astonishing remark to a friend in 1929: "In a few years they will beg me to save the land."

What did Captain de Gaulle foresee as his destiny and mission? In the twenties, amidst a victorious nation but one demoralized by the awareness of its losses, the young officer, disciple of Charles Maurras, could only dream of France's restored grandeur, a regeneration through sacrifice. This was the central idea of his generation; and although divided, as their elders, between Right and Left, there was a rather large platform on which they could stand together. The young men of the twenties and early thirties, until Mussolini's Abyssinian campaign and the Spanish Civil War, shared many ideas inspired by revolutionary mystique, whether socialist or royalist. Malraux, Simone Weil, Paul Nizan were sustained by faith in a regenerated society, classless and fraternal; those whom a young philosopher calls today "fascist romantics,"²—Drieu, Céline, Brasillach—were nostalgic for refined forms of life and common ideals for the nation, and proposed to reroot the drifting proletariat.

Harsh events were soon to separate this generation which at least had the intention of healing the old wounds. Half-finished, hasty documents survive to illustrate this will of reconciliation, as for example the exchange of letters between Simone Weil and Georges Bernanos. But with confusion increasing, the conviction also grew that only a clear-cut decision, a reorganized

new élite, could save France and western civilization.

De Gaulle was obsessed with the same idea, and since he was a soldier, he thought of the army as the natural leadership body of the nation. The style in which he expressed this thought is characteristic of the man: "Into what mad and irresponsible hands might force not fall," he asked in *The Edge of the Sword*, "if its control were relinquished by a wise and highly trained directorate?" Characteristic too is the anecdote reported by General Chauvin: at the War College the young captain was one day instructed to take the (theoretical) command of an army corps. Asked by the colonel-professor to give some detail about his supply line, de Gaulle ordered his chief of staff to offer the information. "But it is you I am asking," remarked the colonel. "Sir," replied the young officer, "my responsibilities are those of an army corps commander. If I had to assume the tasks of my subordinates too, my mind would not be free to accomplish my mission." And turning once again to his chief of staff: "Answer the colonel!" he ordered.

The de Gaulle of wartime London and Algiers, the provisional prime minister of 1944-46, and the providential leader of 1958 is fully painted in this attitude, in this firmness. But in a way his drama is also inscribed in it.

Not that he does not assume loneliness and incomprehension as part of his sense of grandeur, personal and national. It is well known that he even cultivates them consciously: "When faced with the challenge of events," he wrote, "the man of character has recourse to himself. . . . He is inevitably aloof, for there can be no authority without prestige, nor prestige unless he keeps his distance. . . . The man of character draws to himself the hopes and the wills of everyone as the magnet draws

iron. . . . On the other hand, the knowledge that the lesser men have confidence in him exalts the man of character. . . . He is a born protector." Elsewhere he calls this confrontation with danger, responsibility, history "the divine sport of the hero."

Thus de Gaulle has always foreseen the incomprehension that will surround him, and when he stepped on the plane which took him to London where he was to make the proclamation of June eighteen and undertake the titanic task of organizing the Free French, he merely acted on what he had long considered his calling. But we have seen that in his conception the leader's aloofness, the prestige-with-mystery, draws a necessary nourishment from those who put their confidence in him, who supply the material, the human means, by which he "achieves great ends" and "leaves his mark upon events."

It is noteworthy that each time de Gaulle was raised to the pinnacle of power (never a second role), he sought for the public acclaim, the communion with the masses, the warmth of the crowds. Let us observe that he never had to clear, one by one, the steps of leadership: from an almost obscure colonel, appreciated by prime ministers Léon Blum and Paul Reynaud but otherwise shunned by military and civilian authorities alike, he was made general and secretary of defense (in the last days before the collapse); in London, although he had to start again and impose himself on French refugees and on a skeptical Churchill, he became at once the only uncontested rallying point; and in May 1958 he had only to step into an overripe situation prepared for him by others. All the way, from 1940 to 1960, from the first inspection of the troops in England to the presidential visits in Algeria and the periodic tours through the French provinces, he has been surrounded by hands reaching out to

touch him like a medieval king; and he willingly leaves the circle of officials and aides to plunge amidst the people and spread his magic.

On these occasions de Gaulle seeks the roots of his power. For this man who has such exalted notions of country, nation, history, and a strong State, who castigated the Third and Fourth Republics for allowing "a long disease" to rob the *patrie* of its "vital forces," this man has always lacked the consecration of continuity and the legal passing of power into his hands. Like Napoleon, he seems to want, beyond the exalted role of savior, the comfort of legitimacy. Did he not exclaim recently, addressing the Algerian rebels behind their barricades: "It is I who have incarnated legitimacy for the past twenty years!" The exaggeration reveals the still unfulfilled desire.

For like Napoleon (and Caesar), de Gaulle is a popular tribune. Like Napoleon, he despises the ideologues and intellectuals who form the political class in France, the "princes who govern," as Michel Debré has put it. But in contrast to Napoleon, de Gaulle carries in himself the wound of having broken one, for him sacred, continuity: the discipline of the army.

Let us make no mistake: in 1940 it was not he but Marshal Pétain whom people acclaimed as the father of the nation, not only a legendary military leader but a self-denying one who decided to remain on French soil as a peasant would, unable to tear himself away from the land. Even in 1942 Churchill spoke of the "Marshal's mystical authority" in France. In contrast, hardly known de Gaulle who, in addition, had served for many years under Pétain, was a rebel, a challenger of hierarchy and order, a trouble maker. Can a soldier of de Gaulle's stern standards forget this act of rebellion, this immense risk involving not only his unbroken record of loyalty,

but all France? Was it not, at the time, an incitement to further divide an already divided and occupied country?

In the face of this personal and national *déchirement*, de Gaulle had to elevate his cause to unattainable spheres, to fight one "mystique" with another. It is known that once, in President Roosevelt's presence, de Gaulle compared his mission to that of Joan of Arc. But, striking as this image is, has it been accepted by his compatriots, so conscious of their history and its parallel situations? This summer a *chansonnier* in one of Paris' political cabarets undertook to compare the Maiden of Orléans and Charles de Gaulle; the subject lends itself to obvious irony and in such cases the living always suffer; but from this and other chansons (by which one may measure the popularity of public figures in Latin countries) and a number of uniformly hostile books, one can deduce that many Frenchmen consider themselves victims of a long mystification. As the entertainer explained, the only similarity between Joan of Arc and de Gaulle is that both guarded a herd of sheep—and in the General's case this was clearly a reference to the way he governs his compatriots.

All this indicates that there are deep cracks under the iceblock of de Gaulle's haughty leadership, since entire segments of the nation have never accepted it, or accepted it only in the absence of something else. This situation would be normal from the point of view of a leader willing to lean on a majority; but de Gaulle is a man of absolutes, he insists on drawing his authority from the totality of the nation, otherwise he rejects it altogether. Thus the man who is admired for his monolithic grandeur and for his grand designs which strike the imagination has suffered from equally vast failures, so vast in fact that he may become one day the tragic hero of history books.

I stress this isolation of General de Gaulle as a significant phenomenon because, among other consequences, it affects his political judgment. Wrapped in the cloak of his sense of mission and dedication, he often appears to confuse the milestones of history with the yardstick of concrete politics. Or, as a critic, Alfred Fabre-Luce, has written, "the artist and prophet win out over the statesman." Hence the ambiguity of his pronouncements and actions, conceived as immense syntheses, which disintegrate when confronted with the real world. Many Frenchmen admire him not for what he does but for what he is; *c'est un grand bonhomme!* they say, but would be at a loss if they were asked to detail this statement.

The portrait of the General is, nonetheless, easy to sketch, that is if we are not concentrating on the power, style, and dimensions but reach also for the contradictions in his character and career. We have before us a man supremely confident in himself who, according to General Chauvin's testimony, "struck people by his faculty of having examined all problems and knowing all the answers." But it is equally true, and is borne out by other witnesses, that de Gaulle literally wrestles with the problems presented to him, that he is a grave and attentive listener and a man of no superficial judgments.

His convictions lie very deep, nourished by long meditations and by a kind of communion with the nature of things; his statements at press conferences, for all their Olympian setting and skilled stage direction, reach for the heart and mind of the journalists—a most difficult public—and move what is best in them. They may disagree; but while in the General's presence, they are aware of a powerful mind communicating to them the profounder aspects of life.

Yet de Gaulle has an empirical mind and an almost pragmatic, intuitive approach to things. His collaborators have noted the element of improvisation in his reactions, the quick weighing and espousal of solutions presented to him, his capacity to extract the usable from various contradictory proposals. In this big frame a mobile mind stirs restlessly, one that seems to find delight in unorthodox means to reach long-prepared ends. He combines cunning and tenacity as when he ejected his rival, General Giraud, from the position of power where the latter had the sympathy of the army and the backing of Roosevelt. This is what prompts his critic, Fabre-Luce, to say of him that "it is always hard to distinguish in de Gaulle the impulsiveness from the Machiavellism. It often happens that what the first begins is continued and exploited by the second."³

Once his mind is made up, there is no power to move him; but in order to make up his mind, even when this appears to happen suddenly, in reality a long process of weighing the factors has preceded it; not until all fragments of the puzzle are in place is the General's decision made known.

Take the famous press conferences. Everything is organized like a ceremony, with liturgical precision and in such a way that the Actor should have the full benefit of the performance. As the clock strikes, he enters, dominating everything and everybody shoulder-high, courteous like a *grand seigneur*, with the gestures of one used to command. With all that, businesslike and matter-of-fact. The words and phrases begin immediately to flow and carry the sweeping historical perspectives which transform the glittering grand salon into a place of encounter with the march of human events. The voice is deep, majestic, yet modulated like that of a fine

instrument, the gestures accompanying it as it descends or surges always in pleasing harmony.

It is like chamber music; the voice, the hands, the movements of the head in perfect orchestration. Irony, pity, encouragement, attack, regret, heart-to-heart talk, sobering statistics follow with precise timing, underscored by soothingly balanced sentences. One feels in the air the suspended breaths of the audience as the long periphrases, with their subordinate clauses and inserted exclamations, roll towards their well-deserved periods. Now the breaths are released, one would like to applaud. With a last incisive formula the General has disappeared behind the red velvet curtain.

DE GAULLE STANDS before us as a figure carved of one block of marble, yet with some disturbing and deep cracks revealed by the quickened pace of history in our time as it surprises and shakes even the steadiest of men. We shall examine these cracks, the more significant as they appear in a leader who holds a position of unique authority and arbitration and who twice in twenty years took France, Atlas-like, on his shoulders.

We have also before us a soldier whose career has run its course *outside, above, and against* the military order and the military class, who twice claimed to have *understood* his comrades and twice had to follow a road different from theirs.

Finally, de Gaulle appears to many as the natural representative of tradition and rightist background, a monarch who liberates and reassembles the land, and imposes peace on rival factions; this image, however, is doubled—if not replaced—by that of an enigmatic demigod who sanctions the old routine by his prestige and uses secrecy, silence, and "immobility" to reduce his opponents. Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote of him: "General de

Gaulle alienates those who are in contact with him and inspires others who do not know him."

There are two statements made by de Gaulle to two magazine editors which shed light on his attitude in the last ten years. At the time when he was organizing, or rather approving the organization of the RPF (*Rassemblement du Peuple Français*), he told a leftist intellectual known to him from the days of the Resistance: "Why don't you join us, D? You well know that I am the only revolutionary in France!" Ten years later, explaining his Algerian policy to a rightist intellectual, editorialist of a political weekly who was among the organizers of his return to power, he said, with a tone of resignation: "Dear S, if I were only ten years younger I would tread with more circumspection with regard to Algeria and Africa. But time presses and I must leave France freed of her present difficulties."

Is there a plan, a will behind these remarks, which inform de Gaulle's actions on the controversial and tragic issues now facing his country?

We have mentioned earlier that from the point of view of the average Frenchman—and army officer—in 1940-41, there could be no comparison between the prestige of Pétain and de Gaulle. The victor of Verdun, in spite of Laval's tortuous collaborationist policy, was, in the nation's eyes, above the conflict, above the whole miserable situation; facing him, de Gaulle was, politically, a prisoner of the British, surrounded by doubtful elements, among them also communists. In 1942 the following report was made to the State Department by American services in France: ninety-five per cent of the French are against Hitler, but ninety-five per cent of this ninety-five per cent are not Gaullist and would refuse to follow the General.

The French Empire was, of course, the

plaything of German, Italian, and Japanese interests, and the Vichy government commanded a vanishing loyalty in these territories; and, in fact, it was de Gaulle who first rallied parts of Africa and the islands off the American coast, thus reinforcing French administration and forestalling the centrifugal tendency. Yet, it was also the General who, in his Brazzaville speech of 1943, set the tone for the coming disintegration of the system while still referring to the indestructible unity of the Empire.

As he notes in the third volume of his *Mémoires*, "the new age will mark the independence of the colonial countries of Africa and Asia The West must understand this trend and even promote it."⁴ And: "The policy of France consists in bringing each of these [black] peoples to a degree of development where they will be able first to administer, later to govern themselves."⁵ Leopold Senghor of Senegal called him "the principal artisan of decolonization."

These were statements heavy with consequences, particularly as other declarations accompanied them referring to "structural changes in postwar French society" which was invited to confirm these "revolutionary transformations" by its votes. Nor were these just pious words: the postwar de Gaulle government worked out major nationalizations in heavy industry, banking, utilities, and transportation. As Robert C. Doty wrote in the *New York Times*, "although French liberals and Leftists still consider him to be a man of the Right, on performance, by American standards, de Gaulle would be well to the Left of Franklin D. Roosevelt."⁶ Thus General de Gaulle appeared to the conservative majority of French society as either a revolutionist or a dupe of his environment, "the men of London and Algiers" to whom the intention of turning

France into a people's democracy was freely attributed.

It may be said that the first "Gaullist" regime ended in failure (January 1946) for two reasons: one was that the routine-loving political class was unable and unwilling to think and act outside the constituted party lines which were repulsive to de Gaulle's personality and convictions; the other was the passive resistance and political resignation of the conservative forces, now collectively accused of Vichyite sympathies and neutralized on that account. Yet these forces held the balance of the future, by their number and the place they traditionally occupied. As M. René Rémond rightly points out, in France during this period (1935-1945), there were only a handful of fascists, a small minority of reactionaries, and an immense majority of conservatives.⁷ Nobody could govern against the lack of confidence of the last category, which was apprehensive about a de-Gaulle-sponsored adventurous policy.

When the General withdrew and laid down his burden as prime minister, he left behind him the image of a strong personality but one whose ideological position had to be guessed.⁸ This is not necessarily a good recommendation in French public life, not even in the eyes of the army. As mentioned before, de Gaulle purposely cultivated the secrecy that surrounded him, although he took openly nationalistic positions on various issues such as German rearmament, European military integration, and the Common Market.

The brief interruption of his secluded life at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises in order to rally the French people showed him that the conservative forces would eventually back his return to power and that he was considered, if reinforced by the solidly conservative Pinay, the only hope of breaking the "immobilism" of the Fourth Republic. Thus he was thrust into a po-

sition where perhaps he could have executed a coup d'état in favor of large sections of the population, but would not have been able to fulfill his aspiration as an arbiter of the whole nation. He was waiting, as usual, for the last moment when only a heroic intervention might turn the tide of events. His position resembled that of General Boulanger some sixty odd years before.

That he did not accept the role prepared for him had, very probably, other causes as well. The fate of "rightist" organizations in France seems to be an early disintegration. It is in the essence of rightist political philosophy to distrust the phenomenon that is the modern political party with its directing apparatus, ideological commitment, and discipline. In the eyes of rightist thinkers nothing less than the entire nation should be inspired, shaped, called upon to perform glorious tasks. In this sense de Gaulle is true to his background: he despises parties, party work, ideological provincialism; but by remaining aloof from the servitudes of a modern party leader, he indirectly encourages his lieutenants to compete, set up factions, and otherwise destroy the organization. This happened in the case of the RPF, and is happening these days with the "Gaullist" UNR (Union pour la Nouvelle République).

The deeper cause for the failure of de Gaulle's brief political reappearance in the late forties was his refusal to be—and to be considered—the representative of the Right, in the given circumstances, of the conservative bourgeoisie, the strong man who imposes himself on the nation. In this light his earlier quoted words begin to acquire a fuller meaning: de Gaulle, *temperamentally* a monarch, an absolute ruler, an authoritarian, has shifted *ideologically* to a position that one might call, if the term is used with care, leftist.

I say the term must be used with care, and when it is used at all the French realities must be kept in mind. The following passage from *Le Salut* would, at first sight, refute any such assumption. Speaking of the State, de Gaulle writes: "It is necessary that the State have a head, a leader, in whom the nation might see, above the flux of events, the man in charge of the essential tasks and guarantor of its destiny. It is also necessary that the executive power whose duty is to serve exclusively the community, should not have its responsibility transmitted to it by parliament which is the expression of particular interests."⁹ In practice, however, de Gaulle bypasses most of the constituted bodies of the nation, and on important issues likes to resort to referenda and to the informal plebiscite of popular acclaim. In fact, he is ready to take no account of such collective manifestations either, and was the first to ignore the new constitution according to which he had no right to grant independence to the nations of the Community, nor to belittle the results of the Algerian elections in 1959.¹⁰

The events of May 1958 presented General de Gaulle with the third opportunity to seize power. Not only is such a chance indeed rare in the records of history, but what makes it even more exceptional is that at this time de Gaulle was not returned to power by men deeply loyal and committed to him. The significant fact is that not one section of the French nation believed at the time in de Gaulle's ideas, if indeed they knew at all what these ideas were. Only three years before, another political career—soon interrupted—that of Pierre Poujade, indicated that there was deep resentment among the little people, the *commerçants*, the artisans, the small manufacturers, that is, people whom the unexpected eclipse of the Gaullist RPF had disappointed and left without political

hope and expression.

The General was, then, returned to power by the coincidence of a number of circumstances, and most of all by the Algerian deadlock which people were hoping he would solve. The circumstances were of such a nature—the Suez humiliation, the bombing of Sakhiat, and the consequent acceptance of Anglo-American arbitration, the general subservience of the French governments to American direction—that French prestige and national pride were involved; it was obvious that the only man to redress such a series of humiliations and to use a tough language with the paternalistic Anglo-Saxons was Charles de Gaulle.

For the governments of the Fourth Republic—whether under Gaillard or Pflimlin—there was no way out. The army, angered by a long series of defeats (for lack of support), by the half-hearted conduct of the Algerian war, by the loss of Morocco and Tunisia, by the dismissal of such firm Algerian governors general as Robert Lacoste and Jacques Soustelle, was ready to march on metropolitan France in order to secure a tougher policy on these and other issues.

Neither the nation nor the army knew exactly what they were bargaining for in the person of General de Gaulle. During the years of his retirement in Colombey, de Gaulle was not seeking participation in an active military life. Yet, most of the higher officers, former combatants under his banner and sentimentally attached to their wartime chief and hero, were recruited in advance to his cause. The ambiguity which always surrounded de Gaulle worked in his favor; it was enough to know that he was a great, a very great patriot, a man of striking moral and intellectual qualities, an unyielding, unswerving leader; to accept him as the natural representative of all those who had reason to be discontented: the humiliated army, the followers of

Poujade, the right-wing intellectuals, the conservative bourgeois. When, after a dramatic nocturnal meeting with prime minister Pierre Pflimlin (at the home of the Count of Paris, anxious to bring about an agreement and save France from a civil war), de Gaulle was ready to be invested with power, it seemed that the nation found its natural leader and that de Gaulle had secured the legal way to undisputed power.

IN THE PERIOD between June 1958 and January 1959 that is, while holding full powers, Charles de Gaulle was expected to accomplish two things: bring the Algerian conflict to an end, with Algeria becoming a pacified and ordered community, part of France; and clean up the "mess" in Paris, abolish what the French call the "system," and pass measures promoting general well-being (for example, by solving the housing shortage) so as to weaken communist influence and the temptation for the leftist parties to form a popular front. Admittedly, this was to be a Herculean task, but de Gaulle's own convictions seemed to be in harmony with these desires, and the legal means now at his disposal were adequate to carry them out. Briefly put, with the possible exception of Napoleon, nobody before Charles de Gaulle—neither Henri IV, Louis XIV, nor the government of Thiers in 1871—was in a similar position of facing an eager nation prepared to line up behind a national leader. Politically, it was zero point, pregnant with the possibility of a new start.

There were, of course, hostile elements. Those extreme rightist circles whose views find expression, witty, bitter, incisive, unforgiving, in papers like *Rivarol*, *Aspects de la France*, *Ecrits de Paris*, must be counted among the enemies of the General. They hold that de Gaulle had opened the door, during and after the war, to the

communists, first by not checking their zeal in the *épuration*, secondly by giving cabinet posts to their leaders in the framework of the policy of friendship with Soviet Russia. These circles, without illusions from the beginning, considered de Gaulle a lesser evil, but still sufficiently dangerous precisely because his views would find little contradiction. For them de Gaulle's general policies are not distinguishable from those of Mendès-France or Edgar Faure, and, in fact, more fatal since de Gaulle can have his way with the army while the civilian politicians dared not touch it.

The other opponents of de Gaulle were the leftist parties and politicians, chiefly, of course, the Communists. To them, the General, like Napoleon III and Boulanger, was the representative of conservatism, reaction, and big money. In June 1958 M. Claude Bourdet, ex-deputy and editor of *France-Observateur*, and M. Maurice Duverger, Sorbonne professor and political analyst of *Le Monde*, explained to me in detail the composition of the first Gaullist cabinet, mentioning at each name the banking and industrial interests they represented. The conclusion these men drew was that the General was a puppet on the multiple strings of big business, and that he would either play the game as instructed by these interests, or desiring to extricate himself, he would have to fall back on army support, that is, military dictatorship and fascism.

At the time the classical left was almost completely disorganized, stunned by the reappearance of de Gaulle and even more by the nation's enthusiasm for the new regime and the voters' desertion of the Communist, Socialist, and Radical Socialist parties. It will be remembered that only the new Senate gave a last-minute shelter to the leftist leaders—Duclos, Mitterand, Mendès, etc.—who has been abandoned

by their partisans at the elections to the National Assembly.

In spite of the expected hostility of Right and Left, de Gaulle had much more than a comfortable base—and a new, “presidential” constitution—from which to reorganize the country, end the war in Algeria, and give world-political expression to France’s economic potential and new hopes (especially important in this respect is the improving birth rate and consequent rejuvenation of the population). But the General’s strategy was again to keep his intentions secret and dissociate himself from those who would back him. It is well known that his cabinet ministers literally trembled in his presence, and while much of what they recommended entered into their chief’s decisions, they never had the impression of being more than occasional consultants.

In other words, while de Gaulle expects absolute loyalty, he acts to confuse and disorganize the groups around him whose cohesion he ought to encourage and promote. This happens on the level of his immediate collaborators, on the level of the entire nation, and even on that of France’s allies, whether in the Common Market, in the matter of European unity, or in NATO.

We have alluded to the fact that his return to power was not due to well-defined sections of the population, but to a crying need for leadership and honor, and to a few devoted men, in the army and outside. Yet his very presence in the commanding position brought, when it became an accomplished fact, deep satisfaction and serious hopes to many who had been exasperated by the weakness of the Fourth Republic. In other words, de Gaulle had, as soon as he uttered the right words and struck the right attitude, both popular support and important allies. He was not a prisoner of any group, could maneuver quite freely among the antagonistic forces

of a divided society, and was able to use the supreme threat: to retire once more to his village if any obstacle is put in his way. Everybody knew that he meant it.

Let us take a few examples of his freedom of maneuver. The Left lay defeated on June 1, 1958, and its defeat was confirmed in the fall. Its evil spirit and permanent temptation, the Communist party, suffered the biggest blow since the Stalin-Hitler pact, and this time not only its intellectuals, but the militants too were leaving. Yet it was known to some people that de Gaulle, now prime minister, offered two posts as under-secretary to Communist-sympathizer leaders of the CGT, and was ready to accept Communist collaboration. (In the speeches and writings of his retirement he had called the Communists “separatists” and “*le parti de l’étranger*”; but in his heart he never considered the rank-and-file anything but true Frenchmen, becoming loyal again under the right leadership.) At the same time he made it clear to the organizers of the UNR that no real political tie would exist between them and himself; nor did he show any solicitude for rightist organizations offering their support. In fact, between Right and Left he preferred to staff his cabinet with so-called “technicians” and “specialists” (like housing Minister Sudreau and Minister of culture Malraux), emphasizing that he intended to remain free of all obligation.

He showed the same independence vis-à-vis the “ultras” of Algeria when he became, as soon as he landed, the hero-savior of the Moslem masses. On the other hand, by taking integration for granted (although never mentioning the word), he made it clear to the FLN that ultimately the policy advocated by Lacoste and Soustelle would prevail. His attitude towards the army was also noncommittal, although he encouraged the impression that he was

its natural chief and that he understood its every aspiration. Particularly emphatic was his choice of taking the young captains rather than the generals into his confidence, thereby marking that he identified himself with the "new spirit" of the military. At no time did he suggest, however, that with May 1958 the paradise of soldiers would begin; on the contrary, he gave repeated assurances to a humiliated parliament and to the republican personnel of the state that France will remain a secular republic in which the army is subordinated to the civilian authority.

This Olympian aloofness from commitment, combined with a superior talent for difficult maneuvers, would, in most cases, secure success to a man of de Gaulle's firmness. But once again the question arose: What does the General actually want? To what ends will he use his power? How will he handle Algeria, Africa, and France's internal and external problems? The *Mémoires*, whose last volume appeared after May 1958, were monuments of form and style, collections of brilliant portraits rather than blueprints for action—other than for the "greatness of France."

I have written above, "the question arose"; but what maintains the malaise in France today is that the question has not been answered and that a country in which critical analysis inspired by violently conflicting ideologies comes off the printing presses twenty-four hours a day, in which the great unsolved issues keep poisoning the political atmosphere, is left in a state of mounting tension. I think that it belongs to a portrait of de Gaulle to analyze this situation as it has appeared, substantially the same, for the past two years, because this situation is, to a large extent, the expression of his personality and policy, of his qualities and defects.

The malaise which strikes the visitor in France, despite order and prosperity, is a

result of the fact that, in the last analysis, General de Gaulle understands the French situation no better than did the regime which preceded his; that the Fifth Republic is, in its essential aspects and actions, a continuation of the Fourth.

What does de Gaulle think of the great and grave problems mentioned earlier: Africa, communism, the army, European unity, the place of France in the Western alliance?

De Gaulle never commanded in Africa and does not possess the experience of those officers who served in colonial territories. In the past several decades such experience—not only for the French army—proved extremely useful in acquainting officers and men with the problems of poverty, race relations, and nationalist and revolutionary movements agitating Asian and African masses. Often the civilian politicians were far more reluctant to understand the interests and aspirations of the colonial peoples than were the intelligent officers on the spot. Thus Lyautey's administration in Morocco was far more enlightened than that of the Radical-Socialist governors who preceded and followed him.

De Gaulle is essentially a product of that bourgeoisie which has never been enthusiastic about colonial adventures, which, through the pen of one of its most characteristic representatives, Voltaire, ridiculed two hundred years ago the "few acres of snow" that in their eyes Canada was and which, today as in the past, proposes that France withdraw to the ideally shaped "hexagone," count its gains and losses, and let the Africans take care of themselves. It is true that de Gaulle always speaks of France's mission in the lands under her charge; at his press conference of November 10, 1959, he emphasized that his country's ties with the new African nations are not something to accept or reject at will, that they are part of "France's

human mission, conforming to her native genius."

Yet, men who have known de Gaulle for many years claim that his views on Africa and the future of Franco-African relations do not differ essentially from those generally held by the Left. "The only difference between de Gaulle's and Mendès-France's ideas about these relations," an official from the General's entourage told me, "is that de Gaulle does not share the latter's illusions." Indeed, Mendès-France, like most leftist politicians, hopes that a timely withdrawal from Africa will secure for France an economic and cultural influence she otherwise may lose in the continuing climate of hostility created by the presence of her military forces, political interventions, and the Algerian war. De Gaulle, on the other hand, is apparently aware that Africa is lost for France, and as a military man he understands also that the power vacuum will be filled by stronger influences from outside.

De Gaulle was deeply hurt when, after the community-wide referendum, Sekou Touré's Guinea chose independence. At each major public discourse in which he surveys the state of the community, he mentions that country and points to the futility of its secession. It seems, however, that even while he was touring Africa and proclaiming the new principles of its association with France, de Gaulle entertained no exaggerated hopes concerning the future of the community. Thus later and recent developments have not surprised him, and, according to reliable reports, he looks with equanimity at the successive transformations and power struggles within it.

Of course, he must know that these developments cannot leave the fate of Algeria unaffected. But, in fact, does he regard Algeria in a different light from the rest of the African continent? It is highly questionable. As early as 1958 de Gaulle an-

nounced to people in his entourage that he was firmly opposed to the "integration" of Algeria with France. This is a significant admission in view of the fact that he owes his third chance of governing France to those men who trusted his "integrationist" views and whose impression he did nothing to rectify. It seems then that he deliberately allowed this impression to spread while proceeding with consummate skill to dismantle the power of the partisans of French Algeria in the government (the dismissal of Soustelle) and in the army (by reassigning several generals and colonels). It is even rumored that the Algerian insurrection last January was a trap set for the partisans of General Massu to reveal their plans before time.

The obstinately maintained vagueness of the meaning of "the Algeria of the Algerians," first mentioned at the press conference of September 16, 1959, is characteristic of the ambiguity in which de Gaulle likes to envelop his plans. However, this time he may miscalculate the reaction. Today, as a result of a general uncertainty about the future, those to whom the foreign press refers as the "ultras" are increasingly demoralized. While the older members of the European community hope to be at least buried on the land which for them is their own and their fathers' native country, they admit to foreign visitors and journalists that their children's future is unpromising. The exodus of Europeans from Algeria has, in fact, started.

But for the army the stakes are different. And, first of all, this is no longer the army that de Gaulle, who began his military career in another age, knew and understood. As Jean Lartéguy describes them in his recent novel, *Les Centurions*, the new officers, many of whom learned about the new, revolutionary and ideological—that is "total"—warfare in Indochina, consider Algeria their last stand. In remote

southeast Asia they felt that the nation was indifferent, even hostile to their sacrifice; but in North Africa the threat is clearer: with Algeria lost, France may be stabbed in the heart. "They want to avoid the fate of those mercenaries," writes Lartéguy, "whom Carthage had had massacred so as not to have to pay them."

Many of these young officers, politically very much alive, are veteran sergeants of the eight-year Indochinese war, to whom their modest social origin dictates an attitude quite different from that of the older generation. They have no great respect for their generals, and de Gaulle in their eyes represents a past, the Elysée palace (when they are invited), a meaningless symbol. They are far more interested in the problem of housing their families and generally in the social question; through the "socialization" of their vision they take the side of the Algerian little people, white and Moslem, against the incomprehensible grand politics of Paris, the great landowners of Algeria, the politicians—and de Gaulle. Many observers hold that this "new army" is ready to give support to a national-socialist regime.

It is also claimed by close observers of French events that General de Gaulle is very much aware of the latent opposition to his policies. In that case his only weapons are ambiguity, cultivated both instinctively and deliberately, and the hope that time will somehow work in his favor. As he managed to exhaust with his stubbornness Churchill and Roosevelt, the partisans of Giraud and the Communists in the resistance, so may he count on his rock-like firmness to overcome the hostility of the Algerians and the army, of people complaining about high prices and the disgruntled Left. On the other hand, in his deep-rooted realism he has no illusions that he can effect really far-reaching transformations in a country which, of all west-

ern nations, is perhaps the most tenaciously attached to its routine. It is worth noting, in this respect, that when the referendum gave him such a decisive edge over the Left, he made it clear that he would not use his advantage to complete the defeat; like Bernanos, whom he resembles in so many ways, he distrusts the conservative streak in the French bourgeoisie and accepts the Left as a factor of equilibrium. Above all, he knows that as long as he is president of the Republic, leadership will remain essentially liberal; "there are people in the country," he ended his last press conference with characteristic sarcasm, "who would like to start the mess [*pagaille*] even before the problem of my succession arises. I beg them to give me time to think it over."

AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE in September 1959, General de Gaulle referred to the "wind of history" which imposes certain changes in our attitude toward world events, and, by implication, he demanded that France submit to them; he seemed to paraphrase the same thought when, last June, in one of his television addresses to the nation, he spoke of the "time of the sailboat and the oillamp" with its romantic grandeur but now irreversibly behind us. In this way the President of the Republic tries to accustom France to a new political orientation—his own.

What is this "new look" that de Gaulle wants to accredit in France; what are his basic views which, for lack of a vigorous opposition, thus find exclusive political concretisation?

I have said above that de Gaulle seems to confuse *history* (and its long-range perspectives) and *politics* (which deals with the immediately given). Not only are his discourses and writings cast directly in words of bronze; often the ideas too, while communicating historical truths, appear

irrelevant *hic et nunc*. The listener or reader has the impression that de Gaulle the thinker and historian sees farther than de Gaulle the head of state and that the latter is impatient to catch up with the former. It is true that, as he always reminds us, a nation has a destiny; but he seems to forget that it has a present existence and concrete interests also.

The *Mémoires* testify that the General had a superb understanding of the goals that his great allies, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin were pursuing in the global and conflicting interests of their respective nations. He grasped with a philosopher's insight the Rooseveltian mixture of imperialism and utopia; the nature of British diplomacy, "the least disinterested of all"; the cunning of Stalin, who pretended, as long as he needed, to recognize in the president of the United States a respected elder brother. But his wisdom proves inadequate when an understanding of present-day realities in *ideological terms* would be vital.¹¹ Thus his wartime analyses are incomparably better than his recent appraisals of the international situation, for the simple reason that in war the national goals, interests, traditions, and idiosyncrasies gain the upper hand, even in our times, over ideological preoccupations.

De Gaulle's interpretation of this age is a historical one, and he considers nationalism the motive force of the present period. He could say, with Bernanos, that he is attached to his land of birth "as only animals and trees can be," and perhaps it is this indestructible feeling which enables him to sympathize with the nationalistic drive of the African peoples. But does he understand with the same acuity the ideologies which forge supranational, even supracontinental ties and divide internally nations and classes?

I have mentioned that he trusts the French Communists' ultimate loyalty to the

patrie; but he takes no notice of the *engrenage* in which the Communist voter is inevitably caught when the party enrolls him in its various organizations and isolates him from others. This is because de Gaulle is convinced that communism will fade away as profounder realities supplant it. He may, of course, be right in the long run, but is this view relevant today, may one build policy on it? According to him, Stalin was the last real revolutionary and Khrushchev is only the timid representative of the new Soviet bourgeoisie; in the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies the new managerial élites are clashing with the outmoded holders of totalitarian ideology.

This view, which he confided to his collaborators after Khrushchev's visit to Paris last spring, explains in part why de Gaulle insists that Europe, while in full cooperation, should remain *l'Europe des patries* and not coalesce into a supranational union. He foresees great upheavals in Russia, partly resulting from the Chinese menace, partly from a great upsurge of nationalist feeling, and he does not want to squander the counter-power that the spirit of patriotic sacrifice of the individual European countries would then represent. He hinted at this at his last press conference, when he remarked that in a future conflict people cannot be expected to die for the Coal-and-Steel Community but only for the defense of their families, homeland, and ideals.

L'Europe des patries is not a new idea. It has been, since the end of the first World War, a favorite expression of the French Right, the historian Jacques Bainville, the writer Drieu la Rochelle, the politician Laval. De Gaulle has made his own this grand design, including reconciliation with Germany and the exclusion of England. A "Gaullist" Europe would thus close, as it were, its windows on the Anglo-Saxons and

the Atlantic Community, and attempt to recreate the empire of Charlemagne with its distrust of and defense against the Eastern invader, endless Russia. We need not be surprised at this rapprochement with Charlemagne and the oldest concept of Europe as it emerged from the chaos left by the dying Roman Empire: did de Gaulle not write that "no experience, however trying, changes the nature of man, and no crisis that of the States."¹²

Before we finish this portrait, which coincides on so many points with that of France herself, let us characterise the present malaise whose roots too are in the personality of the President of the Republic.

Since 1945 France has undergone a process of de-politisation which has become accentuated under the Gaullist regime. De Gaulle's distrust of parties, parliaments, and the democratic process has relegated the political personnel of the Fifth Republic to roles of executants who may or may not be consulted. As a general rule, France is so active politically that de Gaulle may have decided to put the whole apparatus in hibernation and thus to create a temporary vacuum in which urgent issues can be dealt with concretely and expeditiously. During this period of enforced rest—and prosperity—he thought that only one idea should be in people's minds, as it has been in his own: national cohesion. This is the subject he constantly emphasizes: regeneration, cohesion, unity. He hopes that the force of his personality, the symbol that he has become, will lend a hypnotic power to his speeches, which are in reality sermons on the nation's altar.

Yet France has been, ever since 1789, a divided land, and "cohesion" remains a rather empty word. Or, at least, in order to make it meaningful, one would have to give it a doctrinal formulation. In other words, the simple call to national consciousness is no longer sufficient in the

second half of the 20th century: it requires an ideological framework to which de Gaulle may not want to condescend.

But then what is the "Gaullist" doctrine? Is there one at all? How does one distinguish among very different people who call themselves Gaullists: Gaullists of the left, of the right, Gaullists of the Resistance, of the army, of 1940 or 1958, Gaullists who want integration and others who favor auto-determination? In the midst of them, and above them, there stands the impressive figure of the General-President, half-man, half statue, who, as Duff-Cooper reported, asks himself every day how his acts will appear in the light of history. We cannot speak for posterity; but we may apply to him his own words of Napoleon: "In the presence of such a prodigious career judgment remains divided between blame and admiration."

¹²"A l'Ecole de Guerre avec Charles de Gaulle," *Miroir de l'Histoire*, July 1960.

¹³Paul Sérant, *Le Romantisme fasciste* (Fasquelle, 1960).

¹⁴Alfred Fabre-Luce, *Le plus illustre des Français* (Julliard, 1960), p. 110.

¹⁵*Le Salut* (Plon, 1959), p. 213.

¹⁶Press conference in Paris, October 25, 1944.

¹⁷Robert C. Doty, "De Gaulle's Philosophy in His Own Words", *New York Times Magazine*, April 17, 1960.

¹⁸René Rémond, *La Droite en France* (Aubier, 1954), p. 216.

¹⁹"At the bottom of his heart de Gaulle accepts no other limitation than his strict adherence to classical and Christian civilization," writes A. Fabre-Luce, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

²⁰*Le Salut*, p. 240.

²¹"The General accepts the practice of universal suffrage because masses may be manipulated. He likes less the intermediate bodies which are not so docile. And he always had contempt for Assemblies [parliaments]." A. Fabre-Luce, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

²²"In the eyes of de Gaulle universal ideals do not exist, there are only *patries*, nations, States." Jean Pleyber, "Les Travaux et les jours," *Ecrits de Paris*, July-August 1960, p. 20.

²³*Le Salut*, p. 54.

*How the nations love and hate what they think of
the United States.*

America's Image Abroad

CLARE BOOTHE LUCE

Oh wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us
To see oursels as others see us!
It wad frae mony a blunder free us,
And foolish notion.

—Robert Burns

IN TIMES OF PEACE the image of a country is continuously and subtly being altered, not only by its own relations to other countries, but by theirs to one another. The image which any given country may have of America today, for example, is constantly and simultaneously being affected by its own foreign policies and attitudes as well as those of other countries to Soviet Russia.

In times of war, of course, nations' images of one another undergo profound and often violent alterations. We need only think of how our own images of Japan and Germany altered between 1932 and 1942, and again since 1945, or to consider Cuba's image of us in 1898 as the great liberator, comparing it with today's image of us as the great oppressor, to realize that a country's image is a very subjective construct.

While the prestige of a country which is strong—and aggressive—may be great, the image of such a country in the eyes of nations who fear it will always be a hated one. Its vices will be exaggerated, its virtues denied or denigrated, and its motives deemed of the lowest. Its culture, no matter how popular in more peaceful times, will be decried as decadent or barbaric, sinister, or godless. Contrariwise, the image of the unfearful country, especially if there has been a long history of peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with other nations, will often be viewed by them with a friendliness and indulgence which its own intentions may not warrant.

I remember the remark made to me by an Italian politician several years ago when I was probing with him what seems to be the inexplicable failure of the Italian masses to understand the danger of Russian

military power to Italy. "Signora," he said, "we Italians remember that we have been at one time or another invaded by all the powers on earth, beginning with the Carthaginians, Greeks, Turks, and Moslems. In modern times all the great nations of Europe have invaded us and our last and greatest conqueror—the one which damaged us MOST—was America. Russia alone has never invaded us!"

Not all the people within a nation hold, at any given time, the same image of another country. The Italian image of America, for example, varies from group to group. The "man on the street" in Milan does not hold quite the same image of us as that held by the Roman patrician, the Neapolitan beggar, or the Sicilian farmer. Our image also changes according to group political affiliations: Fascists, Liberals, Monarchists, Christian Democrats, Socialists, Communists—each group sees a different America. The image varies again, depending on whether or not the individual Italian (regardless of other affiliations) has a parent or even a Zio Pepe or Tanta Maria in America; again, depending on how many letters and how much money they are sending him; and still again, depending on the failure or success of his own efforts to join his relatives in America. The view of the masses is not the same as that of the rising middle class or the Italian aristocrats or the big industrialists of the North. The views of Vatican circles differ markedly from those of the universities, of the intellectuals, professionals, writers, artists, and so on. And last, but not least important: the image which Italian scholars and students and tourists who have traveled or lived in America have of the U. S. A. is also very different from that of their countrymen who have never seen America and know our people and the "American Way of Life" only from their own newspapers or our movies and litera-

ture, or from American tourists, businessmen, diplomats, and military personnel in Italy.

Consequently, there are no altogether reliable or scientific ways for determining what one nation's over-all or shakedown image of our nation may be for any significant period of time. The lack of information concerning America's image abroad is not for want of effort on our part to get it. Many groups, such as the American European Foundation and the Institute of International Social Research at Princeton and the USIA, are dedicated today to the study of national images. Since World War II the efforts of many social scientists have been increasingly devoted to the study in depth of how one nation's ideas and attitudes, actions and policies affect another. The methods of all these groups consist of interviews and questionnaires, polls and surveys, audience tests, content analysis of letters, books, check lists of qualities, and so on.

But just poll-taking, and sociology and its methods, often prove imprecise or inadequate when Americans undertake to discover the opinion of their fellow Americans and define their "basic attitudes"; they are even more inaccurate and unsatisfactory when they are used to study foreign attitudes toward the U.S.A. Nevertheless, national images are an important and sometimes decisive factor in international relationships.² They will not in themselves change the course of events. But they may strengthen or weaken a certain course which has been brought into being by other factors. They facilitate or hamper international understanding. The study must be pursued. Certainly the world's rulers, and politicians and diplomats have a better chance of reaching fruitful and peaceful agreements if they have a reasonably true image of the America they are working with.

If, for example, America's image abroad is ugly or false, it is folly to the point of disaster for us not to try to improve that image, to modify it more in the direction of truth. Not the least of the tasks of the United States Information Agency is to collect information about America's image abroad, precisely for the purpose of projecting more effectively the image we wish.

We may better understand our image abroad today if we make a thumbnail sketch of it in time past.

When the United States was first born of the Revolution, and when it later became a federal republic under the Constitution, it erected a fresh, new, dynamic image which was amazingly popular throughout the 19th century world.³ It was an image of courage, dignity, purpose, and progress. First, by its Declaration of Independence from Britain, America immediately made friends of every nation, large or small, which feared or hated the British imperium. And that global roster, from 1776 to the end of the 19th century was very long indeed. Second, the peoples of many lands (in modern jargon we refer to them as the "oppressed masses" or "exploited colonials") saw in our revolution and its new, liberal political forms the very model of what they aspired to for themselves or for their own countries. Thus the 19th century image of America benefited first on a negative count: our triumph over England released among the nations much "*Schadenfreude*"—that unique and precise German word which describes the joy that animates the breast of the envious, the fearful, or the downtrodden, whenever they can exclaim "Lo! How the mighty have fallen!" And it also benefited our image on a positive count. Our revolution was in the most profound spiritual sense a natural revolution: our egalitarian constitution which asserted the inalienable right under God of every man to "life,

liberty and the pursuit of happiness" spoke to the condition of all men's hearts, in all lands; it spoke to Freedom. And Freedom is the deathless leaven in all human affairs. Its pursuit is the permanent revolution.

For a century and a quarter throughout large sections of the world the image of America remained the image of Little David the shepherd boy, ready whenever necessary to take on the giant Goliath—the slave master, the tyrant, the bully, the oppressor of every man everywhere. This image, fortified by the War of 1812, was again enhanced by the Civil War. Most of the world's peoples saw that war as the greatest blow ever struck by man against the principle of slavery and for the principle of racial equality. Then, indeed, the U.S.A. became the "last best hope" of all unfree men on earth. The war against Spain in 1898, which aligned the U.S.A. against colonialism in practice for herself and in principle for others again strengthened the Little David image—except, of course, in Spain and among rulers of the great colonial powers.

During most of its first hundred years America had opened its doors to all the economic, political, religious, and oppressed classes of Europe. It became more than an inspirational image: it became the acting leader of the liberals and intellectuals of all lands, when it became the potential homeland of all oppressed peoples.

Moreover, we must also note that until the beginning of our own century, America's military power—or as we now call it, more accurately, posture—was not feared by any group of European, Near-Eastern, or Asiatic nations. South America was the first exception. Mexico was the first modern nation which was forced to rectify the Little David Image. And other Caribbean and Latin American lands soon began to feel our economic power in ways

which increasingly dampened their enthusiasm for our image. On the whole, however, the dove of peace perched easily on the Statue of Liberty. Economically the U.S.A. was too busy developing its own industries and domestic markets to menace the foreign markets of either the great or small powers.

Moreover—and here we come to a most important and much neglected point about the popularity of our image throughout the world. From the beginning of our nationhood, most European and Asiatic nations felt culturally vastly superior to America. One seldom dislikes a person if he is peaceful and good-natured, and minds his own business, especially if he can safely be considered intellectually and spiritually an inferior. Abroad, Americans were viewed as a collectivity of second- or third-rate Europeans who had had the great good luck to settle in a rich, if raw and hard, land. (One nation always tends to view another nation's progress as the result of luck.) The fast growing, fast moving, fast circulating American society of the 19th century was regarded as a vulgar, uneducated, formless, "European rump" society. Whatever good came out of it was considered European in origin and inspiration. Only what was bad was considered "Amurrican."

By the end of the 19th century, when the Boy David began to show certain disquieting signs of growing out of his buckskins, chaps, and Levis, he was, nevertheless, still thought of by the European ruling classes as a European peasant with rather humorous bourgeois pretensions and a mildly irritating penchant for boastfulness about a thing he called "The American Way of Life."

Our brief and belated, but decisive, entry into World War I resulted in a startling change in this image of the relatively weak, if overgrown, hayseed David. In

the year 1920 every European who had his wits about him perceived that the United States was not just an overgrown boy who had marched "hay-foot, straw-foot" into Europe. He had, they saw, become a young giant. His steel muscles bulged alarmingly but his pockets bulged even bigger with the gold of California and the silver of Nevada. He was, they thought, a giant who henceforth would have to be reckoned with permanently in the councils of other giants in the world. Had he not sent into Europe serried ranks of millions chanting, "And we won't come back 'til it's over, over there"? And had he not insisted that he was fighting to make the world safe for Democracy? Well, simply because the war was over over there, it didn't mean that the world was safe for Democracy. If America was to be taken at its word, it still had a pretty big job to do abroad after the war was over.

But when the U.S.A. picked up its marbles and went home seemingly indifferent to the vast complex of world problems created by war's end, when it walked out of the League of Nations, it became painfully clear to most of the great European powers that so far as the young giant's understanding of his own proper role—his power role—in the world went, he was either shockingly stupid or scandalously irresponsible. The rulers and intellectuals of Europe felt contempt for a country so lacking in an intellectual grasp of the world scene that it could casually ignore the global complications which its own entry into the war had deeply and decisively affected. Above all, the new young American giant's ignorance of the colossal significance to the whole world of the Russian Revolution seemed conclusive evidence that his head was probably more fit for making Thanksgiving pies for home consumption than for world leadership. The small nations which had achieved their

independence at Versailles because of Woodrow Wilson's insistence on the right of self-determination for small nations did not feel contempt. They felt disillusionment—and dismay. Their idol's feet were not made of clay, but they were inclined to agree with their rulers that the same could not be said of his head.

To Europe's general contempt and sorrow, as the young giant retreated into his never-never land of isolation, envy was soon added. What nation does not envy another which feels itself strong enough, remote enough, rich enough, to be isolationist or, to use the European word, "neutral?" Neutrality, today as yesterday, is the dream of every nation. But what other great nation, since history's dawn, had ever been able to afford this luxury? What other great nation had ever failed to see that what divides the men from the boys—even among nations—is the willingness to assume responsibility?

During the 1920's both the contempt and the envy grew. The image of "America the Golden," which blissfully believed that "every day in every way" it was getting better and better and richer and richer, and that it had found the unbeatable system of unending progress not only in economic well-being for all Americans but in civil rights for all, grew slowly more disrespected and unpopular abroad. And to envy was added rancor over the vast loans which Europe could not repay. This was further intensified by popular resentment abroad as U.S. tariff walls rose higher and U.S. immigration doors clanged in the faces of Europe's new hordes of war-poor peoples.

By 1928 few nations in the world expected world leadership in political, economic, moral, or intellectual matters from the United States. America had begun to lose the prestige it so richly enjoyed in the 19th century—a prestige based largely on

its ascendancy over the minds of men because of the Revolution and—years later—by Wilson's fight for the small nations.

Ignored were the incipient signs of world economic leadership in the post-War I period: the cancellation of many war loans, the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, and the vast new loans of the great American bankers to Europe, which did far more than the League of Nations was doing—or was ever to do—to help reconstruct a war-torn Europe.

America's decisive role in World War I had badly dented Europe's feeling of military and economic superiority. Europe compensated for this feeling of inferiority by concentrating on one aspect of the American image to which it could continue to feel vastly superior. Culturally, the giant, if not a boor, still remained (they thought) a small-town vulgarian, a country boob.

The post-War I intellectual's view of America was that its main contribution to the totality of world civilization would henceforth be largely one of material advancement: more and better central heating, Model T Fords, refrigerators, gas ranges; in other words, a crude, functional advance for the American masses—advances which could be, in some instances, profitably copied by other reasonably prosperous areas of the world. But culturally, philosophically, and spiritually, America's contributions would at best be uninteresting—at worst, corrupting.

In the '20's and '30's Europe's dim view of U.S. culture—philosophy, art, music, and literature—seemed to be shared by the best American artists themselves, many of whom became voluntary expatriates. Living abroad, Whistler, Sargent, T. S. Eliot, and Henry James seemed to prove that our cultural atmosphere was unfriendly—even hostile—to creative effort. Those writers who remained at home, it was

noted, seemed to be increasingly alienated from "The American Way of Life" about which the young American Giant, flushed with pride in the Great Boom of the twenties, now boasted so loudly in his newspapers and mass magazines.

Upton Sinclair in *The Jungle*, *Oil*, and *Boston*; Sinclair Lewis in *Main Street* and *Babbitt*; H. L. Mencken in *The American Mercury* pointed fingers of scorn and condemnation at America's Horatio Alger hero: the successful business man. On many counts our own intellectuals seemed to agree with Europe's that "The American Way" was at best shallow, naïve, optimistic, barren, empty of original ideas, and at worst, revealed itself fraught with scandal and corruption and capable of economic tyranny over its own people.

Viewed from Europe the Monkey Trial in Dayton, Tennessee, in the '20's was an incredible and appalling performance. Even though Clarence Darrow's victory proclaimed that the "old-time religion" of the frontier and Bible Belt was weakened, it revealed a new facet of the American Giant's image: he was capable of being an obscurantist and a bigot. Ku Klux Klanism and the defeat of Al Smith on religious grounds heightened this impression abroad.⁴ The Sacco and Vanzetti trial had deep repercussions on the liberals of Europe. The long ordeal and the final execution of the two men convinced many of them that American democratic institutions were indeed (as communist propaganda had already begun to insist) in the hands of the monopolists and the still rampant heirs of the "Robber Barons." The passage of the Prohibition Amendment and the consequent rise of big gangsterism and mobster terror revealed still other aspects of the giant's character: he also had deep streaks of the irrational, the violent, the criminal.⁵

Until 1928 or 1929, despite this progres-

sive souring of Europe's leaders, intellectuals, and political liberals (many of whom, like our own, had already begun to espouse or defend Russian Socialism) world opinion was not deeply unfriendly to the United States. After all, America "minded its own business" (a virtue in any nation—in times of peace). And it continued to give an inspiring model, to be emulated whenever possible, of efficiency in material affairs. American capitalism might not always be a dainty affair but it did seem to work to the greatest good of the greatest number. Whatever one might say against the young giant, he knew how to make his own people happy and prosperous. He remained the Golden Boy if not the Fair-Haired Boy of the world's masses.

But with the crash of 1929 and the long depression, the image underwent another change—in many ways the worst in its history and the one from which it has not yet recovered in the eyes of the world.⁶

At first, the ruling classes and the intellectuals of Europe and perhaps all the world experienced the same *Schadenfreude* at America's sudden bust after boom that they had felt before when Great Britain had got her come-uppance at U. S. hands in 1776 and 1812. It was momentarily satisfying to know that the American giant was as weak in the head at home as he was abroad. He didn't, after all, as he had so often loudly and boastfully claimed, have all the answers to material progress in a free society.

But as the depression deepened and spread about the world the *Schadenfreude* gave way to dismay and self-concern. And for the first time in a hundred years, foreign intellectuals tore their fascinated gaze from America and its now sorry image to contemplate with a new hope a younger and more confident giant to the East—Soviet Russia.

In the depression days, emigrants left the United States in large numbers, taking back to their homelands gruesome stories of apple sellers and police brutality and bread lines—and the failure of American capitalism. The world's masses grieved. But not so much as they might have. They too began to look to the image of Russia as the new hope for a suffering world. The successful Russian Revolution began to acquire "ascendancy over the minds of men," as once the American and French revolutions had done. And little by little America lost the true glory of her image—the permanent revolution—to the Soviet Union.

The American image changed again (and somewhat for the better) when Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected and the New Deal gallantly galloped off in all directions to seek new ways of saving the old "American Way." Some of Europe's intellectuals were willing to concede, however grudgingly, that economically the United States might still be a land of resilience and originality. But they—and our intellectuals—were quick to say that New Deal innovations were largely borrowed from the economic socialism of the U. S. S. R. The old tendency continued to operate—to attribute anything good that comes out of America to European inspiration: at its best (Europeans thought) the New Deal was an improvisation on the ideas of European Fabian Socialists, and these ideas (they could not fail to note) Soviet Russia was advancing even more rapidly than Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Indeed from 1920 to 1939 the only unique and enviable thing about America seemed to be its remarkable capacity for isolation. But as the shadows of World War II lengthened, the ostrich-like stupidity of America's aloofness became increasingly hard for everyone—except Mussolini and Hitler, and at that time Stalin

—to bear. Perhaps what irritated Europeans most in the days between 1932 and 1940 was the way the United States told everybody else to stand up to Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini, while insisting (as Woodrow Wilson once had done) that we were both too pure and too proud—and too unconcerned—to fight anybody ourselves.

When Pearl Harbor came, an embattled France and England did not feel *Schadenfreude* over the blow dealt us. They felt anguish: the young giant was once again sorely needed abroad. When in the space of a year he dressed his wounds, armed hastily for battle, and finally entered the fray with decisive numbers of troops and weapons, his prestige bounded to the war-torn skies, and his image was hailed with joy and admiration, even awe. The G. I. Giant came with the best tanks, finest planes, and fattest supplies the world has ever seen. Friendly, efficient, noisy, and still politically naïve, he spread across the Globe in classical Seven League Boots, making good every boast he had ever uttered about his own superior technological skill and logistic brain.

And so we come to World War II's end. The image, so long as it resembled the face of F.D.R.,⁷ so long as it remained coupled with the Marshall Plan, was reasonably popular.

Now that a decade and a half have passed, what is that image?

By 1946, certain things were clearly seen abroad: the American giant was strong and intended to stay strong; however reluctantly and in spite of whatever contradictions in his natural character or whatever headaches lingering isolation sentiments gave him, he now intended to remain in the world. He knew at long last he was intimately involved at every level—political, economic, and cultural—with every other nation on the globe. He knew he must by his very existence positively or

negatively affect the power, position, and well-being of every nation on earth. And this being the case, he knew U. S. isolation was dead, since isolation was negative intervention in world affairs. This maturing, if not mature, American Giant intended to be nothing if not positive. In fact, as time went on it was to be increasingly held against him that he seemed far too positive about far too many things.

Today, the image of America which individual nations hold varies, depending on their past historical, cultural, political, and economic relations with the United States, and also on their present relations, intentions, and expectations regarding us. (There is always a time lag, especially in the popular mind, about foreign nations' images.)

Russia's image of America is very different from India's, or England's, Ghana's or Egypt's, France's or Germany's. South America's image of us and Canada's are very different—though both are unpopular.

To spell out these differences nation by nation around the globe cannot be done within the scope of this paper. However one question may be asked: Is there any general view of America's image abroad common to all the nations which can be sketched in bold outline—even as caricature (since there is always some truth, perhaps too much, in caricatures)?

There is reason to believe there is. It can best be described by the Roman phrase: *Odi et amo*. "I hate and I love."

Today, the American Giant presents two faces to every nation: one is still that of David; the other, alas, is the face of Goliath. Today America is at one and the same time the most admired and the most despised, the most feared and least feared, the most loved and most hated nation that has been seen on the earth since the Roman Empire.

Let us take, first, our World War II

allies. The two greatest, France and England, came out of World War II in far worse shape than they or anyone else in the world could have dreamed in 1939. They came out very nearly in the shape that Karl Marx had predicted European nations would find themselves in after the "last of the capitalist wars." Great Britain had little left but her pride to keep herself warm, and it didn't keep her very warm. She suffered long miserable years of austerity while her empire, bit by bit, slipped from her war-weary hands, and her prestige, once so vast, tumbled everywhere. France had not even her pride. America, on the contrary, came out in such good shape, her prestige so strong, as to throw the communist theologians into a frenzy. It also threw their diplomatic and propaganda machines into full gear, thus initiating the Cold War.

The United States could afford not only the Marshall Plan but rampaging prosperity at home.

Between nations, as between individuals, there is nothing which can more quickly blur clear sight than envy. Many of our allies, affected by the green-eyed monster, seemed to feel that in some remote and inexplicable way postwar America was prosperous because in the year or so before Pearl Harbor she had stolen from the common European economic pool while they were busy giving their all.

Napoleon was once asked by a friend, "Why do your brothers and sisters, whom you have made Kings and Queens, Princesses and Princes, dislike you so much?" To which Napoleon replied, "Because they think I have cheated them of their full share of the inheritance of their late father, the King."

Since the end of World War II there have been only two possible scapegoats for the war-torn and buffeted nations of the world: Soviet Russia and the United

States. And our former enemies, no less than our former allies, when choosing scapegoats for their current misfortunes must choose between them. (In this sense, the "uncommitted" and neutral nations see both our images a little more clearly than even our friends or enemies)

Many of the common people of the world, as well as their rulers and statesmen, have found it more convenient—though certainly not more plausible—to make the U.S.A. Scapegoat No. 1. Why is this so? Perhaps the best explanation is the simplest one: Any nation today can afford the dubious luxury of baiting America. We might (and often do) resent it, but we will not desert our allies nor attack our enemies because of it. This could not be said with any degree of confidence of Soviet Russia.

Another explanation is the fact, already noted, that the intellectuals and liberals in America and Europe had formed the habit, in the days of the depression and again after Stalingrad, of looking to Russia and to socialist forms of government as a more reliable solution to their postwar economic and political problems than capitalism. When in the decade after the war they saw that little economic aid to the depressed areas was forthcoming from Russia, when the brutalities and tyrannies of Stalin's Russia finally came through to the intellectuals, when they saw how Soviet propaganda was bent on destroying not only America's image but the deep-rooted traditions, cultures, and religions of all countries as well, they gradually turned away from Russia. But the past faults and the failures of America—tariffs, immigration quotas, isolation, bust and boom cycles—which had provided the excuse for their turning to Russia in the first place, were still used to vilify America's image. America was unpredictable and vacillating in all questions economic and political,

military and moral. (One had to admit the Soviets were consistent.)

Was not America a decade ago an isolationist, depression-ridden land? Had not America now done a *volte-face*, to reveal itself as the fastest, the richest, and most interventionist power in the world? Why? To too many intellectuals there seemed to be only one answer: America now was bent on ruling the world! It was an "imperialist colonizing power" if not by force of arms, then by the power of the dollar. America intended to exploit, perhaps destroy, and most frightful of all, culturally colonize the whole world.

The picture of the ultimate "Triumph of the American Way" sincerely revolted and terrified many European intellectuals and liberals. As they once read the books of Sinclair Lewis and Upton Sinclair and Steinbeck, they now avidly read the brilliant works of Faulkner, Henry Miller, and Tennessee Williams, which painted a picture of an America sick-sick-sick! And they were convinced again—as after World War I—that whenever something good did come from American pens it was always a new statement that nothing good could ever come out of American society. The growing export flood of American movies and TV programs, whose level of morality and artistic merit were indeed constantly falling, confirmed their old prejudice concerned with the era of Al Capone, that the U. S. was a country full of violence and crime, and sex in the rawest.

The liberals who mistrusted American liberalism pointed, again with *Schadenfreude*, to the continued scandals of the Negro question. And indeed, the bad news out of Little Rock and Montgomery penetrated far past Europe, deep into Africa, Asia, and South America, disillusioning millions who until then had held the image of Abraham Lincoln's America faithfully in their hearts.⁹ McCarthy's brief but boor-

ish demagogic reign over large sections of U.S. opinion also convinced them (falsely) that, for all its prosperity and inventiveness in new economic forms, the U.S.A. was incipiently a fascist country. All this was welcome news to those throughout the world who needed it as evidence to explain either their old infatuation for Russia, or their own desire—so natural in the atomic age—for the very isolation and neutrality which they had deeply despised when the U.S.A. had practiced it. Thus, the very real faults and failures of the U.S. in the past two decades to live up to its noblest liberal traditions gave everyone who wanted one an excuse for not taking sides too enthusiastically for either Russian ideology or the American Way.

The very billions of dollars which this America has given and continues to give in economic aid to many lands are often viewed as either a disguised form of economic exploitation or the bones which are contemptuously thrown from the great American Banquet Table to the world's underdogs. Worst of all, the United States military posture vis-a-vis Soviet Russia gave most—perhaps all—nations the jitters. American smugness (especially after Sputnik) about “our bases”—all on foreign soil—rankled badly. In the State Department talk of “agonizing re-appraisals” and “brinkmanship” sent shivers of fear and mistrust through the bosoms of even those statesmen who knew, as diplomats, that these were tactical and not strategic proposals. They diminished faith not only in Secretary Dulles but in the White House. When America talked of war over Indochina and the offshore Chinese islands, the shivers often became fevers. America’s moralizing before the world particularly revolted the British (who had been doing the same thing for a hundred years—it is essentially an Anglo-Saxon custom).

Nehru, no mean sermonizer himself (consequent to his British education), has naturally resented our moralizing, indeed more perhaps than any other world ruler. There is nothing that irritates us more, in others, than our own faults.

Also, what seemed to be America’s many inconsistencies in the handling of its foreign affairs created a sense of uneasiness and resentment among other nations. A few examples among scores: the Israelis blamed the U.S. for favoring the Arabs, the Arabs blamed us for favoring the Israelis; France blamed us for not supporting her colonial policy, the North Africans blamed us because we did; England (wonderfully ambivalent herself about the Suez venture) blamed us (a) for not supporting the venture and (b) for not having objected to it more forcefully before it was launched. And South America demanded to know why, if we considered the Suez Egyptian, we did not consider the Panama Canal Panamanian. Canada blamed us for investing too much American capital in undeveloped Canada, and “paying too much attention to South America,” South American nations blamed us for investing too little capital there and paying too little attention to their problems. One could travel around the globe and not find a nation which in the past decade has not accused the United States of “inconsistency,” because of some American policy unpopular in its own country and too popular in someone else’s.

Odi! Here we have the Image of the Hated Giant, Goliath: tremendously powerful, vulgar, materialistic, greedy, inconsistent, and naïve; unpredictable, noisy, blatantly boastful, hypocritical, a racial bigot and a lowbrow; belligerent, insensitive, a Yahoo and an incipient fascist. The Babbitt of the '20's grown into a colossus, he is seen as spewing his meretricious products on the face of the world solely for

profit—nylons, chewing gum, Coca Cola. His only cultural contributions are jazz, rock 'n roll, the cult of the big bosom, Westerns, Private Eyes, and violent, sexy 3-D Biblical spectacles. His right pocket is stuffed with corrupting gold, his left with missiles. Trigger-happy, drunk on his own chrome-plated glory and power, he stands astride the world, bending only to lift bases, while he pokes an insensitive finger into everyone's military, political, and economic eye.

There is one supremely interesting thing about this image: it corresponds in every detail to the official Soviet Image of America. Despite this sad fact, truth obliges us to admit that the image has been created with considerable help from ourselves.

Et amo! And yet, what is the image of America which is loved—loved no less in Russia than in the farthest reaches of the globe? This image is the image of the incredibly productive, classless, fluid, stable, outgoing and outgiving, discursive, argumentative, generous, scientifically and technologically superb American society. The freest and most altruistic society the world has ever seen. Even Soviet Russia yearns to copy this image, and all her propaganda efforts are bent on making it seem to others that it is indeed really her own. In fact, when we subtract the dogmatic, atheistic (and obsolete) theological content from communism we see clearly that it is nothing so much as a brutal speed-up technique—a tyrant's method—for the Americanization of Russia and the whole world. Russia's proudest boast, and the one which above all has appeal to the backward lands, is "anything good America can do, we can do better. . . . we can do anything good faster than the U.S.A.!"

Fortunately, in the final analysis it is the people who decide what is to be the image of a country. "The America I love" is closely linked by many historical and

modern ties to the hearts of the world's masses. Indeed, the intellectuals, the liberals, the traditionalists, and the conservatives of the world often note with shock and dismay that the very features of America *they* pretend most to despise appeal most to their own masses! The London shop girl is not revolted by the pervert America of Tennessee Williams—she doesn't even read him. She is not annoyed by the inconsistencies of our foreign policy; she is not even aware of her own country's. But she is deeply drawn to a system which will provide her with nylons, electric toasters, and deep-freezers; and if London's streets were only wide enough and Great Britain could only afford the gasoline she would aspire to a car with tailfins too. TV, radio, and comic strips may be, and often are, characterized by vulgarity; but the masses everywhere *are* vulgar. Japanese, German, Italian children enjoy these things and want more and more of them, just as our own children do. Above all, the masses want in their own lands that equality of economic and educational opportunity, that constant raising of living standards, that egalitarianism, that happy ease and fluidity between the classes, that noisy garrulousness and "speaking my own mind" which any foreigner who has ever seen an American movie, or come into contact with American tourists knows characterizes the U.S.A. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are still seen to be the core of the American Way—and the ordinary people of most countries still long to be going our way.

Insofar as Europe's masses bear a grudge against America it is either because the communists—or their own rulers—tell them that in some way we are cheating them of these very blessings. There can be no question but that the masses of people throughout the world, if they were free

to express a preference, would still prefer America's image to the U.S.S.R.'s.

Outwardly despised, the United States is still everywhere felt as a successful, inventive, materialistic, dynamic, egalitarian society which is to be emulated and imitated. And imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. One never seeks to become like the thing one does not love and admire.

Here then we have the American Image to which all the world responds: *Odi et amo*. Can we lessen the hate and increase the love? I believe that where we are rightly hated we cannot hope to be loved. Even though segregation is being slowly overcome, at least at the federal level, and the Negro is advancing, nothing the Voice of America or the USIS says will greatly change the hate that widespread American racial bigotry inspires in many lands, especially in the Eastern and African nations. And nothing we can say, for example, about the materialist pragmatic bias of our country will change the fact. We must broaden our cultural base if we are to "achieve ascendancy over the minds of men in this generation."

We can do much more to make known abroad the best in our poetry, music, theatre, films and great folk art—the musical comedy. We can make the facts about our fifty universities, which at their best are at cultural and scientific levels higher than those of most of the world's universities, better known to European and Asian and African intellectuals.

One could wish that we could find some way consistent with free enterprise, some way which the entertainment industry would not consider "censorship," to prevent the worst and cheapest of our movies and TV programs from traveling overseas. It is my own view—one I have often expressed in Washington—that the prodigious spate of our cheap movies featuring sex, violence, and crime do almost as much

damage to America's image abroad as communist propaganda. If the communization of the world is achieved, historians will surely note that it was with a big assist from the American TV and the mass view which supports its worst efforts so handsomely. If John Q. Public does not wish his image abroad to have a slightly gangsterish, psychopathic, murderous expression, he has to stop himself from enjoying that image at home.

At all levels, especially governmental levels, we can take far more care to understand the culture, languages, and religious, political, and economic forms of other nations—in other words, to see their true images. As there are no nations who cannot learn from us, so also there are no nations from whom we cannot learn. No one can be understood who does not seek first to understand.

There is little to be done about the American tourist, who also gives coloration to our image. He too must be understood: he suffers an inferiority complex in the face of Europe's indisputably richer artistic culture, and he naturally compensates for it by bragging about our superior materialistic know-how. We can only pray that his generally amiable indiscretions abroad will be forgiven him because of his unflagging openhandedness, and that he will return to his own shores enriched by what he has seen and learned.

In the end the best way for foreign peoples to get a true view of America is not through literature, information, movies, even traveling art exhibits, propaganda, tourists, diplomats, foreign correspondents, or American businessmen abroad. The best way is at first hand. The more foreign scholars, students, visitors from all nations (including Russia) we can bring to our shores, the clearer and truer will be their image of America. Exchange programs of all kinds should be given every priority

in time, attention, and funds which government or private groups can afford.

It is important to point out the three most serious errors which our government and our people make and which perhaps more than all others contribute to the image of the hated and feared Giant. First, we waste far too much time and energy and money trying to explain the so-called inconsistencies of our foreign policy to other nations. Many of these inconsistencies are unavoidable, viewed from our own world position, which faces on Asia and Africa and South America, as well as Europe. They are dictated by our necessity to remain friendly with scores of nations who are often not friendly with one another. Moreover, when these inconsistencies are wrong as they often have been, they cannot be explained. It is better not to publicize our own errors, since others will always be willing to do so for us. Rather we should use what breath or money we have to publicize policies which have been consistently popular. The main principles of our foreign policy should be constantly kept before the world, but the specific and detailed applications of it are best kept, wherever possible, matters for intragovernmental discussion. In short, our White House and our State Department talk too much and explain too much abroad.

Second, what makes the most mischief abroad is an attitude of ours that is uniquely American but which the rest of the world views as verging on the bubble-head. This is the attitude that every problem can be quickly settled or solved if everybody would only go about things the way we Americans do. This attitude is the consequence of 130 years of relative isolation.

The American view that every situation is a problem that can be solved with money

or a gimmick, with a smart idea or with propaganda, with good will or with teamwork, is the very opposite of the civilized world view. This view is that every problem is a situation which can be solved, or rather dissolved, only by the efforts (generally over decades) of patient and dedicated men. It believes that time solves more problems than all the world's statesmen, diplomats, and electorates. In truth, it is a rather more realistic view than our own. It is the historical view—the one view on which the American Giant is still shaky and without which he will never become a fully mature, fully responsible world power.

Third and last, there can indeed be no question but that while the image of the good American Giant includes in good measure the virtues of courage, resourcefulness, generosity, imagination, it is somewhat shy of the one virtue utterly necessary to world leadership. It is the virtue Soviet Russia possesses in abundance: patience.

NOTES

The image of a nation and the prestige of a nation, while obviously closely related, are two different things.

The prestige of Pontius Pilate was great on Good Friday; that of Jesus, low. But the image of Pilate was a sorry and ambivalent one, and that of Jesus so clear and compelling that He made converts among even those who crucified Him.

The image of a nation is basically created by its vices and virtues, material weaknesses and strengths, the clarity or confusion of its economic and political forms, but above all by the universality—or provinciality—of its religion, modes, art, education and culture. The image of one nation can profoundly influence the minds of peoples of other nations—and, in so doing, it tends to change their images.

The prestige of a nation, on the other hand, resides largely in its capacity to operate on the world scene and its willingness to operate. A nation operates when by the conscious use of

military, economic, political, and cultural means it creates new situations and new conditions favorable to itself and consistent with its national goals.

¹The Czar's Russia, allied briefly with Austria, invaded Italy in the 19th century, but Soviet Armies were not present in Italy in World War II.

²Since this article was written, the question of America's Image abroad has played a large part in the American Presidential election.

³The effect of our Revolution in France, and later on the risorgimento, in Italy, changed the history of those two nations.

⁴A solid gain in Mr. John F. Kennedy's election is that it has somewhat rectified this picture of America the Bigoted.

⁵Too many U.S. movies and television shows abroad are doing all in their power to perpetuate this image of America the Violent and Lawless.

⁶The American "Boom and Bust" image was sedulously revived by Senator Kennedy in the last campaign.

⁷Senator Kennedy's passionate efforts to drape himself—during the campaign—in F.D.R.'s mantle had a 2-fold purpose: to secure the approval of European and South American—and Soviet Russian—leaders and to evoke emotions of partisan loyalty in the American Democratic masses.

⁸It is the practical certainty that the U.S.A. will not attack Cuba, rather than the fear it will, which encourages Castro to his excesses against us.

⁹Recently I asked an important UN ambassador of an allied country why the Afro-Asian nations tended to vote against us as a block on major questions, when often it was not to the *self-interest* of some of these nations to do so. He replied, sadly, "They vote their skin. The incidents that too many UN African representatives have had in America colors their judgment black—against the U.S. and European nations."

¹⁰Presidential candidate Kennedy's somewhat brash proposals on Quemoy and Matsu were bids to inspire confidence among jittery foreign chanceries and among equally jittery U.S. intellectuals.

The Skaters

The skaters
in a world of
falling
hold the center
a wheel of singing spokes
turning the night
on the axle moon
around and round
and lights go flying
on broken heels
but the moon goes
on and round
around a world
of lasting stars
where a girl flares out
whiter than fire
taking the center,
the moon
and even the night
all falling
down, behind the dark speed
of her singular light.

RICHARD KELLY

How a political currency operates in a divided world.

Understanding the Ruble

ROBERT V. JONES

"RUSSIA," PROCLAIMED the headline of a dispatch in one of our leading newspapers a little over a year ago, "lends \$100 million to Egypt." The report bearing this caption stated that the Soviet Union, desiring to assist the Egyptians in their economic development, had agreed to make 400 million rubles available as a loan, which sum was said to be the equivalent of 100 million American dollars. Because of our then recent differences with President Nasser's government, the transaction received unusual attention in the American press, and similar headlines were printed throughout the country.

Since 1953, when the Russians began merchandising their own peculiar brand of foreign aid, news reports of this character, although less prominently displayed, have been appearing intermittently. At one time it has been \$100 million lent to Indonesia, at another \$100 million or so to India, and so on.

The cumulative impression given by these advices is that the Soviet Union, in order to win friends and influence politics the world around, out of its prosperity is making large loans to other nations, either in American dollars or in sums which are the equivalent of American dollars. A writer

in *The American Economic Review*, the journal of the American Economic Association, recently estimated that the total Soviet credits to other countries up to the beginning of 1958 amounted to \$1.6 billion, and this statement was made without any suggestion that Russian rubles were in any way involved in the transactions or any indication of the rate at which rubles—which assuredly were involved—were translated into dollars.

But of course the Russians make no loans whatsoever of American dollars. The Soviet Union deals in rubles rather than dollars, and rubles and dollars are vastly different things. The ruble is primarily a political instrument in a communistic society; the dollar is primarily an economic instrument in a free enterprise society. Performing fundamentally different functions in radically different social organizations, the ruble and the dollar have few characteristics in common and many characteristics which are sharply opposed.

Unfortunately we seem to be oblivious to this basic difference between the Soviet monetary system and our own. We take ruble figures on Russian production, consumption, foreign trade, and other aspects of the Russian economy; we convert the ruble figures into dollar figures, usually at the so-called official rate of exchange; and we then use the dollar figures so obtained for the purpose of analyzing the Russian economy and drawing conclusions about it, in much the same way that we would use dollar figures in analyzing our own economy. But this process is completely unrealistic. Soviet prices are substantially different in nature from the free market prices of our own society. They are established differently, they perform a different function, and they tell a different story for analytical purposes. Moreover, the dollar figures we arrive at by this process are worse than

useless for understanding what goes on in Russia; they mislead and delude us.

One of the practical differences between the ruble and the dollar—which may serve to introduce us to a better understanding of what the ruble really is—is that the dollar can be lent in international transactions, whereas it is impossible to make an international loan of the ruble. This defect in the ruble, constantly overlooked in current discussion, can be readily understood if the ordinary processes of international lending be kept in mind. If, for example, the United States government decides to lend—or give—\$100 million to some foreign state, the United States treasury places that sum to the credit of the borrowing state in American banks. The sum so credited can then be drawn on by the borrowing state for the purchase of goods either here or abroad. The loan is completed when the bank credit is established, and all control of the American government over the use of the loan thereupon terminates, except as specific restrictions on the spending of the money may have been agreed upon in advance. In its procedure this is a simple transaction, following the established pattern of our markets for money and for goods.

But nothing like it can occur in Russia. Suppose that the Soviet Union should place 400 million rubles to the credit of the Egyptian government in the Gosbank—the Soviet state bank. What could Egypt do with this ruble credit? It could not be spent in Russia for the purchase of goods without the further approval of the Soviet government, for there is no open market in Russia where goods can be bought, the only seller of goods being the government itself. After granting the credit, therefore, the Soviet government would still be in control of the goods to be bought, the prices to be paid, and the terms of repayment. The respective positions of the Egyptian and

Soviet governments would not be changed in the slightest by the granting of the credit; any transactions would still require exactly the same negotiations and decisions that would have been required if the credit had never been granted. The establishment of such a credit at the Gosbank would accordingly be a meaningless gesture so far as the purchase of goods within Russia would be concerned.

Nor would such a credit be of any use for the purchase of goods outside Russia. In the first place the Soviet government does not permit the transfer of rubles to other countries, and in the second place they could not be transferred even if transfer were permitted. No seller of goods outside Russia will take rubles, for the reason that the ruble is practically worthless outside its own country. A small market for rubles exists in New York City at about 30 rubles to the dollar, but if any substantial quantity of rubles were offered for sale, this market would disappear entirely.

As a practical matter, therefore, an international loan of rubles is an impossibility. The most that the Soviet government can do, and the most that it does in fact do, when it wishes to extend credit to a foreign state, is to indicate its intention to sell goods at some time in the future on deferred payments. It cannot do more than this because the communist money system does not permit more. The vaunted loans of the Soviet Union necessarily come down to mere statements of future plans. But plans of course can always be changed, and often they are in fact changed, and when that occurs the ephemeral quality of the so-called loans becomes readily apparent. Some time after the Soviet government announced that it had made a loan to Yugoslavia it refused to sell any further goods to that country on the credit supposed to have been established by the loan. The reason given was that the Yugoslavian

government had become unfriendly. But the repudiation made obvious that there never had been any real loan at all; what had occurred was simply a statement of intention to make sales on credit in the future—an intention which could be repudiated unilaterally.

Our treatment of these Russian statements of intention involves the further error, mentioned above, of converting rubles to dollars at the so-called official rate of exchange of 4 rubles for 1 dollar. This rate of 4 for 1 is official on the Russian side only; the American government has nothing to do with it. It means that the Soviet government, through the Gosbank, will give 4 rubles for every dollar transferred to it. The practical effect of this is about the same as though I should tell my friends that I would pay them 4 dimes for every dollar they would give me, or as though the Bank of France should announce that it would give 1 franc for each dollar delivered to it. In neither of these cases would much business be done. Nor is much business done by the Gosbank at its fanciful rate of exchange. Probably a few people needing rubles in Russia, such as Americans wishing to remit money to relatives, find it necessary to buy rubles from the Gosbank at the rate of 4 rubles for each dollar paid. But the business done at this rate must be very small indeed. The Russian government itself gives tourists rubles at the rate of 10 for 1 dollar, and it tolerates—and perhaps itself operates (my guess is that it operates)—a black market where on tourists can buy rubles at from 20 to 75 for the dollar, the price varying as the quantity of dollars exchanged becomes larger. The basic reason why the Russian rate of 4 for 1 is meaningless and of no practical importance is that 4 rubles in Russia will not on the average buy as much—nor anything like as much—as 1 dollar outside Russia. A dollar is worth a

good deal more, by any conceivable measuring stick, than 4 rubles.

Yet in our discussions of Soviet affairs we translate ruble figures into dollars at the 4 for 1 rate. Thus we tell ourselves that the 400 million rubles in the transaction with Egypt are the equivalent of \$100 million. Although—for reasons to be observed in a moment—rubles cannot accurately be translated into dollars at all, if we should insist on some sort of translation, it would be much more realistic to say that 400 million rubles are represented by a figure somewhere between \$25 million and \$40 million than to say that they amount to \$100 million.

Similar transmutations of rubles into dollars at 4 to 1 can be seen almost daily in our newspapers, periodicals, and books. A recent popular book on Russia transfers rubles into dollars on nearly every page, and although the author warns his readers in an early chapter that the 4 to 1 rate may be misleading, yet he uses it anyway and frequently tries to draw impressive conclusions from the dollar figures he thus builds up. He reports, for example, that the buildings and equipment of Moscow University cost 3 billion rubles, so he was told, which he changes to \$750 million; and this latter figure, he points out, is more than the endowments of Harvard, Princeton, and Yale combined. Waiving for the moment the fact that construction costs cannot be known with accuracy in a communist society, where everything is run by the state, we must nevertheless recognize that changing the assumed cost of 3 billion rubles into dollars at 4 to 1 can give only an inaccurate and indeed ludicrous result. Anyone with the slightest knowledge of construction costs who has seen Moscow University, or even pictures of it, knows that its cost could not have been anything close to \$750 million. Even in this country, where labor costs are far in excess of those

in Russia, it would not cost anything like \$750 million. Dubbing the 4 for 1 rate official cannot make it accurate or useful. A 2 for 1 rate would have just as much contact with reality as the 4 for 1 rate, and at 2 for 1 the Moscow University figure would grow to \$1,500 million—about as informative as the \$750 million figure.

But if the 4 to 1 exchange rate is unrealistic, what is a realistic rate? Premier Khrushchev recently intimated that the present rate may be changed in connection with a contemplated modification of Soviet money. It can be confidently predicted, however, that any official rate of exchange, no matter what it is, is bound to be just about as unrealistic as the present 4 to 1 rate. Why this is so will become apparent if we examine the nature of Soviet prices—for a principal function of money is to measure prices—and consider the difference between prices in the Soviet system and prices in our own free enterprise system.

In a free enterprise system prices are arrived at by the dealings of a multitude of individual buyers and sellers, who buy and sell only as prices are agreed upon. As a result of this process of free bargaining, there is a strong tendency for the prices of goods to conform to costs; a free market, if it be kept free, will rather quickly rectify any situation in which goods are produced either at a substantial loss or at an unusual profit. Thus prices fluctuate about cost, which is always pulling prices toward it. Prices in a free enterprise system also tend to conform to the usefulness of goods to consumers, since consumers try on the average to spend their dollars for those things they think will give them, at the particular time and place, the greatest utility for their money. In a free enterprise society, therefore, prices have a story to tell; they report on the cost of goods and

on their usefulness in caring for human wants; and the report is rather accurate.

Under collectivism in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, prices are not established by the bargaining of buyers and sellers but are fixed by the decrees of officials. It is imperative to remember in dealing with things Russian that all property is owned by the state and all business is done by the state. The exceptions to this proposition are relatively insignificant. In consequence of this totalitarian nature of Russian society, there is only one seller of goods and only one employer of labor—the state. The state therefore decrees the prices of the goods it sells to its citizens and the wages it pays them for their work. A comparatively few public officials issue orders saying that prices shall be thus and so, and prices become thus and so, changing only when the officials change their minds. These fixed prices cover everything except the small quantity of vegetables that growers are permitted to sell in the cities in open markets. This, however, is but a tiny drop of free price in a vast bucket of fixed price.

One might suppose, having in mind the teachings of Karl Marx, that the decreed prices of a communistic society would be directly related to cost. Marx taught that the entire price of a good should go for the wages of the labor that produced it, which means that prices should be directly based on costs in terms of wages. But investigation of prices in the Soviet Union shows that this is not the case. The price of a loaf of bread, for example, is about 2½ rubles in the cities. This amount roughly equals the wage of a common laborer for 1½ to 2 hours, or the wage of a skilled laborer for something like ¾ of an hour—although wages of skilled labor vary a good deal. But the labor in a single loaf of bread cannot possibly amount to this much. In the United States the price of a loaf of bread

amounts to the wage of a common laborer for 7 or 8 minutes and to the wage of a skilled laborer for an even shorter time. Granted that labor is far more efficiently employed in the United States, nevertheless the work time needed to make a loaf of bread in Russia cannot be anything like that represented by the price charged for it.

The same proposition seems to apply to all articles of food and clothing. The price of a pair of shoes is from 400 to 1,000 rubles, of a man's suit from 1,500 to 2,000 rubles, of a pair of women's nylon hose 300 to 500 rubles, and of a bar of chocolate 150 rubles, to cite a few varied examples. When we consider that the monthly wage of unskilled labor is from 300 to 500 rubles and of skilled labor from 750 to 1,200 rubles, we can see that the prices of these goods are far in excess of the cost of the labor employed in producing them. It cannot possibly take a month of skilled labor to make a pair of shoes, or 2 months of skilled labor to make a suit, and so on.

Why does the Soviet state, which itself operates the entire apparatus of production, demand this large profit above the cost of producing these consumer goods? Why has it departed from Marx's teaching? I think it quite clearly is for this reason: The collectivized state furnishes to its citizens a substantial volume of services—education, medicine, and the more customary governmental services—either without charge or at a charge far below cost. But the people who perform these services—the teachers, doctors, nurses, soldiers, and so on—must be paid their wages by the state even though the state makes no direct charge, or an inadequate charge, to the citizenry. The rubles for these wages could conceivably be obtained simply by printing them—paper is cheap. But this would lead to inflation of the money, and monetary inflation is even more dangerous to a communistic society than to a free en-

terprise society. Accordingly the collectivized state must get the necessary rubles from its citizens through some form of taxation.

The collectivized state, however, has very few sources of taxation. It cannot tax land or factories or apartment buildings because it itself already owns all these things. It cannot tax stocks or bonds or bank deposits because there are none (the few minor exceptions to this statement being too small to require notice). And it cannot in reality tax incomes, although it goes through the motions of doing so to a small extent, because all the income of citizens comes from the state in the form of wages, and accordingly a tax on incomes can be no more than a reduction in the wages paid by the state—a mere accounting procedure.

Therefore the collectivized state must resort to what in effect is a huge sales tax. Consumer goods are sold by the state to its citizens at prices far in excess of the wages paid out by the state in producing them, and the excess or profit in reality constitutes a tax. A portion of this excess or profit is, in fact, denominated a turnover tax, collected by the state as part of the price. But this tax is applied to some things and not to others, and there seems to be nothing in the stores to indicate to a purchaser what portion, if any, of the money he pays for a particular good is tax. And indeed it can make no difference to the purchaser whether the rubles he hands over are called price or tax; the money all goes to the state, and so far as the purchaser is concerned, what he pays is simply the price of his purchase. Nor does it make much difference to the state (although it makes some difference for interdepartmental accounting); the important thing is that the desired quantity of rubles be collected. Therefore through the prices it charges on the sale of con-

sumer goods the Russian state obtains not only the rubles needed to pay the cost of producing such goods, but also the rubles needed to pay the cost of the services furnished to the citizenry at little or no direct charge.

Thus in setting prices for consumer goods, the Soviet bureaucracy has to take into consideration both costs and taxes. Costs, however, are extremely difficult to ascertain in a collectivized society. They must be ascertained in rubles, and costs of goods in rubles are pretty much whatever the Soviet officials say they are, for the officialdom sets the prices that enter into costs as well as the prices that are paid by consumers. Thus cost does not furnish an objective element in decreeing prices. Nor does taxation furnish an objective element either, for as we all know there is no such thing as scientific taxation, the only basic principle being to get maximum money with minimum complaint, a principle which in practice leads to making do with whatever tax method seems to be working.

There are, moreover, two further elements, in addition to cost and taxation, which must be considered by public officials as they fix prices—elements which also are not objective, calling for judgment rather than measurement. One is what we may call, for want of a better term, the "social direction" element or factor. The core of collectivism in practice is central planning, and the ultimate concern of central planning is what goods people will consume. One of the effective controls on what they will consume is the price charged for different things. Suppose you wish to discourage the reading of philosophical books and to encourage the reading of scientific books, and yet you do not wish to appear to be exercising censorship. The solution is to raise the prices of philosophical books and to lower the

prices of scientific books. Or suppose you wish to make the citizens believe, despite a desperate housing situation, that the government in its goodness is doing everything it can to furnish housing reasonably. The solution—in lieu of actually building the housing—is to charge a very low rent for such housing as is available, making up the loss on housing by higher prices for other things.

The fourth and final influence in Soviet price determination is what may be called the national income and outgo factor. For reasons we will not pause to examine, it is extremely important to a collectivized state to avoid a deficit in its operations. As we have seen, practically its only income is the prices it collects for consumer goods. And practically its only expense is the wages and pensions paid to citizens. To avoid a deficit, the total of all prices collected must cover the total of all wages and pensions paid out. But this balance of income and outgo is not easily arrived at; and when once a schedule of prices and wages seems to be accomplishing the desired balance, the schedule must not be tampered with lightly. When Soviet officials consider changing a price, therefore, they must consider the effect of the change on the total income of the state.

Thus in fixing the prices of consumer goods, Russian officials must consider costs, taxation, "social direction," and the internal flow of funds. But no one of these factors is susceptible of objective measurement. They are all matters of subjective judgment. Prices of consumer goods in Russia are accordingly the result of the combined guesses of the bureaucracy, and thus they are primarily political facts.

The foregoing observations concern the prices of the consumer goods which the Soviet state sells to its citizens through the state stores. When we turn to capital goods

—raw materials, machinery, apartment buildings, factories—we find that for practical purposes prices are only nominal. Capital goods are not sold by the Soviet state to its citizens, who cannot engage in business and cannot own capital goods. All capital goods are owned by the state, and they are transferred from one governmental department to another, from one factory to another, as they are needed.

When the state railways need new rails, for example, they do not buy them in the open market, nor do they buy them, in the sense of the term to which we are accustomed, from the state steel mills. Some board having jurisdiction of the matter issues an order that the steel mills deliver a specified quantity of rails to the railways. A designated amount of rubles is charged against the railways and credited to the steel mills, but this charge and credit do not involve any market bargaining. The quantity of rubles debited and credited is no more than bureaucratic bookkeeping, and it can be varied up or down without any appreciable influence on affairs. Consequently capital goods in Russia do not have prices attached to them within any realistic meaning of the term.

Presumably in setting these bookkeeping prices for capital goods Russian officials give consideration to costs. But here again costs cannot be objectively measured, for the prices that enter into costs have in turn been arbitrarily fixed by the officialdom, which thus is never able to escape from its own circle of subjective judgment.

The end result of all capital creation, moreover, is ordinarily a building of some kind with its equipment—a factory or an apartment house—whose cost ceases to be of much importance once it is finished. Consider the case of an apartment building: It is composed of brick, timber, cement, other construction materials, and construction labor at the site. When it is

finished the rent need not be based on its cost, and in fact in Russia it is not based on cost but is typically a good deal below the figure that cost would dictate. Accordingly the prices charged to the construction of the apartment building in the bureaucratic bookkeeping are not very important. The price of brick, for example, can be set high enough to make the brick works look profitable without any practical effect on the apartment building. The total cost shown on the books can be 500,000 rubles or 1,000,000 rubles, and whether it is one figure or the other will have little influence—probably none at all—on the rent which will be charged. For rent is a consumer good price decreed by officials who must look at cost as only one of the elements to be considered in price fixing.

But all capital goods, whether brick, steel, locomotives, or punch presses, end up in some form where the price ceases to be important in the collectivized scheme of things. This is why all prices of capital goods, as they are set by Soviet officials from time to time, are primarily political in nature and convey little or no economic information. And this, further, is why figures on costs of projects in Russia can have little or no meaning. The 3 billion ruble cost of Moscow University, mentioned above, could easily have been changed to 2 billion or 4 billion simply by changing the prices of the supplies and equipment which entered into the project, and the change could have been made without the slightest real effect on affairs of any kind.

Thus we can see that prices in the Soviet Union are a vastly different thing from prices in a free market society such as our own. In a free market, prices are comparatively simple in their composition, being an expression of the interplay of cost and utility, and the story they tell is likewise comparatively simple, consisting of

information on cost and utility. Soviet prices, on the other hand, are comparatively complex in their composition, being the product primarily of various value judgments made by officials who themselves may not be clearly aware of the motives prompting them. In consequence the story told by Soviet prices is always a complex one and often turns out to be so involved and tortuous as to defy unraveling. Who can figure out, for example, just why the Soviet officialdom has come to the practice of charging so little for rent and so much for bread?

In a free market, when the price of a good declines, we can typically deduce that the demand for the good has declined or that its cost has declined, or both. In the Soviet system, on the other hand, a decline in price may have no relation whatsoever to either demand or cost, but may have been dictated by quite other considerations. Likewise in a free market society an increase in national product, measured in terms of money, can usually be relied on to indicate at least approximately an increase in goods. But an increase in national product in Russia, measured in rubles, need have no relation at all to an increase in goods; it can be accomplished simply by decreeing an increase in the prices—bookkeeping entries—on a few key products, such as steel and petroleum, on which the Russians are concentrating their efforts. Yet we continue gravely to study and quote these ruble figures, usually first changing them to dollars at 4 for 1. What we need to study, rather, is the figures on production in terms of goods themselves: how many housing units, how much food, how much clothing, how many hospitals and schoolhouses is the Russian economy producing?

Ruble prices, that is to say, cannot be translated into dollar prices without gross deception. No realistic exchange rate is

possible. Rubles are rubles and dollars are dollars, and they can never meet in a meaningful rate of exchange. Just as you cannot transmute, say, oranges into carrots—although they are both forms of food—so you cannot transmute rubles into dollars—although they are both forms of money. You can say that 6 oranges weigh as much as 8 carrots, but you cannot say that 6 oranges are the same thing as 8 carrots or any other number of carrots, and if you insist on talking this way you will only be indulging in an odd sort of self-deception. Likewise it is only self-deception to talk as though 4 rubles were the same thing as 1 dollar, or as though any other number of rubles were the same thing as one dollar. The reality is that the two monetary units belong to different worlds, and we must recognize that reality.

And if we are to recognize this reality, then we must change many of our current modes of discussion relative to the ruble. We must treat ruble prices as the political facts they are, rather than deal with them as though they were economic facts similar to prices in this country. We must appreciate that, since the ruble is first of all a political instrument, it is also strictly a national instrument, incapable of international transfer, and therefore we should stop talking of international loans of the ruble. We should further acknowledge that ruble prices cannot accurately or meaningfully be translated into dollar prices,

and if we feel in particular cases that some comparison of ruble and dollar prices should nevertheless be made, we should accompany such comparison with a cautionary explanation. As readers, we should pay little or no attention to any figures on Russian prices, production, consumption, or foreign trade which are expressed in American dollars. And we should never, under any circumstances, transpose ruble figures into dollar figures at the absurd 4 to 1 rate.

Note

The Soviet government has recently announced (after the above article was in type) a drastic modification in the official rate of exchange of the ruble for the dollar. Beginning January 1, 1961, the exchange rate of the present ruble will be 9 for a dollar, instead of 4 for a dollar, and the new ruble, which Russia will then begin to issue at the rate of 1 new ruble for 10 old rubles, will accordingly have an exchange rate of .9 new ruble for each dollar.

This change will have no economic effect of the slightest importance, for the reasons set forth in the article. All the dollar figures which have been appearing on Russian loans, production, and so forth are automatically reduced to 44.4% of their former amount, although this will probably go unnoticed. Probably, too, many observers of the Russian scene will continue dutifully to translate rubles into dollars at the new rate. But although the new rate will give results not so grossly misleading as those given by the old, it will no more express a rational relation to the dollar than did the old.

The change illustrates and confirms the article's thesis that the ruble is primarily a political fact rather than an economic one, and that a rational relation between the ruble and the monetary unit of a free market is impossible.

The abiding sources of the power of the myth.

The Life and Death of Orpheus

ROBERT BEUM

IN AMERICA children do not grow up with the Greek myths. They never have. The stories are not in our consciousness at all but only, here and there, out on the peripheries. In the main, they were sealed up in that part of "culture" that came here, from across the Atlantic, in least strength. And America was an innovation, a continent to settle: not a few of those who did come here with the kind of absorption of pagan and pagan-Christian myth the mainstream-soaked English wrote from, found little leisure to do anything with it. I am not thinking of the decoratively literary, the unfelt or unrealized consciousness of Greek myth. There was a plentiful sprinkling of that kind of thing, just as there is today. But of the real familiarity and enthusiasm that brings a poet to write the "Hymn on the Morning of Christ's Na-

tivity" or "Eros" or "Leda and the Swan," or a novelist to write something like *Ulysses*, there was very little. The Puritan had no truck with it, the Pioneer had no time for it, the Transcendentalist was thinking and feeling in another vein. And Greek myth was rejected as a part of the played-out culture of Europe that America could not profit by inheriting; the voices here are Whitman and Thoreau, in their less charitable moods—Whitman intoxicated by the awakening and the potential of the New World, and Thoreau content with the natural scene:

What care I for the Greeks or for Troy
town.

If juster battles are enacted now
Between the ants upon this hummock's
crown?

And the new myths—they were coming out of the seaboard, out of the West, out of the Negro South. As for today, there are goddesses and supermen enough in Hollywood and on the screen in the living-room, and here we are—with our children.

It happened, though, that I learned about the Greeks—and about one of them in particular—far better than I learned about Christ or the West. The loan of a book, and the circumstances of my liking reading almost as much as rowdying, and of my living in a big, ancient house where reading somehow seemed one of the best things to do—this was enough to start the anachronism of an admiration for Orpheus. I can begin to see now some of the places I followed him to, and I began to write about him mainly, I suppose, because setting things down is one of the best ways of seeing new things, as well as seeing more clearly what one has seen already. I came to think that Orpheus was—or could become, as one thought about him—a good deal more than an esoteric figure of Greek religion, or a pretty figurehead First Poet. And it was the years of thinking about him that put me with those who believe that the poetry and wisdom of the Greek stories are really inexhaustible, that what we can learn from them about symbols, about the possibilities and limits of human power, and about recurring human situations, is much more than we have learned yet—and not “learned,” but turned into root knowledge, the kind of felt knowledge that starts new work.

The first time I met Orpheus I knew he was important, but I was to be a long time finding out why. He gave me a special fever, struck through, left me in turmoil. Whatever was the final truth of things, I knew that one could learn something about it from him. There was a depth, a richness, an urgency not in any of the other myths.

Actually, my first love in the Greek stories was not Orpheus and Eurydice, but Ariadne and Theseus. I was twelve or thirteen when an aunt gave me her copy of Guerber's *Myths of Greece and Rome*. It was one of my favorites, and I brought it to my desk or bed innumerable times, not so much reading as marveling over the profuse illustrations, among which were the “Ariadne” by Rae and the “Orpheus and Eurydice” by Beyschlag. When Theseus sailed, I was heartbroken with Ariadne, and Rae's romantic seaward-sighing figure of the girl whose very name was so regnant and beautiful made its indelible mark. Without doubt, too, Beyschlag's sturdy and glaring Orpheus led me farther into a story I sensed to be full of wisdom and humanity before any more definite notion of these qualities came into my head. In later years, only *The Tempest* was to match its fascination. And now I can see no important differences between the stories of Orpheus and Prospero. Both are poems too magically suggestive to yield at once any considerable part of their “meaning,” yet the presence of that meaning makes itself felt at once. These two stories strike so far into the soul, they remain haunting presences for life: nourishment for the sense of beauty and mystery as well as elusive game for rational analysis. The world of *The Tempest* has all the magic and distant familiarity of one of the old myths. Yet it's the one story most original with Shakespeare, and so a myth of his own creation, its pattern and its wisdom going back to nature's elemental course and counsel revealed through genius.

Slowly, unable to bear the misty knowledge of intuition, of the half-revealed, or to resist entering such a vivid world, we begin the unravelling. Only recently, after years of turning the Orpheus story over

and turning it over again, have I come to separate any of the threads. Not separate in the sense of solving a puzzle, a thing that has a definite and usually only a single solution. There is probably not, in the Orpheus myth, or in any other that has passed the test of longstanding fascination for mankind, any finite point at which one may arrive and exclaim, "Ah, *that's* what it means!" Surely whatever a myth or poem or other imaginative creation suggests—not frivolously to individual minds, but recurrently to numbers of good minds—is part of its meaning. Though, again like a poem, every myth must have a relatively definite core of meaning: the Orpheus myth, or Lear, or Prospero, can mean or be or represent many, but not all things, for there are other myths, other poems.

None of the great myths is pure allegory, that is, abstraction clothed in concrete figures and events and sent on its moral way. There is no possibility of a 1:1 translation, as there commonly is with allegory. To a certain extent, all the myths may be sheer stories, created by the imagination out of the natural delight in creation and in vicarious experience. Some are probably dreams made public. Others no doubt were inspired partly by historical persons and events, as Euhemerus believed.

Yet the myths that stay in the forefronts of our lives contain recurring human aspirations, questions, root insights, and declarations of values:

To be Orpheus is an aspiration. To be the greatest of poets, to move the very stony stuff of this world by notes and cadences—desertion of that ideal has filled the world with banal music and trivial and private poetry.

To try to go down, without dying, into the place of death, and see what's there—we will always be doing that.

To insist on the terribleness of death and on its final irretractability, even when death's agents are confronted by all man's power, persuasive art, dedication, and suffering, is to achieve an attitude in which there is no room for sentimentality.

To imply that a poet-musician can come closest to penetrating mystery and reclaiming life from death is to set a value. And we are always dying into abstraction or into moral or physical isolation, dying away from the sense and knowledge of things as they really are, as they really affect us in all their vividness, warmth, uniqueness, and subtle relationships; poetry goes down to reclaim our souls for a moment.

To see life as a brief marriage, followed by a long and difficult search for lost harmony, lost revelation, lost capacity for love, is to see one of the really permanent strains in life.

II

There is no danger of reducing him to allegory. There is no one interpretation to arrive at, but many interpretations interwound, inseparable, and the whole fabric is infinitely harmonious and frees the imagination. Orpheus is not merely a personification of natural forces. Not simply the sun going into the dark west in pursuit of his own lost light. The Greeks were too much concerned with man and man's experience not to have meant Orpheus as a real person—a man raised to his highest powers—with senses, gifts, and experiences entirely human.

Was there even an historical Orpheus? I was greatly excited when I first came to consider the possible historical content of some of the myths. Had sand of the Naxos beach taken Ariadne's impression? Has dust that was the greatest poet's dissolved in Aegean rains?

Watmough is cool to the idea. "To de-

bate whether Orpheus was or was not a historical figure is in some ways wasted energy. With our present evidence, abundant though it is, a scientific investigator is bound to remain agnostic . . ."

W. K. C. Guthrie seems to have a predilection for believing, though he wears a respectable conservatism: "We can scarcely reflect on the evidence for the story and character of Orpheus . . . without having somewhere lurking in our minds the question of his possible historical existence. This is a question which will always be decided by the temperament of the individual rather than by strict deduction from unmistakable ancient information."

And Jane Harrison has no doubts at all. "Orpheus was a real man, a mighty singer, a prophet and a teacher . . . we are struck by the human touches in his story, and most by a certain vividness of emotion, a reality and personality of like and dislike"

Orpheus the reformer seems historical indeed. There must have been someone who stepped forward to protest the Dionysian darkness and contend for form and reason, someone who made poetry possible, where before there had been mere frenzied chanting and piping for the god. Such a man could not but become a myth.

In giving him Apollo and Calliope for parents, the Greeks made the magic musician's powers the less mysterious. But even such a pooling of musical and poetic genes seems hardly able to account for his extraordinary gifts. He must have made some new world-opening discovery about the nature and possibilities of musical and poetic art. He must have discovered form: bar, measure, and theme, and definite prosodic form. He, and soon everyone, saw the human delight in it, and realized its evocative and creative and civilizing powers. Orpheus found that form was a joy and a challenge. It brought a pleasur-

able familiarity and predictability, it satisfied the sense of restraint and order, and it helped create the songs themselves.

Going from history to dream, one sees that the figure of Orpheus may be the mind unfolding itself in a symbol of its own beautiful power to contend against fate and evil, to shape and direct nature, to temper the Dionysian excesses, that is, put a leash on wild energy, that it might be directed to some end compatible with civilization. We never think of Orpheus' voice or poetry as a great wild rush of word and tone but as an art of masculine force, variety, and even ecstasy—the variety no longer, however, undisciplined, and the force and ecstasy something different from sheer animal passion and frenzy. The singing, dancing, and piping of the wine-god women had been only an adjunct to the god's rite and had taken only the raw, direct forms suggested by the ritual; insofar as this may be considered a kind of poetry, its only law was constant increase in tempo, pitch, and volume to the climax of the orgy. But what Orpheus created was a thing in itself, a music shaped partly by consciousness and susceptible to control. Orpheus began to play and invent, and it seemed that suddenly more light had come into the day and that the maenads had turned into placid trees. One line suggested another; one stanza needed another to complete the feeling and helped at its birth; one melody became compelling by variation and return. And so he was fruitful, and there was more light.

III

There are many Greek stories with happy endings, but so realistic a temperament as the Greek could not have made Orpheus one of them. In none of the myths is any figure, once claimed by death and brought to the underworld, ever restored to life (Alcestis may be the exception, but her death seems to have been conditional). No

one had ever really beaten death, and even Orpheus was not allowed to. He himself, one of the few men to have gone down living into the places of death, was not only to find its claim irrevocable, but, as a kind of compensation for his having been allowed to come so very close to success, he was to be killed soon after (unlike Hercules, he had worked his way down through the terrors by guile and art, an impertinence that could not be allowed to stand). Here we see the maenads as restorers of natural balance, levelers of the high. Orpheus becomes every person who has wished for and sought the return of a vanished precious thing—childhood, powers of judgment or synthesis, a loved one. His longing is a universal experience. So is his defeat. So the myth strikes home.

It is this enormous grief of his which disposes of the rumor that, after the final loss of Eurydice, Orpheus gave his love only to young boys. The imputed homosexuality will be seen as a spurious interpolation in the true biography. It is inconceivable that Orpheus could have so violated his unparalleled devotion to this one woman whose bodily and spiritual refinement stood utterly apart from the maenads. The man whose lament for his wife was the very last thing to die out of him could not have turned seducer of young boys. He may have gathered them around him to seduce them into the art of the lyre and the lute.

IV

Prometheus gave us fire, and so technology and civilization; Orpheus, self-discipline and form, the arts made possible by them; Christ, the revelation of divine, inclusive love. Fire and tools; discipline and the arts; inclusive mercy and love. Prometheus, chained and devoured living by vultures; Orpheus, torn to pieces by frenzied maenads; Christ, crucified.

Such givers must be murdered, every-

thing demands it, escape is rare. Fear and jealousy set the seal. Not only that the Inspired Man, or the Good Man, his vision threatening the prevailing gods, is murdered by their agents. But we ourselves, receiving the gift, begin to plot against him. We are glad, perhaps, for the fire (or the poetry or the love) but wary of it too, fearing its newness and untestedness, and sensing its enormous potential and our own fallibility in controlling it (as with fire) or our inability to submit to it wholly (as with love and poetry), which brings us a new agony. To relieve the dread responsibility of having fire, love, and poetry, we turn on the giver and have him impaled or torn to pieces. Then, guilty, repentant, indelibly impressed by his dedication and suffering, we see that what we have done we have done to a god. The maenads even are said to have repented their murder.

Immediate motives for the slaying of Orpheus by a pack of maenads are not lacking. Whether they came on him by accident or were deliberately tracking him is of no great importance. Motive they had, and they did find him. It has been suggested that Orpheus may have been the aggressor, provoked the attack by raving against them, railing in the madness of a misogyny that had broken over him with the death of Eurydice. But this notion is not plausible. It shows, more than madness, a pettiness of soul unlike the real Orpheus. And the psychology is bad: his grief would have robbed him of both the energy and the interest to attack the women. No immediate provocation from him was necessary. Those wild women had plenty of old scores to even. He had set about reforming their whole way of living, and it was for this they bore him grievance. It is certain that he preached against the wine god and against lust and their insane extravagances. But they were by no means ready for what

he preached: monotheism, monogamy, relative chastity, discipline. They may have feared even that this new art of his, which woke the hearer to a marmoreal ecstasy rather than incited him into a bodily fury, might somehow reduce the fertility of the race. Does the soul dream, in Orpheus, the danger of man's getting too far away from body, from the dark but healthy animal?

V

The three writers of tragedy are silent about Orpheus and Eurydice. That seems incompatible with the story's obvious intrinsic richness as dramatic material, but it is easily accounted for.

These lovers came onto the Greek scene at a very late date. Orpheus himself is not mentioned in Homer. And Orpheus the Magic Musician and religious Reformer was known long before the lover of Eurydice. All extant monuments depicting Orpheus alone or with company other than Eurydice are older; the Orpheus-Eurydice monuments are later. As a matter of fact, this love story is generally regarded as the last of the great reverberating legends the Greek myth-making age was to pass on to the future. But the tragedians were cool to material of recent origin. They preferred folk tales, themes that had already mellowed and become familiar. Partly, this was sheer conservatism, adherence to the tradition of writing plays about only the protagonists of the great houses. And the histories of the great houses did furnish, as a matter of fact, the characters and situations that best suited the Greek conception of tragedy. Partly, too, these stories were a means of obtaining aesthetic distance; contemporary subjects might be inflammatory, or not quite clear, or attended by too many extradramatic associations to permit sublimity. And, being abundant, the old tales were the line of least resistance. Further, to an aesthetic and contemplative genius like the Greek,

it was a nobler feat to liberate force and tragic emotion from a story whose outcome was already known to everyone in the audience than to descend to novelty and surprise. Finally, the playwrights were cool to themes of romantic love. They considered them not substantial enough to produce the higher tragic effects. Even Aeschylus' lost Orpheus play, since it was said to be about the death of Orpheus, presumably neglected Eurydice.

And this last makes good sense. An Orpheus tragedy would not have to depend on the poet's loss of Eurydice for its pathetic interest. Of far deeper tragic stuff than the poet's loss of his wife is his dark involvement with the maenads. What most moved me to sympathy with Orpheus was his gradual recognition that though he had been right in preaching against the excesses of the wine-god women, he had also wronged them. They were not ready for his preaching, though their men apparently were. The women were suddenly deprived of love and thrown into confusion. There is a note here of the pathetic suffering that is brought about, along with any possible benefit, by all radical innovation. In the depth of his wretchedness for Eurydice, this reflection must have weighed Orpheus down into a sense of the futility of all he had done. No doubt he lost his confidence in the pure beneficence of his Apollonian vision. By then his agony was so great that he went abroad with no fear of the maenads, but resigned to their vengeance or even offering himself in atonement for the violence he had done them.

VI

One image in Orpheus' life persists endearingly: the plants springing up to hear, to sway with his music, to touch him and invite him to notice them. The sense of vegetable and animal meeting, undivided, undivorced. This is man remembering and

reliving his kinship with the green world, a momentary dream of the continuity of life.

Poems are the fruits and flowers of the animal. Normally we cater to the self, add foliage, but poetry is a flowering, a transformation of the self into a less finite life. Plants, having no nervous or spiritual process or being, have their poems nevertheless, in their flowering—all that inessential subtlety and variety. Every birth, even, is one of nature's poems, but nature, wanting a more intricate and even more beautiful poem, instead of limiting man to a poetry he shares with the whole range of living things, freed him into the poetry of language, dance, line, color, tone. When the plant has had light and food, it stops vegetating and flowers (if it can), as if pain told it that it must hurry to its end, its purpose beyond the sufficiency of its own individual existence: the beauty and immortality of the flower, the poem.

So Novalis and Keats. Their blood, their vital sap, going bad, they flowered quickly. So Orpheus, who found that he would have to bring even more powerful art from his being, if he were to win back Eurydice. The pain of his anguish put the spur to his resources and pulled all his energy into the single focus of his art, that even Dis and Kora would now find moving.

But such quick doom as theirs is, if not rare, at least not typical. Nature provides that some of her plants and poets shall live long, vegetating and flowering intermittently. For every Keats or Novalis we have a Sophocles, a Goethe, a Yeats. The strong, spirited poems men have continued to turn out in their old age are nature's freedom from mere body, at the same time that she glories in body. Long after mortal seed is impossible, seed of heart and thought is active.

But it is not morbidity to admit that pain is behind poetry, prompting it. Physi-

cal desire itself, about which there is nothing morbid, is a kind of pain, urging the flesh into ecstasy. So too, at the very foundation, poetry is partly a release of fullness of being, of thought and feeling that are painful while only half realized.

Even for a life happy in its outward circumstances (Robert Bridges, Felix Mendelssohn) the very pain of knowing truths and half-truths and beauties and half-beauties, instead of Truth and Beauty; of being only a fragment of Being; of knowing finite and sensing infinite love, causes a constant flowering into the arts.

The cosmic, unvarying, mutual attraction of things (gravity); the coming together in love, on all levels, of plants, animals, and men; this is all that nature can do to alleviate the eternal pain of the fragmentation of things from God, of the tearing of Eurydice from Orpheus.

The bacchanal music and poetry were inseparable from the god's rite and of no value or meaning in themselves. By practicing them independently, after reshaping them and after discovering the value of form, Orpheus brought the arts into self-sufficiency. His kind of poetry, poetry as imaginative construction, as a dialogue with all reality, has persisted ever since.

He was the first to realize that while a poem sometimes reflects in a more or less direct way what the poet himself has actually thought and experienced as a person, more often it arises from imaginative experience which may have only a very slight basis in the individual poet's direct experience; its "I" may be fictional, not actual. Orpheus provided us with a means—the poem—of exploring reality and of freeing one's limited self into the selves of others in times and places not our own. There are poems and poems, and each one has its own peculiar genesis. One arises almost purely out of a desire to describe and perhaps praise an impressive or

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evocative landscape—trees in October, say. Another is an attempt to recreate the movement and rhythm of some object or situation actual or imagined. Still another begins in the most nebulous impulses and becomes solid perhaps largely through the challenge and guidance of a definite, chosen prosodic form. The value of the lyric poem is the same as that of the drama and of imaginative prose: it provides us with knowledge in the form of vivid and meaningful vicarious experience; it allows us that wide experience, that freedom from the confines of One Self, which we all seek. I say “experience” rather than “fantasy,” since intuition and imagination allow us to lose ourselves within the very reality of particular circumstances and to identify ourselves in a very meaningful way with historical or mythical persons. We can see life through Iago’s eyes or through Prospero’s—and then we see so much more of it. The poem is thus not only a means for expressing experience already held but also a means for exploring it further, for exploring, in fact, all existence, and the poem is the record left behind. We are humanly impelled toward such variety, such enrichment, partly—let the most conservative of us admit it—out of our constant desire for novelty and partly out of a grander desire for the inclusiveness of spirit that promises to bring us into an inner harmony which itself seems to be the goal of all our explorations.

The pathetic brevity of Orpheus’ marriage with Eurydice suggests the soul dreaming of the briefness of the times when it experiences the sense of union with persons and things outside the self, and thus dreaming of life as a search for its elusive power to love and find harmony. As its chief hope of success, life relies on music and poetry, which, sounding, bring things together in a common experience of liberation.

*A lively presentation of the case for instructors
grading students according to their abilities and
keeping their distance.*

The Segregation That Is Needed

MARION MONTGOMERY

SINCE OUR FIRST "AGONIZING REAPPRAISAL" of educational materials and methods in 1957, occasioned by the Sputnik panic, we have begun once more to slump back into presputnik complacency. There was at first an urgent flurry of talk about attracting the gifted young people into the teaching profession, and we have even made federal funds available through congress toward that end, money by act of congress being the most ready answer to any pressing problem. There was likewise much talk of better salaries for teachers, of stronger parental support in the maintenance of discipline and work, of de-emphasis of frill benefits of high school kindergarten, and of a new emphasis on a hard core of studies related to science. It was a happy season for hurling bricks at the ever-tempting heads of the professional educators, those feather merchants whose vested interest lies in the system of education developed and sold the American consumer with Madison Avenue skill. For since John Dewey gave them the light in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, they have carried it unto all

the people with a fervor that has resulted in the deification (but not the definition) of Education. But what Lyell and Darwin were to many a comfortable Victorian congregation, well-adjusted to 19th century pleasures, the first Sputnik was to the innumerable converted and baptized worshipers of Education. They suddenly discovered that our intellectual comfort was the result of intellectual drowning rather than baptizing, that what we suddenly needed was not the muddled doctrine of "equal intellect for all" as distorted from Dewey through Columbia Teachers College and its subsidiaries across the country, but a better bear trap, one with the best hydrogen trigger money could buy.

After that initial panic, the bear's breath began to seem not so hot on our neck—rather, well . . . warm and even perhaps friendly. Nevertheless the embarrassment of the unexpected crisis left us with anger to express. We began to sound more like enraged alumni who discover at the homecoming game that their much publicized quarterback has his position through

influence rather than through ability than like a congregation whose faith in omnipotent Education had been shaken. There has been more "Kick out the coach" than "Examine the priest on points of doctrine." For we are not, despite our pretense to the contrary, a religious people, being interested in emotional peace and contentment and a workable product from our institutions.

Well then, the coach must go. The cry is not new, it has simply been louder recently. There has been constant criticism of doctrinal points held by the educators of educators. One could collect an amazing bibliography to support the statement. But the voice of interrogation has been unpersuasive, partly because it has not addressed itself to the problem of the better bear trap, a utilitarian concern which most *motional* (that is, devoted to that other undefined American god, Progress) Americans can understand. There is a persuasiveness in the argument that higher mathematics is necessary to the national welfare since only through higher mathematics will it be possible to outdo the Russians, get to the moon first, or catch up with them in rockets. What chance have the ancient arguments concerning the value of mathematics for its own sake? How persuasive is it to point out that Einstein was not looking for a way to make an A-bomb when he devised formulas that made the H-bomb possible? We make the same demands upon the new coach as made upon the old. In the past we demanded in the name of Progress, not higher mathematics but business math, not the grammar and logic necessary to rational thought but business English—while those old fuddy-duddies, the "professors" whose retreat was generally the ivory towers of liberal arts colleges, talked angrily, then desperately, and then cynically, if at all. Oh, for a Jonathan Swift among them! But in an age capable of seeing only a literal horror of a misanthrope in the

"Modest Proposal," the following quotation can only be taken as praise:

The evolution of the prescribed education "lingo" has been an amazing development. If, in 1900 a teacher at the University had brought a hen to class for teaching purposes, while an innovation, the hen was simply a hen. By 1910, this hen was a "problem." By 1915 the hen became a "project." Around 1920 the hen became a "unit of work." By 1925 the same hen developed into an "activity." By 1930, she became the basis of an "Integrated Program." And lo, in 1936, the poor old hen had become a "frame of reference." As 1941 drew to a close, she implemented into an "Area in a Workshop." By 1942 she appeared to have been "calibrated as a part of orchestration of school and community activities." After the summer of 1945, she is the concomitant of "Motivated Evaluation."

Does this not bespeak Progress? If there is criticism, it is likely to be directed at the facts: for instance, any one who is advanced in henology enough to attend one of the elaborate annual conferences at my university entitled "The Chicken of Tomorrow" could immediately point out that the writer must be talking about several hens, not just one. Everyone knows hens don't live forty-five years.

So those professors of the ivory tower (currently expected to produce something more basically necessary to our survival than a chicken of tomorrow) watched helplessly. The demigod Education, worshiped of the people, gouged intellect first with one horn in the name of high school social adjustment and then with the other in the name of an immediate monetary return for four years of college. The "professors" who professed abstract values proved Humpty Dumpties easily pushed from the wall, and it took the Russian Sputnik to make their

argument persuasive among the voters of the nation. Social adjustment in high school and business math build no satellities, and while business English may make one adept at the creation of business jargon and Jaycee public relations speeches for Allied Can, Inc., it does not equip one to read fearful handwritings on the wall. The panic of 1957, then, was simply the outer sign of the inner weakness the educational coaches had promoted and nurtured for three generations. Alumni-itis struck in. New coach! New scholarships for potential quarterbacks! Let's get in there and support our team!

II

New coach indeed. But what characteristic ought we to look for? The ability to produce a better chicken of tomorrow or larger H-bomb? Give us that winning team! But it is a great mistake to continue the sloppy analogy between the good teacher and the good coach or practical product finder. Nevertheless our thinking half-habits make us act as if the analogy were absolutely sound. We want a man as coach who can discover talent, and through proper exercises develop it toward the perfection of our desires. We can muster "democratic" support for such an approach so long as there is a chance that our team won't win. From the conception of the All-American High School Boy as a junior edition of Chaucer's miller, we turn to a conception of him as a junior Univac. Contemplating these two American dreams of manhood, one can be thankful for the force of inertia, the product of complacency among parents and vested interest among the high priests of Education. We are saved for the moment from absolute dominion of either.

What kind of coach do I want? First of all, I don't want a coach at all. I want what is just as respectable and far more efficient: the good teacher. The good teach-

er, I should think, is first of all one whose awareness of these two American ideals of man as left guard or Univac does not leave him desperately cynical. He must see that there is some middle course between ape and essence, though he will not be one to champion such a course with the catch-all phrase of "education of the whole child." Furthermore, being aware of the two extreme conceptions of the All-American Boy, the good teacher must also be aware that his is, and will continue to be, a constant struggle with the fanatical and inconstant alumni who are in the majority, the alumni, so recently calling loudly for the coach's scalp, whom the teacher knows immediately as Junior's Mama and Papa. For Mama and Papa will in one emotional context malign him for damaging the child's immortal psyche because Junior is not graded on the curve on his history test covering names of English kings and at the next, in times of acute Sputnik-itis, condemn him for pussyfootedness when "the safety of the nation is at stake."

I think undoubtedly this good teacher I am talking about (and to) will find himself possessed of more than the ordinary degree of original sin; otherwise he wouldn't be a schoolteacher in the first place. Adam had to know, got so concerned with knowing, that he ate the fruit to be equal to God in knowledge (and those of us who find such relief in putting the failure of our educational system solely on the professional educators ought to remember Adam, who didn't get to stay in Eden by blaming Eve). Ever since Adam, man has been cursed by the desire to know, and the good teacher is the person who manifests this curse most constantly. Furthermore, he is not to be set apart from that supposedly insufficient judge, the layman, as being the man with the most education degrees, longest bibliography, or most popular with the students. Neither Socrates nor Christ

was popular. I would like to have the following motto cast in bronze and placed as paperweights on the desks of all board of education chairmen, presidents, deans, principals, department heads, and teachers:

THE GOOD TEACHER EMULATES
SOCRATES AND CHRIST, NEITHER
OF WHOM WAS POPULAR WITH
THE MAJORITY OF HIS HEARERS
NOR WROTE ARTICLES OR BOOKS
NOR HELD DEGREES—HONORARY
OR EARNED—FROM RECOGNIZED
INSTITUTIONS OF LOWER OR
HIGHER LEARNING.

The first, indispensable quality in the good teacher, displayed in myriad ways, is his desire to *transcend* rather than to *adjust to*. The teacher's ability to adjust to degrees and bibliographies as end products rather than means, his ability to adjust to his students and the community may destroy his ability to transcend: intellectual evolution becomes retrogressive. (See Jacques Barzun's recent *House of Intellect* on this question.)

Now the privilege of transcending the ordinary level of knowledge, as the good teacher does, is accompanied by the necessity of judging degrees of knowledge. Willy-nilly, Mama and Papa upset and angry or not, the teacher must judge. Of course he fears that his light may be darkness, but he will know when his darkness is a light unto the outer darkness that may be represented by Mama and Papa and Junior. He judges, knowing that democracy as conceived by the Greeks and adopted by our founding fathers has so far decayed into intellectual anarchy that Mama and Papa may consider him presumptuous, arrogant, even immoral when he exercises intellectual honesty by saying that Junior has not mastered rudimentary mathematics. Except, I must keep repeating,

in that year of grace, 1957. That year Mama and Papa may still have felt the same way, but they were also moved by the desire for survival. Part of our muddled headed thinking about Junior and his school (and we are all like Junior's Mama and Papa some of the time) lies in this: we have extended the grim and honorable old injunction to "judge not lest ye be judged" to regulate the school teacher's duty because we confound *soul judgment* and *mind judgment*, because we don't know Christ from Socrates. We take the Bill of Rights as an assurance that every man's son is equal to every other man's son in intellectual potential. Of course, when I put the statement that bluntly, it will be denied by all as an absurd piece of thinking or a deliberate distortion. The point, though, is that we *act* by that view and have developed our educational system in this century with this conception as fundamental to "democratic" education. This was a desirable tenet for the initiators of the new system, for to arm the people with such a conception is to provide the necessary votes to provide the necessary laws and monies to build that new system. The ambitious politician knows well that he must not take Education's name in vain—that is, he must not question the holiness or supernatural powers of that god by questioning unlimited suffrage. Suffer *all* the little children to come unto me for at least twelve years, and deny them not, if you want the office. Until 1957.

So no wonder that Mama and Papa resent any strict judgment of Junior's intellectual progress that might indicate he has gone as far as he should at the end of junior high. How dare you say Junior can't do as well as Banker Brown's boy in mathematics? He is *just as good* as Johnny Brown. Just as good. As if *goodness* of an individual has anything to do with his intellectual prowess. Of course, if the

teacher is diplomatic, he may say that Junior *won't* do as well as Johnny Brown. This gives Papa occasion to smile knowingly, still holding inviolate Junior's potential equality of intellect while enjoying the pleasure of his being a little rascal who needs only a trip to the woodshed to set him on the road to realization, perhaps even to the presidency (while Mama wants a more *inspiring* and *sympathetic* teacher).

Now Junior already accepts the fact that Johnny Brown is better at his books than he, just as Papa has finally accepted the fact that Jack Jones can kick the football farther than Junior. But democratic anarchy leaves one without a place, and Mama and Papa are consequently in quest of status. Of course man has always been a status seeker, ever since the confusion commenced between the relative potential of individuals and the absolute potential of the individual. Cain slew Abel a long while back. Nevertheless, status seeking has changed in its ends. The values which have been treasured most highly have been outvoted, foremost among them being intellectual accomplishment for its own sake. To be good, we now feel, is to have found one's safe place in the world. Environmental determinism (to which I shall speak again directly) encourages us to better ourselves by adjusting to environment, not by attempting to realize our true intrinsic worth—not by trying to transcend environment. To be saved then is to have finally arrived at the four-bedroom house with double carport. How may Education save one? Through business math and business English for the masses. And elementary psychology to keep us happy till we can get that house.

No surprise then that we establish our educational system to provide safety of adjustment to the natural and social world. Now no doubt there is still resentment on

Papa's part because Junior continues to kick that football only an average of twenty-five yards, despite all the milk and steak and practice, while skinny Jack Jones kicks it fifty. (One thing the 20th century Papa has over his grandfather: a scientific scapegoat to replace God: he can blame Junior's relative inequality, when forced to recognize it, on his genes, and *his* on *his* father's, in a comfortable retrogression, thus freeing himself of any guilt feeling. The modern epic has been the scientific justification of genes' ways to man.) Jack has a knack with a football just as Johnny Brown has a knack with a mathematics formula, but the distinction between twenty-five yards and fifty yards on the football field is an incontrovertible fact of inequality, easily tape measurable. Disallowed is any popular scientific personality mysticism which would make it necessary for the football coach to grade Junior on the curve. Papa must accept or be ridiculed.

Papa will not only accept this inequality on the football field; as often as not he will contribute to an athletic scholarship to send Jack Jones to State U. And then, just as self-righteously, he will turn to Junior's problem in mathematics and feel that for the mathematics teacher to suggest that there is an incontrovertible distinction between Johnny's and Junior's potential is a sign that Junior has a poor teacher—one who can't get the material across. Such a teacher, usually, is said to lack that heal-all, Compassion, by which Papa and Mama mean (though they do not know that they mean it) the ability of a teacher to lie to Junior about his intellectual potential—with a kind face, of course. Junior will be considered dull if he doesn't get credit for the course—at least sufficient credit to allow him to go to State U to watch Jack Jones play on Saturday afternoons. A scholarship for Johnny Brown, in the

event his father can't send him to pursue mathematics? Witness:

I happened to be attending the State University of Iowa when the first successful launching of an American satellite was announced. What an orgy of self congratulation followed: one of the key members of the team that put the Explorer in orbit was none other than Professor van Allen of the Physics Department at SUI, a native son. Furthermore, the initial data from the new satellite were being broken down at that school. The press of the state flooded all news media with stories and features: van Allen as boy, as student, as teacher. The family history. Family home. Other successful members of the family. The van Allens at the White House reception for the satellite team. Then the inevitable: the suggestion was made and quickly formalized that a scholarship fund be established in van Allen's name, the proceeds from which were to be used to finance talented students interested in physics. After elaborate planning, organization, promotion, and collection by the citizens of the state of Iowa—spurred on by civic-minded leaders and government officials—a few hundred dollars were finally deposited in the van Allen fund, considerably less than a thousand.

Meanwhile, anxious alumni of SUI provided funds to buy the basketball coach a new automobile. He had made a good showing that season.

This, while an unusually dramatic example, is nevertheless essentially a typical example of the way we Mamas and Papas *feel* about Junior and Jack Jones and Johnny Brown. And this is consequently the way we act, for—as I have already asserted—we act on feelings, not thoughts. Feeling and its act are built into the system, drilled into our teachers through the professional courses in the muddlement of thinking for the sake of that empire build-

ing whose pretext for existence has been the development of the "whole child." It is one of the ironies of our situation that there is a sounder and more respected democracy at work on the high school football fields of the nation than is allowed to operate in the classroom. Who would dream of erasing the distinction between varsity and intramural teams? I do not observe that Mamas and Papas generally worry about the damage done to Junior's psyche when he doesn't make the varsity team or when he only makes the second or third string. Certainly most Juniors seem to "adjust" well enough without being allowed a turn as quarterback or left end in the big Thanksgiving Homecoming Game. When Junior exits from the stadium waving his school colors on the end of a stick, he does not give the appearance of a child suffering from an inferiority complex.

As a matter of fact, it is Junior's nature (as it was and sometimes still is Mama's and Papa's) to respect relative ability. It is only by rigid suppression of such respect through the public relations work of those with maladjustment theories to sell that he is finally prepared to step into his father's shoes and suppress his own son's native sense of relative values—in the name of Education and Progress and Democracy. Meanwhile, Junior doesn't feel that he isn't as good on the scale of absolute value of the human being as Jack simply because Jack is first string while he is third—provided only that Junior be allowed to live with himself long enough to adjust to himself. It is considered dangerous, as it well may be, for one to get to know himself too well; the emphasis is on living with others.

It would be well for us Mamas and Papas to notice that often Junior tries hard to equal Jack on the football field.

We honor competition everywhere except in the classroom.

III

I have said, and here re-emphasize: the good teacher must accept as a starting point an alumni association of parents who generally cannot make a distinction between intellectual accomplishment and moral goodness. Then he must, soundly and according to his intellectual principles, insist upon judging intellect. For herein lies his true compassion for Junior, as for Jack and Johnny. Johnny makes consistent A's because he is exceptional (in the old sense of the word), and Jack kicks the football fifty yards because *he* is exceptional. Is Junior as second man to be told that his twenty-five yards is really forty or his C in mathematics a B plus? If Jack Jones simply cannot do mathematics because he is exceptional (in the newest euphemism for the old-fashioned *dumb*), he should not be given the Social C. Not even when he works diligently, makes no trouble, and is needed for the Thanksgiving Homecoming Game. (Usually he isn't required to know anything about mathematics to be eligible to play, but he must have a passing grade in the subject.) If both Jack and Junior fail to master the material, they should be given the F, which despite popular superstition is not equal to the mark of Cain.

Aside from reasons other than practical, the person who knows most accurately that there is a lie in the grade book when a C is substituted for an F or a B for a C is Junior. One of the major causes of classroom chaos (at least I gather this to be true from my interviews with university freshmen just out of the nation's high schools) is the dishonesty involved in the attempt to adjust the student socially and psychologically to mathematics or English grammar or physics. If I can get away with this, says Junior or Jack with his

adjusted C, how much further can I go? Having got a C where a D was called for, can I get a C for an F? Where Junior may have tried to make the first string on the football team, he now tries to see how much he can get away with in the classroom. Honesty in judgment of intellectual achievement would make a remarkable difference in the wear and tear on teachers. It would do more than a raise in salary, *provided* honest judgment were supported by the teacher's superiors so that eventually it would come to be valued by Mama and Papa.

Compassion? Yes. But the good teacher's compassion involves his maintaining Old Testament principles as well as New Testament ones. For the reality of human existence in our limited world of *now*, to which we are supposedly adjusting in our schools, cannot be denied indefinitely. We are somewhere *now* in our intellectual journey, just as we are somewhere physically. And the teacher's responsibility is to tell us where. The teacher's justice in giving the student his intellectual place is ultimately the greater mercy.

IV

The word has got abroad that, if the teacher is to be successful in his missionary role of helping Junior adjust to society, he must become a contortionist "personality-wise." That is, he must put himself on a level with Junior and Jack and Johnny. But the teacher, in deserting his proper role as sympathetic but disinterested judge of intellectual accomplishment in order that he might work such adjustments, has destroyed his authority and forfeited the dignity proper to his role. The teacher must regain authority and its concomitant dignity as necessary to his position of judge, and he must do so, among various ways, by re-establishing a line of distinction between teacher and student. The teacher as regular fellow is

not per se the good teacher any more than a friendly coach who lets Junior play first string end is a good coach. One slight, symbolic, and perhaps even "undemocratic" step toward the restoration of authority and dignity would be to place the teacher's desk on a raised platform in the classroom, as is done in some places now, though usually because of the large classroom and the impossibility of seeing the last rows of students otherwise. The platform is a control post, and emphasizes control. But it also emphasizes the necessary segregation of teacher and student. Desegregation between teacher and student is a thing to be earned by the student, not one to be conferred at birth. As for the "undemocratic" aspect, one does not put off his humanity when he puts on the judicial robe of the teacher—when he ascends the platform. And neither is one being human when he substitutes for the robe of teacher dignity the clown's uniform of motley. The teacher's platform, though often so used, is not primarily for the purpose of entertaining a paying audience through professional antics.

Of course the good teacher is haunted, as I said earlier, by this nightmare vision of himself on the platform *misjudging*. One has to choose his nightmare and accept it. Many teachers are reluctant to set themselves up as judges of intellect, even as trainers of intellect, who are not reluctant to draw salaries as teachers (low though that salary be). And many are not reluctant to concern themselves with psuedo-moral judgments. More teachers can be found who are willing to condemn liquor in the mathematics class than are willing to flunk Junior because he made 30 of a possible 100 points on his final examination on the multiplication tables. It usually turns out that those teachers who are more concerned with social-moral problems than with intellectual problems

are actually preaching moral values and social responsibilities according to the gospel of environmental determinism, whose cardinal virtue is social adjustment. It is an easy gospel to evangelize about, requiring little depth of thought. Since man is conceived by this gospel to be the product of his environment, it follows as the night triumphant that (1) man is not responsible for his *unfortunate situation* and (2) the *unfortunate* situation changed to *fortunate* will automatically change the man into a *desirable social entity*. (The logical correlative to this line of reasoning is that the man already in a fortunate situation—which generally means he who has already acquired his four-bedroom house and a college education—is likewise not responsible for his situation, but this aspect of determinism is not tolerated. Such an assumption would be labeled quickly and indignantly as socialistic polemics, if not raw communism by the haves who might be required to give up a bedroom and a car to make their less fortunate neighbors good. Besides, we want credit for our success.) The result of our illogical, pragmatic use of determinism is made manifest in the schools as the necessity of adjusting Junior to social mathematics.

For the good teacher it seems a dark forest to contemplate. He feels he has only a hatchet where an ax or buzz saw is needed. But some light filters through if he chops at the underbrush. When Junior and Jack, and even Johnny (since he eventually feels he must be one of the boys to overcome his social handicap of proficiency in mathematics), see what they can get away with in mathematics class, they are aware of one of those self-evident truths that most of their teachers and parents manage to outgrow, a truth which the popularized environmental determinism overlooks: there are two terms in the

proposition *man in environment*. The boys know, however inarticulate they may be as a result of native handicap of the farce of business English, that the individual sprouts and flourishes in an environment and that, while the quantity of the fruit of his accomplishment may be affected by environment, the quality of the accomplishment is untouched. Environment has nothing to do with kind. If the corn seed sprouts at all, its stalk can bring forth only corn, good soil or bad. Dog fennel grows tall in rich bottom land, but it is still dog fennel. Consequently, in the insane environment of that classroom which denies this sane principle of reality, where dog fennel seems to be cultivated in the hope of harvesting corn and where corn is expected, because it is corn, to flourish in indifferent soil, the students mark time by playing with the environment for amusement. They play Alice's role in Wonderland, but not as politely as Alice. Thus, the teacher who sits democratically in the center of a circle of chairs to be "close" to his eleventh grade government students, to be democratically "one" of them, finds instead that he is less than they, that he is indeed in a cage of chairs and is being played with. His position as judge is permanently damaged. For, while we insist that the world's judgment of our moral and civil misdoings be made by a committee of our peers, we resent intellectual judgment from one of our peers. The teacher who is primarily one of the boys is not the good teacher any more than the father who is a boy among his sons is a good father. The child is father of tomorrow's child, not (sweet thought though it be) father of today's man.

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Now, in closing, to connect the problem of that desired judge of intellect, the good teacher, as he faces his class in general mathematics in the tenth grade, with his

relationship to Junior's and Jack's and Johnny's parents. Environmental determinism, the dominant American philosophy (dominant because it is the philosophy according to which we define our lives and establish and maintain our institutions) as it has filtered down through the ranks of our registered voters has become an emotional religion which is hard to combat with reason. One who dares confront it may find himself accused of being un-Christian. Yet this most narrowly subjective of philosophies is ultimately responsible for undermining the area of true objectivity in the schools, specifically those courses of study having to do with the measurable development of mind. The philosophy has come waving a deceptive flag emblazoned *humanitas* in the name of that mythical and illusive god Education, anthropomorphically produced by schools and departments of education. Education's supposed grace is that it makes one able to absorb environment rather than overcome it, to exist in the world in an "adjusted" state. It is understandable how it was that a majority of the registered voters came to align themselves with the initial flag wavers following the shattering effect on religious thought of the coming of scientific determinism in the 1800's. The emotional adjustment of the Bible to Darwinian thought leads naturally enough to the emotional adjustment of intellectual values to social values.

The good teacher will not be so undiplomatic as to attempt to wrest the flag from the evangelists of Education. Such a move would leave him unsupported on all fronts. For in these three generations during which the present philosophy of education came to power, most teachers willingly or of necessity deserted teaching the intellect, a most demanding occupation, for the easier comfort of helping their students

feel toward adjustment. Indeed, most students of high school age have come to have a vague feeling, akin to that of their parents and most teachers, that they may *acquire* intellectual prowess by existing in what is supposedly an intellectual environment for from four to eight years, at the same time enjoying the pleasures of social adjustment in business English and mathematics and making crude bird houses in Shop II and worse than crude upsidedown cakes in home economics. The college community rounds off Junior's social self, the "Whole Junior," and he is ready for the great adult world, especially welcoming the comfortable arm of the socially agreeable state with its unemployment insurance, social security, import taxes, crop supports. We Mamas and Papas have provided it all, having the necessary vote. And it is all very fine. Except in 1957, of course.

The good teacher's progress against this hydra-headed problem as he faces his

mathematics class will be slow and seem slower. But perhaps in three generations, if he holds his principles, he may restore a fundamental principle to the canon of public education: the training and proper evaluation of the individual's intellect. It must be attempted. And of the possible allies, aside from a Russian scientist in orbit around the moon, the best are among the students themselves, those students who resent being subdued to the useful and the good by the Telemachuses who would feed their people bread from dog fennel seed. Some there are who honor the honesty to call a failure an F. The responsibility of adjusting to an F or an A is primarily Jack's and Junior's and Johnny's, and the teacher must stop reducing himself in an attempt to adjust for them. And the good teacher might well reassure Mama and Papa that Junior has just as good a chance of getting to heaven as Johnny. No doubt Junior has an even better chance.

Burke and His Native Land

ROSS J. S. HOFFMAN

Edmund Burke and Ireland, by Thomas H. D. Mahoney. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960

BURKE LEFT his native Ireland in 1750 to study in London for the law, his father's profession, but instead became a writer, a politician, and an expatriate. Without losing his brogue or a clannish affection for Irish relatives and friends, he became an Englishman, a Bucks County squire. Only four times did he revisit the land of his birth. Twice in the early 1760's he spent a parliamentary winter in Dublin serving as private secretary to William Gerard Hamilton, secretary to the lord lieutenant; and in 1766 certain personal and family affairs drew him back for a two months' stay. But after that "the whole chart of the country"—so he told his friend O'Hara—began to wear out of his memory, and he did not return until twenty years later (for a few days only) "to make my son known there." His friends resident in Ireland dwindled. He left the management of a modest property in County Cork, inherited from a brother, in the hands of local relatives. Party politics and his English estate absorbed his energies, and a distaste for Ireland seems to have grown in him. Never-

theless, his continued connections with that country never ceased to influence it, and they even form a principal part of his history as a British statesman. Thirty-four years ago William O'Brien related that part in his *Edmund Burke as an Irishman*, but fresh materials have since become available for a better and more realistic history of Burke's conduct respecting Ireland. His private papers, which bulge with unprinted letters from Irish correspondents, were opened to scholars eleven years ago. His intimately self-revealing letters to Charles O'Hara, head of an ancient family in County Sligo and member of the Irish parliament, have been published. A new edition of his correspondence has begun to appear, which will include every Burke letter known to be extant; and hardly a year in the last decade has passed without the appearance of new studies of Burke. Thus it became possible for Professor Mahoney to bring the history of Burke and Ireland up to date.

Apart from a continuing personal interest in friends and relatives there, Burke's lasting concerns with Ireland derived from his detestation of the penal and proscriptive laws against the Catholics, and from his conviction of the value to both countries of Ireland's subordinate connection with England. He was raised in a family of mixed marriage, his father conforming to the established Church while

his mother adhered to her ancestral Catholic faith. She was a Nagle, descendant of a leading Cork family of Norman foundation whose fortunes had been ruined by the triumph of William III's partisans in 1690. Burke spent some of his boyhood years with his mother's Catholic relatives in the Blackwater valley, even attended a "hedge school" there, and never lost what his friend Lord Charlemont once described as a "constitutional bent towards popery." So that his lifelong championship of Irish Catholic rights and hopes was much more than an expression of abstract justice; it was related to persons, to people of his own blood. Burke always was shy of his father, even quarreled with him, and almost nothing is known of a connection with any near relatives on that side of his family; but he maintained the Nagle ties with fidelity and great affection. It is hardly too much to say that the Catholic people of Ireland were to him his Nagle relatives in extended dimension.

While serving with Hamilton in Dublin Castle he wrote his famous *Tract on the Popery Laws*, damning them as "repugnant to humanity and good sense," and encouraged the leading Catholics—all friends of his—to muster sufficient courage to petition government for relief. He was instrumental in winning the assent of the British government to the first Catholic relief act passed by the Irish parliament in 1778. It was the initial breach in a system unmatched for iniquity in the Western world until the Nuremberg laws of 1935. "You abhorred it, as I did, for its vicious perfection," wrote Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe. "For I must do it justice; it was a complete system, full of coherence and consistency, well digested and well composed in all its parts. It was a machine of wise and elaborate contrivance, and as well fitted for the oppression, impoverishment, and degradation of a people, and

the debasement in them, of human nature itself, as ever proceeded from the perverted ingenuity of man." In the early 1790's, when some of the Catholic leaders were tempted to embrace the principles of the French Revolution in order to overthrow the Protestant Ascendancy, Burke and his son not only cautioned them wisely against such a course but effectively helped them to obtain voting rights. Even in retirement from public life Burke counseled and encouraged the gallant Lord Lieutenant Earl Fitzwilliam, who might have ended the proscriptive system if the British ministry of William Pitt had not recalled him and thrown their support to his enemies. Only against Jacobinism and British tyrannical rule in India did Burke direct a moral passion equal in intensity to that which animated his efforts to obtain justice and tranquillity in an Ireland cleansed of Ascendancy misrule.

Support of Catholic hopes and claims was, in the circumstances of that age, wholly consistent with Burke's dislike of any sort of "patriotism" in Ireland that militated against the dependent link with Great Britain. He always saw the superior power of England as an actual or potential brake upon the rapacity of the Protestant oligarchy, and therefore feared an Irish legislature loose from British restraints. Thus he deplored the Octennial Act of 1768, limiting the duration of the Irish parliament, because it was a "patriot measure" sponsored by a party unfriendly to British superiority. He opposed allowing the Irish government to augment its army lest that be used for domestic oppression. He zealously seconded and assisted the campaign in 1773 of his political chief, Rockingham, to prevent the Irish legislature from voting a tax on the rent rolls of absentee landlords and grounded his argument on the impropriety of a subordinate legislature's penalizing a free choice of

residence within the imperial community. It is true that in 1775 he wished the Irish parliament to attempt a mediatorial role in the Anglo-American quarrel instead of supinely endorsing British coercion of the colonies; but then he never had equated Ireland's dependency with a servile submission to an ill-advised British king. Ireland ought, he believed, to enjoy a generous constitutional freedom but that ought not to be asserted against her own self-interest which nature had united with England's. For that reason he deplored the legislative independence exacted from Great Britain in 1782, fearing rightly that it would serve the interests of the Ascendancy. Afterwards, however, he wished to see the new constitutional relationship respected by the British government and therefore opposed Pitt's commercial propositions of 1785 for a customs union of the two countries. Since that promised economic advantage to Ireland and Burke had on repeated occasions since 1766 attempted to win benefits for Irish trade, Professor Mahoney sees here an inconsistency in his conduct and attributes his opposition to the exigencies of factional politics. However, an Anglo-Irish customs union must have been a likely prelude to the legislative union that Pitt ultimately established in 1801. Burke had always thought such a union politically imprudent.

Professor Mahoney's history of Burke's Irish politics is generally accurate in fact and just in interpretation, but the work is not exempt from adverse criticism. There are some unfortunate omissions and errors of fact, and the author has not always been rigorously critical in the management of his sources. No mention is made of Burke's paper written in the early 1760's on Ireland and the public debt, although this document is among his literary remains. Overlooked too is the memorandum of Burke's conversation with Pitt on the Irish

Catholic question in October 1792; yet this is a key document for explaining a change in British government policy on the question of granting further concessions to the Catholics. Professor Mahoney seems to have ignored the interesting genealogical studies of Basil O'Connell, who has thrown new light on Burke's concern for the safety of his Nagle relatives in the repression of Whiteboy crimes in the 1760's. The basis for stating that Jane Nugent, Mrs. Edmund Burke, was a Catholic who conformed to the Church of England after her marriage is very unsound; it consists only of a statement of Burke's Quaker friend, Shackleton, that found its way into the press. Because Burke never denied it, as he never denied or affirmed any statement in newspapers about himself or family, Sir Philip Magnus—most erratic of Burke's biographers—wrongly deduced that it was true. The fact is—and until Magnus wrote, this never was denied—that Jane Nugent, like her husband, was the issue of a mixed marriage, her Catholic father, Dr. Christopher Nugent, having been united with a Presbyterian woman. As was then common in such marriages, the sons were raised in the religion of the father and the daughters received the faith of the mother; thus Dr. Nugent's son, John, became Catholic and Jane was Protestant, for the same reason that Burke's sister, Juliana, was Catholic. Other instances of an incautious reliance on Magnus might be cited. Nor do these few exceptions exhaust the criticism that may fairly be made of Professor Mahoney's work. The writing lacks grace, sometimes even grammatical accuracy; and there is so much well-known extraneous matter brought into the book that it spreads into a biography. Had it been more pointedly directed upon the subject of Burke and Ireland, its organization would have been more successful.

Lifting the Historical Blackout

War Crimes Discreetly Veiled, by Frederick J. P. Veale. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1959.

The Liberation of Italy, by Luigi Villari. Appleton, Wisconsin: Nelson Publishing Company, 1959.

MR. VEALE, an able English lawyer, is one of the few British writers to dare or wish to penetrate what he calls "the Iron Curtain of Discreet Silence," by which he means what the reviewer has called in this country "the Historical Blackout," namely the attempt to suppress the truth about the causes, course, merits, and results of the Second World War, especially in its nonmilitary aspects.

His *Advance to Barbarism*, which appeared in a greatly enlarged American edition in 1953, is probably the most valuable and generally useful revisionist book written by an English author since 1945. It not only provided a clear account of the Nuremberg trials, with their affront to all decent conceptions and precedents of international law and justice, but also placed them against an illuminating history of warfare, in its institutional and moral aspects, from primitive days to the Japanese surrender in August 1945. It still remains, and is likely to remain, the best book for the general reader on the nature and implications of the Nuremberg trials (although it can be fruitfully supplemented by Montgomery Beligion's *Victor's Justice*).

War Crimes Discreetly Veiled amplifies much of the theme of Veale's earlier work and makes even more poignant reading. Both deal with the manner in which "the crimes against humanity" were distorted in the reports which reached the Allied reading public—the Allied crimes, such as initiating indiscriminate bombing of civilians, being either played down or ignored entirely, while the German violations were

greatly exaggerated and the reports endlessly repeated, being further enlarged in each repetition. But the book under review here concentrates mainly on the Allied "war crimes," chiefly those carried out by Communists or under Communist direction, and the manner in which the public has been prevented from learning much about them.

To turn to the specific content of the Veale book, the author first deals with the "Stalin Myth" or the Allied contention that Stalin was an appropriate partner in a coalition to promote freedom and justice in the world, and with the rewriting of history which was required to support this fantastic item in Allied propaganda. Much vivid material as to Stalin's actual acts and policies is included.

Veale then considers one of the more dramatic examples of Stalin's contributions to the cause of "humanity," namely the murder or exile of some 15,000 Polish leaders and officers who had been seized in the Russian invasion of East Poland. They were regarded as impossible to assimilate into a Communist culture and hence as fit subjects for political euthanasia. The German army dug up some 4,500 of them in a mass grave in the Katyn Forest in April 1943. The Russians at once accused the Germans of the crime, but it was quickly shown that the men had been murdered by or prior to April 1940, long before the Germans entered this region. The Russians had the incredible effrontery at Nuremberg to continue to charge the Germans with the crime, and the British and American staffs did not have the courage or decency to rebuke them. Whether the remaining 10,000 Polish leaders were killed in East Poland, where their graves have not yet been found or revealed, were killed and buried in Russia, or were sent to Siberian labor camps for a life worse than death has never been determined. It is likely that they were all murdered; otherwise, there would surely have been some news from at least one of a body of 10,000 men.

Veale's account of the murder of Benito Mussolini by Communist-directed Italian partisans on April 28, 1945, is the best one available in English. Veale carefully examined both the historical evidence and the topography of the territory where Mussolini and his mistress, and members of their party, were brutally murdered. This was carried out by Communists with the prior approval of Palmiro Togliatti, the Italian Communist leader. The Allied leaders connived in it to remove the embarrassment of having Mussolini testify at a later war-crimes trial. The murder is still described not only in Allied propaganda literature but also in solemn historical books as a formal judicial execution based on good legal precedents. The murderer was rewarded by being elected to the Italian Chamber of Deputies.

The Marzabotto Affair comes the nearest of all of Veale's case studies to being "one for Ripley." An able and honorable German commander, Major Walter Reder, wiped out a nest of Italian partisans under Major Lupo north of Florence on September 29, 1944. The engagement took place near the village of Marzabotto, although there was no fighting whatever there. The combat was conducted by Major Reder in full accordance with the laws of war and no noncombatant civilians were consciously attacked or killed by his men.

In September 1945 he was arrested on the basis of false testimony by a French collaborator who vainly hoped to save his own skin by his mendacity. Major Reder was accused of having driven the whole population of Marzabotto into the church and there burned them to death along with their priest, and of following this by razing the whole village to the ground. There was not the most remote factual basis for the charge. The British and American captors of Reder quickly recognized the bizarre nature of the charges against him, but instead of freeing him, they turned him over to the Italians, who under Communist pressure convicted him and sentenced him to life imprisonment. He has now

been imprisoned for some fifteen years on utterly baseless charges. The Italian government has been too fearful of the Communists to free him; Austria is too weak to bring about his release; and the Adenauer government apparently has little interest in anybody who served in Hitler's armies.

The final case is that of Admiral Erich Reder, an able German sea commander in both world wars. He was convicted at Nuremberg of waging aggressive warfare and was sentenced to life imprisonment in the grim fortress-like Spandau prison in Berlin. His offense was planning the German invasion of Norway *after* the British invasion had been planned by Churchill and his associates. Reder served nine years in prison, being released in broken health on September 26, 1955. Winston Churchill conceded that his prison experience was one of "very hard and inhumane conditions."

Even a brief review of these case studies will make it clear why they have been "discreetly veiled." If the Veale book could be widely read, the veil might be lifted, even if inadequately, to the benefit of both sound history and public intelligence.

Dr. Luigi Villari, who died last November at the age of 83, was long the most distinguished Italian authority on the diplomatic history of his country. He spent his life in the diplomatic service, save for honorable military and diplomatic activities in the First World War. He was richly honored by many countries other than his own, receiving, for example, the French *Croix de Guerre* (with palms), and the British Military Cross. While ideologically associated for a generation with the Italian parliamentary system established by Cavour, he proved his patriotic devotion to his country by serving it under all legitimate Italian governments down through the Second World War.

Dr. Villari's *Italian Foreign Policy Under Mussolini*, which was published in 1956, is the best revisionist book on this subject and the only one available in English. Its substantial character was attested

by the review in *Current History* which said of it: Mr. Villari, who saw and interpreted the events of this period, does not throw any bouquets at the Italian Foreign Office with which he was associated, but tells the story from the Italian's point of view, presented his facts with organized precision and offering an interesting picture of the political scene during this controversial period. In the volume under review, which brings the story down through 1947, when a "Carthaginian Peace" was made with Italy, Villari once more presents his facts with "organized precision." He was a personal observer of most of the matters that he records in his book, which can be regarded as virtually a primary source for the period and its leading events.

While Dr. Villari's volume is mainly devoted to the liberation process in Italy, his treatment of Italian developments is given wider perspectives and greater value by being placed against a brilliant characterization of the liberation episode as a whole. This is accomplished mainly in a long Prefatory Introduction, which is worth the price of the whole book and is the best summary appraisal of this bloody, brutal, and expensive episode available in the English language.

Proceeding to the course of events in Italy, Dr. Villari devotes his attention mainly to the following matters: the ousting of Mussolini; the Armistice of September 1943; the complexity and contradictions of the liberation procedure, with the foreign war continuing for nearly two years after the Armistice; the puppet governments of Marshal Badoglio and his successors which were set up by the Allies; the proscription of Fascism and the persecution of Fascists; the rise and predominance of Communist influence in Italy as a result of Allied, especially American, policies and actions, and the heavy later costs of this folly, both material and moral; the resulting triumph of Communist attitudes, policies, and actions in the liberation activities; the murder of Mussolini and his

party, and the associated "Dongo Gold" scandal; the violence and bloodshed which followed the end of hostilities, when Communist-controlled partisans carried out the mass murder of upwards of 50,000 helpless Italian men, women, and children for weeks with little or no restraint by the Allied forces of occupation; the overthrow of the Italian monarchy and the establishment of a republic through intrigue and subterfuge in the referendum; and the Peace Treaty of 1947, which repeated on a lesser scale the folly of the Allies at Versailles in 1919.

These two books underline with eloquence and impressive factual evidence the importance of revisionist research and writing in clarifying the origins and nature of the international problems which face the United States as a result of its participation in the Second World War and its aftermath. The refusal of the great majority of the American newspaper and periodical press to call attention to their existence, even if unfavorably, emphasizes the deplorable postponement of any period in which the lessons they could amply teach can be applied to the revision of our foreign policies. How far the Historical Blackout has developed in the United States may be discerned from the fact that the *Christian Century*, which took the lead in journalistic popularization of revisionism after the First World War, refused to accept a dignified and restrained full-page advertisement of Dr. Villari's book.

Reviewed by HARRY ELMER BARNES

Dr. Johnson's Politics

New Light on Dr. Johnsons Essays on the Occasion of his 250th Birthday, edited by Frederick W. Hilles. *New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.*

Johnson Before Boswell: A Study of Sir John Hawkins' Life of Samuel Johnson, by Bertram H. Davis. *New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.*

The Politics of Samuel Johnson, by Donald J. Greene. *New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.*

THE ALMOST SIMULTANEOUS publication of three full-length books on Dr. Johnson should not be regarded as surprising or unusual. Johnson's life and works have attracted interested comment in almost every year since his death. The significance, then, of these three volumes is that they testify strikingly to what has become the accepted modern estimate of Johnson—an estimate compounded of equal parts, perhaps, of reverence and scholarship. The first of these volumes, in fact, illustrates very aptly how these two elements can be fused. Physically, Professor Hilles' book is obviously a work proceeding from deep affection. It is a handsome volume, beautifully printed, beautifully bound, containing for the most part essays originally delivered to a group of zealots in New York who call themselves simply The Johnsonians. But the book is much more than an expensive tribute to a coterie interest. If it proceeds from reverence, it is based also on the premise that reverence is best served by scrupulous scholarship. Indeed, there exists perhaps no better collection in illustration of the belief that Dr. Johnson—solitary and magnificent—remains for us, as he was for Boswell, "the brightest ornament of the eighteenth century." The essays, be it admitted, vary greatly in value. It requires an ardent devotion for things Johnsonian to see much value in an essay so fragile (albeit tender) as W. S. Lewis' "The Young Waterman." But everyone will welcome the inclusion of pieces as fundamental and discerning as M. H. Abrams' "Dr. Johnson's Spectacles," F. W. Hilles' "The Making of *The Life of Pope*," and William R. Keast's "Johnson and In-

tellectual History." In the sixteen other essays, which range themselves between these two poles, one finds either amusement or instruction. My only cavil would be with the title; even the mildly initiated Johnsonian will find little here that is very new to him.

In its own way Mr. Davis' book serves a function similar to that of Hilles' volume. Specifically, it allows us to see what too many commentators have forgotten—that Johnson's continuing, and growing, fame is not necessarily the result of Boswell's biography. Granted that for many it has been difficult to think of Johnson apart from Boswell; granted that for many Boswell has been both preservative and catalyst for Johnson's fame. It still remains true that there are dangers attaching to such esteem for Boswell's immortal effort. And Mr. Davis makes us aware that we need not measure Johnson by Boswellian standards alone; that taken even by the standards of a biographer whom critics have so far agreed to disparage, Johnson remains an imposing figure. Admittedly, Davis' book is a somewhat extreme case of special pleading. I find much stretching and straining of argument, much desire to palliate Hawkins' shortcomings. Nonetheless, the book is an honest and valuable piece of scholarship. It demonstrates, for example, the almost culpable, certainly misleading, editorializing of Boswell's commentators, from Malone and Croker to Hill and Powell. It enlarges, in some ways, the Johnsonian canon, at least to the extent that no student of Johnson can any longer afford to dissociate himself from Hawkins' work. And insofar as the book compels us to beware of the sometimes deceptive dramatics of Boswell, it tends to make us more aware of Johnson's own imposing stature. All in all, Davis does succeed, in his own words, in raising Hawkins' "*Life* to its proper position as a standard work on Johnson, second only to Boswell's."

Useful and interesting as are the books of Hilles and Davis, Professor Greene's book is easily more important than either,

or both. It is the merit of Greene's book that he has attacked what is genuinely a fundamental problem in Johnson and has gone very far in the solution of that problem. I have spoken of the new "reverence" for Johnson which is part of our modern attitude towards the Great Cham. It was perhaps inevitable that with this new reverence should come a sober reassessment of what once seemed even the most absurd positions of Johnson. One of these absurd positions has been Johnson's unremitting (or supposedly unremitting) Toryism. It is this problem that Dr. Greene addresses himself to.

In an exquisitely turned insult, Landor once remarked that Dr. Johnson "was a deaf adder coiled up in the brambles of party prejudice." While not perhaps capable of matching Landor's economy of epithet, other eminent Victorians were equally at odds with Johnson, and particularly with Johnson as a Tory. The proto-Victorian Cowper, after reading Johnson's *Lives of the Poets*, vowed that he could "thresh his old jacket, till I made his pension jingle in his pocket." Macaulay, in a peroratory, condescending sneer concluded that though "the memory of other authors is kept alive by their works... the memory of Johnson keeps many of his works alive." Too often, primarily because of his political dogmatism, Johnson's memory has survived because he seemed mildly demented, or at least engagingly eccentric. For many a college sophomore Johnson must have seemed a good deal like an Augustan William Randolph Hearst. As I have remarked, this attitude is no longer fashionable. Most scholars would agree, rather, with the estimate given by Walter Jackson Bate in a volume of a few years ago, *The Achievement of Samuel Johnson*:

No matter how much the detail about him continues to accumulate, the character and achievement of Johnson still grip the human imagination and conscience, constantly rising above the waves of our commentary, and moving us to reconsider them.

But to return to the main thesis of Greene's book. Greene is attempting to show that "though Johnson may continue to have a claim to be called a Tory, we are not justified in inferring from that label what nineteenth-century writers inferred from it; dogmatism, reaction, subservience to authority." Greene is placing himself in opposition to a view like that of Macaulay, who maintained that Johnson "was himself a Tory, not from rational conviction... but from mere passion, such as inflamed the Capulets against the Montagues, or the Blues of the Roman circus against the Greens." From the tone of Dr. Greene's book one might infer that Greene himself is as much convinced of the final perseverance of the Liberal position as was Macaulay. But it is a measure of the new respect accorded to conservative thought that Greene can assert, near the close of his solid, scholarly volume:

Conceivably one reason why [Johnson's] reputation as a political commentator suffered is that . . . he was in advance of his time. Many of his political judgments, wrong-headed as they seemed to those who took a short view of these matters, have had a disconcerting way of turning out to be true in the long run . . . we have come to see that, as Johnson insisted, the key to the politics of the modern world is the omniscient sovereignty of the modern national state; whether we like the fact or not—and Johnson nowhere says that he likes it, merely that it is so—any political discussion which ignores this fact is misleading and dangerous.

Professor Greene's method is a rigorously inductive one. He has, first of all, read and pondered all of Johnson's writing on politics—something previous commentators have probably not done conscientiously. Secondly, he has sought honestly to isolate the content and significance of eighteenth-century Toryism. As for the latter, Greene demonstrates quickly and clearly that the traditional view—the product

largely of writers such as Macaulay, Lecky, Green, and Trevelyan—is a mistaken one. It was Macaulay who oversimplified the political history of the eighteenth century into a contest between “those who were before their age [the Whig ‘liberal democrats’], and those who were behind it” [the reactionary Tories]. In this connection, Greene remarks:

Macaulay’s postulate has an inspired simplicity, and it is not to be wondered at that so many people, from his day to the present, have accepted it. It is so easy to grasp, and based as it is on the doctrine of the inevitability of progress, so cheerful; so useful, moreover, to political groups who wish to identify themselves with “the wave of the future.

Addressing himself directly to the question of Johnson’s Toryism, Greene begins by advising us to stop cherishing such Johnsonian, anti-Whiggist epithets as “the first Whig was the Devil”; and “Whiggism is a negation of all principle.” Such utterances were, in many instances, Johnson “talking for victory,” and they have been canonized by naïve editors from Johnson’s day to our own. “Those who have been deceived,” Greene remarks, “by Johnson’s anti-Whig outbursts into seriously believing that he could hardly bear the sight of a Whig have been the victims of one of the great hoaxes of literary history.” When Johnson’s writings on political matters are read in a spirit free from the provincialism of unreconstructed liberalism, Johnson emerges, to use some of Greene’s phrases, as “a radical egalitarian,” “no royalist,” “secular, rational, and hedonist,” potentially “an excellent revolutionary.”

At this point, even ardent Johnsonians may pause, shocked at finding Johnson the scrupulous Christian described as a “hedonist,” or Johnson the respectful royalist labeled a revolutionary. But Professor Greene justifies the use of such terminology by asserting, over and over again, that for Johnson the individual is the keystone

in the structure of his political thought and that therefore, in deference to the dignity of the individual, even fairly revolutionary political and ethical positions are tenable. As Greene himself phrases it: “the most important key to Johnson’s thinking is his conviction that the individual has an inalienable responsibility to examine and judge all human matter for himself.” Commenting on a passage in Johnson’s *Life of Savage*, Greene enlarges on this thesis:

In its skepticism and pragmatism, its expression of distrust for fashionable slogans, its insistence on probing beneath them to the real motives of individuals concerned with propagating them, the statement provides a key to Johnson’s political attitudes from that time [1743] until the end of his life.

Had Professor Greene stopped at this point, stopped, that is, with the quite plausible assertion that Johnson as a humanist, as an “egalitarian” of sorts, showed a fundamental concern for the rights of the individual, his reading of Johnson, though an accurate one, would have been a partial one. At times, in fact, Greene seems determinedly naïve enough to take such a position. He compares Johnson, for example, with men of a totally different philosophy. In a crucial comment on Johnson’s “political system,” to cite only one example, he remarks:

The striking thing about Johnson’s political system as expounded here and elsewhere is how extremely *radical*, how economical of postulates, it is. It throws out natural rights and natural law; it ignores Burkean ideas of prescription and the organic nature of the state; and insofar as it recognizes tradition, it seems suspicious of it. It is a determinedly secular, rational, and hedonist theory, difficult to distinguish from Bentham’s and Mill’s . . . it seems to touch Hobbes on the one hand and certain authoritarian political theorists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the other.

To call Johnson a Hobbist is quite enough to chill most Johnsonians. But Greene redeems himself (at least partially) and his thesis by his repeated insistence on Johnson's fundamentally moral outlook, on the necessity such an outlook entails of insisting, in political questions particularly, on the primacy of individual moral responsibility. In a concluding chapter, Greene sums up Johnson's political philosophy in these words:

This is neither Toryism nor Whiggism: it is simple fundamental human morality, taught by a thousand doctors, Christian and non-Christian, but seldom related so closely to current political discussion as by Johnson.

I think that Professor Greene's book is a book of first importance and that it is extremely accurate and satisfying. But at the same time it seems almost crudely naïve to call Johnson a Hobbist, or to assert that he ignored the natural law. To say such things is to forget the very large, the compellingly large fact of Johnson's Christianity. Hobbes insists upon power because he despairs of humanity; Johnson stresses power because he is aware of man as a fallen creature but a creature capable, nevertheless, of the highest dignity. What Greene finally comes to is a judgment of Johnson as "a skeptical conservative." But even this requires qualification. Granted that he was "a skeptical conservative" (most Christians are), this does not mean he should be linked with skeptics (Hume, Hobbes, Gibbon) who were "conservative" because of their skepticism. One might recall in this connection the passage from Boswell in reference to Hume: "He would not allow Mr. David Hume any credit for his political principles, though similar to his own; saying of him, 'Sir, he was a Tory by chance.'" If, then, we make a qualification of this sort, we owe a very large debt to the work of Professor Greene, who by virtue of this book has certainly now become one of the most prominent of the "newer" Johnsonians. It is refreshing to reflect that, after all the charges of the

tribe of Macaulay, a scholar of our own day has placed Johnson's political thinking in its true light with a multitude of scholarly details and a clear-sightedness, exemplified in many passages, of which the following may serve as closing and example:

Politics thus resolves itself into questions of morality dealing with the relations between individual human beings, questions to be decided by invoking general moral principles. To Johnson all political questions are thus moral questions: politics is no more than a branch of general human morality.

Reviewed by JOHN A. RYCENCA

D. H. Lawrence and the Artist as Cartographer

D. H. Lawrence: The Failure and the Triumph of Art, by Eliseo Vivas.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1960.

WRIGHT MORRIS in *The Territory Ahead* aptly likens D. H. Lawrence to a pagan bull run amok in the critics' orderly arrangements of categories and myths. Eliseo Vivas, a critic who is also an aesthetician and a philosopher, has in *D. H. Lawrence: The Failure and the Triumph of Art* come as close to corralling this elusive bull as anyone has. To the charge that he tries not only to corral the bull but to fit him into a Procrustean bed, Vivas would quite openly plead guilty, contending on the one hand that "we are inevitably the victims of the definitions we use to our advantage" (p. xi) and on the other that

definitions must be employed if criticism is to have coherence. "Criticism . . . grounded on a syncretistic hodgepodge of theories picked up *en passant* without regard to their fundamental coherence is not responsible" (p. 283).

Neither Lawrence's detractors nor his unwavering *aficionados* will take kindly to Vivas' evaluation of Lawrence's work. The detractors will not agree that Lawrence is one of the three or four major writers to be produced by the Anglo-American world in the twentieth century; the *aficionados* will not agree that Lawrence's stature is due to three novels only—*Sons and Lovers*, *The Rainbow*, and *Women in Love*—and that of these only the latter two are fully mature Lawrence. Vivas' book constitutes an extended exemplification of an aesthetic theory set forth in earlier writings, notably in his volume of essays entitled *Creation and Discovery*. For Vivas, art is no "mere adornment of human living . . . but an indispensable factor in making the animal man into a human person." The proper response to the work of art is the grasp of the work as a self-sufficient object by means of an act of "intransitive attention" (*Creation*, pp. ix, xi). Vivas' view of art is hardly reducible to capsule form, but the preface of the Lawrence book affords a convenient summary:

. . . the function of the poet [in the broad sense of maker or artist] is to sweep away the "ideas" that darken and falsify our vision. He tears the horny cataract of conceptual abstractions from the soul's eyes, the worn-out categories, the stereotyped modes of response to the living world, the brittle formulas. In their place he gives us fresh, quick, tender, unmediated revelations of the world of nature and of man. Having freed us from our "ideas," he substitutes his own freshly organized experience, through which we are able to understand aesthetically, to grasp by immediate apprehension, those aspects of contemporary experience that with-

out his aid would remain for us threatening and oppressive because they would remain chaotic. The poet's organization constitutes a discovery, but one that is creative. . . . (p. x).

By means of his theory Vivas discriminates between what he considers to be Lawrence's successful art and his unsuccessful art. At the outset he quotes approvingly Lawrence's famous statement, "Oh give me the novel. Let me hear what the novel says. As for the novelist, he is usually a dribbling liar." He then proceeds to employ Lawrence's own dictum against him in an effort to demonstrate that Lawrence, to the detriment of his art, often intruded himself into his writings, particularly the later ones. After *Women in Love*, Lawrence handled "with a messianic fervor subjects he had formerly handled aesthetically" (p. 17). Objectively, and in terms of Vivas' theory, Lawrence failed in his later works to transmute the matter of experience into the informed substance of art. Subjectively, the failure can be attributed to divided vision, to the clash between Lawrence's commitment as an artist and his commitments as a reformer. As for the biographical causes of the division, they can only be speculated upon, but a crucial factor apparently was the brutal trauma Lawrence underwent as a civilian during World War I.

An integral component of Vivas' analysis is his discussion of what he terms "constitutive symbols" in Lawrence. Such a symbol is a "creative synthesis of empirical matter which manifests itself in dramatic and moral terms and which functions categorically" (p. 275). Unlike the pseudo-symbol or quasi-symbol, the constitutive symbol is a symbol whose referend cannot be fully exhausted by explication; the device has nondiscursive, contextual self-identity. Tenor cannot be separated from vehicle, and the critic can only suggest in inadequate paraphrase some of its possible connotations. When embodied in a work of art, a constitutive symbol characteristically

is a complex situation or scene which gathers the significance of preceding events and illumines the situations or scenes to follow. Vivas' discussion of constitutive symbols focuses primarily on the symbol-rich novel *Women in Love*. One highly charged symbolic scene therein is that in which the fierce, clawing rabbit Bismarck "officiates," as Gerald and Gudrun enter into demonic union. This scene in dramatic and concentrated fashion conveys the cruelty and corruption of the ill-fated pair, yet its full significance is, according to Vivas, ultimately impervious to the critic's analytic probing.

In literary criticism there are perhaps three dominant attitudes toward the function of art: art is considered by some to be solely an end in itself; it is considered by others a means to personal or social betterment or both; it is considered by still others a unique means to personal or social edification only if it is *first* conceived as an end in itself. Vivas' organicist theory reflects the third attitude, since he affirms art as unique, noninstrumental, autonomous, yet insists that art is constitutive of and expressive of "the values and meanings by which a society fulfills its destiny" (*Creation*, p. x). This third view is no doubt the most commendable; but its way in the world is always precarious, its adherents a dedicated few, because of the harsh demands it makes. For one thing, it is humanly difficult to abide by the proper time sequence: first, the pure aesthetic response while we are engaged with a work of art, then later ("much later," Vivas says, "for while we are responding all we do is behold") the attempt to discern what it is the artist has comprehended and whether his work has relevance for the human situation. Further, the difficulty of the initial pure response is not simply a matter of the beholder's ineptitude or stubbornness. The work of art does seek to "capture" us, to gain our rapt, intransitive attention, but such a trap is, as Denis de Rougemont reminds us, an oriented trap. This is particularly true of lit-

erary art, which at its purest is still "impure," is never totally devoid of ideational content—and many readers won't see much point in waiting until "much later" to come to grips with such content. The work of art is oriented by the artist's vantage point or perspective by which he orders his insights, and it is expressive of his vision. The artist's significant insights are concretely imaginative rather than abstractly and systematically metaphysical, but they nevertheless grow out of concerns which necessarily include belief. I would not say with Mary Freeman that, in regard to Lawrence, "the rigorous dichotomizing of the artist from the prophet destroys the basic unity of his work" (*D. H. Lawrence: A Study of His Basic Ideas*, p. v), since I am not altogether convinced that a basic unity is there; at the same time I am not as convinced as Vivas is of the possibility of separating artist from prophet.

The arduousness of strict adherence to a "pure" aesthetic is perhaps suggested by Vivas' discussion of *Aaron's Rod*. He dwells at length on Aaron's flight from his wife and children—a flight which he feels is without explanation. Vivas says that he is not calling for a *moral* justification of the act, but an aesthetic justification, a rendering "of that which gives Aaron's action its intelligibility in the story" (p. 24). But if Vivas wants only an aesthetic justification, I fail to see why he bothers to say, later on, that the manner in which Aaron chose to leave his wife "heaped on her humiliation and injury, and the conclusion must be that Aaron is . . . contemptible. . . . To the serious reader, endowed with moral responsibility, what *Aaron's Rod* signifies is the widening area of infection which is poisoning our society" (p. 29). *Aaron's Rod* is not one of Lawrence's better novels; it is desultory and lacking in unity. But as for Aaron's leaving his wife, this is an action which, though not morally justified, is, I think, adequately accounted for—and dramatically so—within the context of the novel. In the very first chapter Aaron's wife is

depicted as argumentative and shrewish, a woman whose "high imperative" voice speaks "with some contempt," "with barren bitterness," and who derides her husband as being a fool who cares about "a lot of ignorant colliers" but not about his family. Added to this is the constant whining and bickering of the children. Here I must concur with Graham Hough: "This is all presented, actualised, not discussed; and Aaron's sudden decision to leave his family becomes all the more convincing because its motives are not discussed" (*The Dark Sun*, p. 96).

Quibbles aside, Vivas' book is, on balance, a distinguished achievement which must be taken into account in any further assessments of Lawrence. Vivas is particularly persuasive in diagnosing what is sick and what is healthy in Lawrence. Justly and cogently he criticizes Lawrence's ersatz primitivism; his "erotic solipsism," the repudiation of any element of self-giving, other-regarding love, or *agape*, in his understanding of the sexual relationship; his misanthropy; his mystic "philosophy of the blood" and his lust for authority, which have led many to label him a proto-Nazi. Vivas is equally perceptive in sifting out what is valid in Lawrence, who "came as close to success . . . as is possible" in "revealing the quality of experience as experience" (p. 225). Lawrence's sacramental approach to life, his essentially religious reverence for nature, his desire to preserve the mystery of existence, his quest for meaning, are positive elements pointing to man's need for integration of selfhood and relation to the cosmos. "At his best what he wanted to say—and said brilliantly in dramatic terms—was that a life lived mainly for the sake of thought, ideas, reason, logic, is an inadequate life." And this claim, says Vivas, "is neither a dangerous claim nor a silly one" (pp. 109-110). In conclusion Vivas states that Lawrence "charts our world," and that without him and the other poets who also chart it, we would be likely to be blind to the process of disintegration of

which we are the victims. Vivas—to exchange the earlier bull-roping metaphor for a cartographic one—has skillfully and sensitively charted the chartist.

Reviewed by DEAN PEERMAN

A Priest of Words

Ghosts of the Heart, New Poems, by John Logan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.

A POET who aspires to the first rank and whose work shows promise of taking its place alongside the best, the wisest, the most sharply chiseled verse in the language is never content with a mere chain of poems—poems confined to statements cautiously, if pleasingly, articulated. Such a poet attempts to present a comprehensive view of a segment of man's feeling. Like Faulkner chronicling his fabulous county the poet chronicles the picaresque voyages of the many ships sailing the seas within him, turbulent seas which the poet himself, in a race against time, is busy charting. Frequently, and quite accidentally, the poet's experience (it is not a "subject") coincides conveniently with some clinically specifiable concern. This was true of John Logan's first book, *A Cycle for Mother Cabrini*, a severely disciplined group of lyrics which made one sight all the way back to Hopkins for comparison.

Logan's first book was not religious, but sacramental poetry, what John Crowe Ransom calls "the poetry of miraculism." The book, though the experiences it embodied are in a sense "obsolete" for Logan, must be gone back to; here is a poet whose total work must be kept in mind. He does

not write failures, and his poems refer contrapuntally to one another; there is a constant speaking of images in the several poems.

In his new book Logan fulfills all promises, through he has moved more certainly into the role of chronicler of the heart's voyages. His verse is still sacramental or "miraculist," but the boundaries of his faith have been enlarged beyond definition or label. In a sense Logan's poetry is a poetry of service—he serves man as priest of words. He himself compared the poet's role with that of the priest when he wrote: "A poet is a priest or necromancer of the baroque who dissolves by the incantations of his cadenced human breath the surface of earth to show under it the covered terror, the warmth, the formal excitement and the gaudy color burst of the sun. This is not a chemical function. It is a sacramental one." He went on to comment on his apparent move away from the religious concern of his first volume: "If some people find my subjects less religious now than they used to be the reason is that I now think poetry itself more religious than I used to do." In one of his poems ("A Century Piece for Poor Heine (1800-1856)") Logan has distinguished merely religious poetry from that of miraculism. In contrasting Heine with Kilmer, Logan plays on the irony of a memorial to Heine in Kilmer Park:

There is no need to forgive
His saintly poems
As there is for the work of another,
To whose New York park
The marble Lorelei fled—
Banned with the books of her maker.

Logan, like Heine, has dared long poems, and his saintly poems will never have to be forgiven. Yet many of us are happy that he has moved on to what might be called even more personal experience—poems of a very private love. Some of these poems ("Honolulu and Back," "Lines to His Son on Reaching Adolescence," and "Nude Kneeling in Sand") mark new, daring departures.

Could one say that Logan has left nothing behind? He has taken with him, from his first book, the clean technical proficiency, the disdain for any irrelevancies, the depth of thought and the quietly absorbed learning, the sense of the miraculous. But he has freed himself from any "subject," he has risked poems of personal play, of sober assertion without footnote, and he has discovered that bitterness begins in honesty but ends in a *cul de sac*, that it is to love that one must turn. "I used to be more interested in the wound on the neck of the unicorn, but now I am more interested in the graceful, powerful unicorn underneath the wound," he has written. "I have discovered that I was less afraid, and therefore (sadly) more prepared to find the ugly under the beautiful than I was to find the beautiful under the ugly." We are confronted with a poet who, no matter what heights he achieves, is not content to stop there. Because he must embrace and examine even the opposite of what he at any moment asserts, we can always be sure, in following him, that we are led in the wake of wisdom.

Reviewed by DAVID RAY

Order and Modernity

The Leopard, by Giuseppe di Lampedusa. New York: Pantheon, 1959.

The Leopard is different from most novels that have been published recently, and the difference lies in the significance of its theme. In the last few years there has been no scarcity of novels set in Italy. Writers of both sexes, many nationalities, and various competence have laid their stories

there, and some of these tales have been told with more skill than Lampedusa had at his command. But ultimately most of these books turn out to be concerned with totally meaningless events which happen to, or are caused by, utterly self-centered, if not depraved, central characters. In our fiction we drink and make love, we talk and ponder the universe, we decide that life is hard and most of the time we go on living. Don Fabrizio, the protagonist of *The Leopard*, did all these things too, but he did and represented other things that are more important.

In 1860, Fabrizio, Prince of Salina, was in his middle forties. A rich man, he was blessed with a dutiful wife, seven fine children, good health, and a handsome mistress in Palermo. He was an amateur astronomer of some repute—he had been awarded a gold medal at the Sorbonne—and he was vaguely amazed that the world to which he had been born and in which he had lived happily and securely was crumbling around him.

Or was it? Tancredi, Fabrizio's beloved nephew, said not. Tancredi's father had been a wastrel; the boy was now dependent on Fabrizio's easy largesse. He would join Garibaldi as the first step toward recouping his fortunes, but about the political situation or the safety of the family Fabrizio was not to worry. Tancredi said, "If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change. D'you understand?" No, he did not understand, not then, not completely. But Russo, the agent, one of the incipient bourgeoisie, supported Tancredi's view. "Everything will be better, believe me, Excellency. Honest and able men will have a chance to get ahead, that's all. The rest will be as it was before."

In a way, Russo was right. Money and power changed hands, but the poor and the weak were no less numerous. One king replaced another; plebiscites were held and protest votes, few as they were, were not counted. Erosion of the aristocratic fortunes set in, but at his death in 1888

Fabrizio was still wealthy, still respected, still the prince. The outward trappings, the physical appurtenances, he and his family had not lost. What they had lost was their sense of themselves and of their position in an ordered society; and this was the essence that gave values to all the rest. Dying, Fabrizio saw quite clearly how things were.

For the significance of a noble family lies entirely in its traditions, that is in its vital memories; and he was the last to have any unusual memories, anything different from those of other families. Fabrizio's grandson would only have banal ones like his schoolfellows, of snacks, of spiteful little jokes against teachers, horses bought with an eye more to price than to quality; and the meaning of his name would change more and more to empty pomp embittered by the gadfly thought that others could outdo him in outward show. . . . Fabrizio had said the Salinas would always remain the Salinas. He had been wrong. The last Salina was himself. That fellow Garibaldi, that bearded Vulcan, had won after all.

Much of the book's meaning is to be found here. And I cannot resist the temptation to proclaim the obvious: the similarity between this statement and the burden that runs through half a dozen or more contemporary novels of the American South. For example, one thinks immediately of Stark Young's *So Red the Rose*: of the McGehees and their profound sense of family, of young Edward McGehee sitting on the porch talking to his father, identifying himself with his Scottish forebears—people who lived long ago in a foreign land.

In *The Leopard* the final scenes confirm the worst. It is 1910. Of all the cast there remain now only the three maiden daughters of Fabrizio and Tancredi's widow, Angelica, all of them old. The sisters, in their innocent devotion, have collected what they believe to be the relics of vari-

ous saints. The cardinal comes to inspect their chapel and leaves behind him a young priest trained at the Vatican School of Paleography, who with hammer and saw, screwdriver, and magnifying glass will test the authenticity of the saintly bones. Most of them are fakes—a fact which even their antiquity cannot disguise from scientific examination. Their material reality can be known, and as for the rest of it, what is left but intangible feeling and impalpable faith?

Of course, in a very important way the cardinal's conduct can be justified. Bullied and pestered by the minions of pragmatic materialism, he must use the tools of modernity. He must fight fire with fire if he is to endure. We alter ourselves for the worse in our quest for survival. What more accurate image of the modern world could be conjured up?

Reviewed by WALTER SULLIVAN

Invocation of the Muse

The Fugitive Group: A Literary History, by Louise Cowan. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959.

FOUR YEARS AGO, on May 4, 1956, the group of Southern writers known as "the Fugitives," whose locus is Vanderbilt University, held a fortieth reunion in Nashville, Tennessee. Professor Louise Cowan's clear, comprehensive, critically detached, informed, and interesting study of the Fugitive Group takes us back to the origin

of what we must now acknowledge as one of the more important regional movements in American literature. Her literary history, which is also an interpretation, shows admirably how these Nashville poets inaugurated the Southern literary renaissance.

Forty years ago—1915—some of the sixteen members of the group met to read and discuss their poems in the rooms of Sidney Hirsch on Twentieth Avenue, Nashville, only a few blocks from the University. Interrupted in their meetings by World War I, they revived the discussions in the fall of 1919. Their hosts were now James Frank and Sidney Hirsch, who lived in a spacious two-story, red-brick house at 3802 Whitland Avenue, a few miles west of the Vanderbilt campus. Every other Saturday at nine o'clock in the evening the members of the group with carbon copies of their poems in hand gathered for the long sessions. John Crowe Ransom was "the intellectual leader" and Donald Davidson "the cohesive force" that held together the vigorously individualistic group. A few years later two extraordinary undergraduates, Allen Tate and Robert Penn Warren, were drawn in, and together these four formed "an interior movement" within the group. Although these are most frequently mentioned in Professor Cowan's volume, the other members—Merrill Moore, Laura Riding, Jesse Wills, Alec Stevenson, Walter Curry, Stanley Johnson, Sidney Hirsch, James Frank, W. Y. Elliott, Williams Frierson, Ridley Wills, and Alfred Starr—are not slighted.

The atmosphere of the group that assembled in Hirsch's room on Whitland Avenue was philosophic, linguistic, and literary. Professor Cowan describes the Fugitives as both "germinal and articulate literary men," who proved their quality by developing a critical viewpoint in literature and a social philosophy, and by writing excellent poetry. These meetings were unlike those of Franklin's Junto in the late 1720's—a club of mutual improvement, interested in moral, political, and natural

philosophy—and more like the Tuesday receptions at Mallarmé's little Paris apartment on the fourth floor in the Rue de Rome.

Bound together as the Fugitives were by a native heritage, associated with the same cultural center, and sharing a common group experience, they stimulated and encouraged one another in the lively meetings. We glimpse Tate introducing Davidson to Elliott, LaForgue, and Hart Crane. We feel the exhilaration of Tate and Davidson in friendly disagreement. "If I write a poem to my left foot, it would certainly take precedence over some other thing to man's immortal soul—provided I am a poet," argued Tate. Davidson would have nothing of this suspect doctrine. "I still say, that, other things being equal, if one of two poems has a bigger theme than another that poem is a greater, though maybe not a better, poem." We recall Henry James' belief that "art lives upon discussion, upon experiment, upon variety of attempt, upon the exchange of views and the comparison of standpoints. . . . Discussion, suggestion, formulation, these things are fertilizing when they are frank and sincere." This is the way it appears to have been with these young, brilliant, and talented Nashville poets. "The language of this new world was poetry," says Professor Cowan, "and each member [of the group] knew that before he could declare himself by means of it, he must practice, criticize, and revise." This is precisely what the Fugitive poet was doing. And this is what he learned: "the problem of language (may a poet use the one he comes by or must he invent his own?); of meaning (may he approach his subject directly or must he take a more circuitous route?); of theme (may he attempt an affirmative treatment on a large scale or must he merely essay to handle well a small portion of experience?)."

What knit the group together? It was not unity of theory, but, in Tate's phrase, "unity of feeling" based on "a common historical myth." Evidence the myth had

deep sources in Southern society is seen in their allegiance to a classical humanism, a code of manners and morals, a pungent and metaphorical language, and a sense of form. They also shared a common motive: they were in revolt against liberalism, scientific naturalism, and a Romantic anti-intellectual aesthetic. Although they did not often agree on theological, epistemological, or aesthetic matters, this high-minded, gracious, distinguished, versatile, and productive group succeeded in making themselves known and felt by establishing a profession of letters, by editing and setting policies for literary journals, by writing influential texts, and by their superior talent as teachers.

In 1922 the Fugitive Group launched a magazine called *The Fugitive*, without sponsorship of section, city, or university. It lasted three years and then folded. The expenses far exceeded the return from subscriptions and advertising, and the group who nurtured it were teachers with a livelihood to earn. The standards were high; *The Fugitive* aimed to realize literary and universal qualities, not simply to encourage Southern poetry. The group had had sharp disagreements over editorial policy. Finally, they discontinued publication. Possibly Professor Cowan's statement that *The Fugitive* had been "the most valuable amateur magazine in literary history" is accurate. Certainly the Fugitive poets had learned something about their art, and they had reached a small, élite reading public without "toadying to sponsor or . . . conforming to a theory." On January 9, 1928, Harcourt, Brace and Company published *The Fugitive Anthology*, a volume which, in Professor Cowan's opinion, "is genuinely impressive, containing some of the finest poetry produced in America."

One of the many services of Professor Cowan's book is the careful distinction made between the Fugitive Group and the Agrarians. The latter group included some of the Fugitives, but its focus was on social and religious rather than on literary subjects. The Fugitives were active from 1915

to 1928, excepting only the interval in World War I. The Agrarians—a group of twelve scholars united by common principles rather than contiguity—were active from 1928 to 1935. In 1930 they published *I'll Take My Stand*, an anthology attacking industrialism and its basic dogma, the belief in the perfectibility of man through secular progress. The Agrarians were a critical and speculative group; the Fugitives represented a "creative adventure." The big four—Ransom, Davidson, Tate, and Warren—belonged to both groups.

Professor Cowan's *The Fugitive Group* is a well-organized, close scrutiny of the Fugitives. She includes useful biographical footnotes and draws freely upon the correspondence of the principal members. In her critical analyses she doesn't pull any punches. Of the poems in the first issue of *The Fugitive*, she says: "None of its individual verses, perhaps, were up to the quality of the really good poems to be found sporadically in some of the established journals." She examines closely the poetry of the Fugitives, and she writes discerningly about them. "Davidson's poetic insight was always to function best within the intensive realm of a tradition inherited as a human being, who lives within fixed and certain boundaries." "Of all the Fugitive poets, Tate had been most uncomfortable in the land of his birth; he had found no niche for himself in a society which made no place for a man of letters or a nonconformist." Nor does she side-step the quarrels that came with the annoyances in the publishing of their magazine. At one point she notes: "Wrangling was so chronic with the Fugitives at this state that Davidson, sick at heart, himself considered resigning." She details the disagreement between Tate and Ransom after the latter's sharp attack on "The Waste Land." And she clarifies Davidson's short-lived opposition to Tate's "Ode to the Confederate Dead."

Professor Cowan also asks important questions: What, for example, was the re-

sponse to the Fugitive Group during this epoch of great interest in poetry in our country? The answer: It was "unstylish"; it didn't appeal to the young advance-guard experimentalists. What critical voices were raised against it? "The Fugitive School of poetry was in style and content too clever," wrote John McClure in the *New Orleans Times-Picayune*. Ransom, writing to Tate in 1922, shows the Fugitives could be self-critical. "I think the most of us (not often you) are like jewellers' apprentices; we invent nothing, we hardly see the whole, but we are good at cutting the individual stone. . . . *What we lack is essentially artistic taste.*" (Ransom's italics.)

Professor Cowan's considered summation counterbalances Ransom's critical misgiving. "They," says Professor Cowan of the Fugitives, "had found that their true task was not the creation of an ideal world but the discovery of a real one, independent of their own thinking; they had learned that a genuine culture, whatever its flaws, is an analogue of something nobler toward which the human spirit aspires but which it can grasp only through submission to the actual." Once they had learned this, "their poetry made available to themselves and to the writers following them a body of techniques, a language, and a core of belief drawn from a traditional society." Here, in this literary record, is a sense of the varied techniques of the Fugitive Group, of their love of language, and—above all—their deep inner conviction. Professor Cowan is right; there is "a kind of parable" here, which, in spite of the petty squabbles, proves that when practicing poets can trust and love each other, the Muse does reveal "her true nature and her role in human affairs." These poets—at least those in the "interior movement"—did kneel to consecrate the flame and not the flicker. They did more than talk, they produced.

Reviewed by REGINALD L. COOK

The Burke Newsletter

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A General Announcement

This issue of the *Burke Newsletter* will be the last to be published in MODERN AGE. For almost two years Burkeans have enjoyed the privilege of appearing as a regular section of MODERN AGE. But necessary changes in editorial policy require that henceforth the *Burke Newsletter* will be published elsewhere. At a later date your editors will notify readers of the newsletter when and where publication will be resumed. To be certain of receiving this notice, readers of MODERN AGE who wish to subscribe to the *Burke Newsletter* should send their name and address to Peter J. Stanlis.

Burke's Correspondence, Volume Four

Dr. John A. Woods, editor of the fourth volume of *Burke's Correspondence*, has been working diligently all year in the Central Library, Sheffield, England, to bring order and light out of the mass of Burke manuscripts which will be included in this important volume. He has submitted the following account of his editorial discoveries.

The fourth volume of *The Correspondence of Edmund Burke* covers the period from July 1, 1778, to July 1, 1782, when Burke's political influence was at its height. Earlier he had been merely one of a group whose advice was sought by Lord Rockingham, and he was not always the most important member of the Rockingham Whigs. But in these four years Burke exercised the decisive influence on the mind of his patron. The volume ends with the tragedy of Rockingham's death within a few months of the formation of his second administration, when the fruit of the long years of intelligent opposition appeared to be within the grasp of his supporters.

Some 230 letters written by Burke will be printed in this volume. The selection of letters to him has not been finally made, but the policy of printing almost all the letters from Rockingham to Burke, with a full selection of those from other major political figures—Portland, Fox, Richmond and Baker—will be continued. This volume shows somewhat less of the variety of

Burke's intellectual interests than its predecessors, though it will contain the already well-known story of the assistance he gave to George Crabbe. There are few family letters, the chief exception being a number of letters to Juliana French at Loughrea. Burke remains as attentive as ever to the needs of the unfortunate, even when they do not really merit his assistance. A group of letters toward the closing months of 1781 relates his successful efforts to obtain the release of Henry Laurens, American Revolutionary statesman, from the Tower of London, in exchange for General Cornwallis. A smaller group reveals his vehement protection of the victims of Admiral Rodney's high-handed actions at St. Eustatius, which caused Burke to expound his convictions on international law in several speeches in the Commons.

For the first half of this volume Burke is Member of Parliament for Bristol. There is much correspondence with his constituents upon relatively minor matters arising from the American war, such as frequent requests for convoys, and a constant concern with the details of legislation which they wished him to modify or oppose. Most of this correspondence is unpublished. It is significant that no letters relating to the renewed attempt to abolish the restrictions on Irish trade survive. Apparently Burke's constituents regarded it as unprofitable to approach him, and he did not choose to elaborate the arguments which in April 1778 had failed to convince them. Although letters to and from Bristol frequently interrupt the flow of Burke's exposition of weightier matters, nevertheless, in conjunction with the similar correspondence in the third volume, they present an unusually complete example of the day-to-day work of an eighteenth-century member of Parliament in the service of his local interests.

Burke failed to retain his Bristol seat in September 1780. Most of his correspondence about the election, as also about the attempt of his friends to secure his nomination in the by-election of 1781, has not hitherto been published. These letters are almost the sole source for the details of his negotiations with his fellow constituent, Cruger. Despite indisputable evidence of the duplicity of Cruger and the damage he did to Burke's position at Bristol, and despite the local unpopularity of some of Burke's actions, the major reason for his defeat appears to have been the difficulty of securing the return of two Whig members. After his defeat Burke showed a

genuine wish to retire permanently from politics, and the Rockingham and Burke papers provide good evidence of the distress that such a wish caused even to those who disagreed with him. During his short period out of Parliament Burke turned with new vigor to Indian affairs. His unpublished correspondence about the cavalier treatment of the Maharatta agents is a striking example of his fusion of a public issue with his concern for the dignity and happiness of individuals.

The high point of Burke's political career was reached during the first six months of 1780, when he devoted all his astonishing energy to the cause of "economical reform." There is little fresh information in the Burke papers about the origin of his program, and his letters during the parliamentary battles are chiefly polite acknowledgments of letters of appreciation from county committees; but there is much new material on the relation of the Rockingham party with the extra-parliamentary reform movements. In 1779 the party was patiently waiting for some new movement of public opinion upon which to base its attack on Lord North's government. This new movement began with the Yorkshire Meeting convened by Christopher Wyvil. The manuscripts at Sheffield show that Rockingham and his friends were in touch with Wyvil's associates from the very inception of the meeting. At the same time Burke and Rockingham vigorously opposed the raising of the divisive question of parliamentary reform and succeeded temporarily in reaching an agreement with Lord Shelburne to preserve the unity of the King's Opposition. The most important part of the political correspondence of Burke in this four-year period centers on these issues. It is surprising how few important political letters survive for 1781 and the first part of 1782. There is only one letter of real significance for the second Rockingham administration.

Finally, Burke's interest in religious toleration continues to show itself. The volume opens with the arrival in England of the Irish Bill for relaxing the Penal Laws, and a full account is given in Burke's letters of his part in persuading the Privy Council to accept it. In the next year there are important letters about the anti-Catholic riots in Scotland, including a long unpublished letter to Boswell. In 1780 the Gordon Riots operated powerfully upon his mind. In 1782 there is a long letter to Lord Kenmare on the further modification of the Penal Laws. In all these cases Burke

is in close touch with the Catholic community, and there are many drafts of documents to illustrate how the Catholics employed his pen.

Burke Studies in England

During the past six months a steady stream of scholars has passed through the "Burke Factory" in Sheffield, England, to do research for various writing projects. Among Americans recently in Sheffield were Professor James E. Bunce, St. John's University, working on the second Rockingham Administration; Professor George C. McElroy, Indiana University, on Burke and India; Miss Naomi Churgin, Ph.D. candidate, Columbia University, on Major John Cartwright; Sister Mary Claver, Ph.D. candidate, Fordham University, on Maynooth and British politics. Mr. J. Hill, Ph.D. candidate, Southampton University, is writing a thesis, "A Re-evaluation of the Principles and Policies of Edmund Burke." Mr. Roger Levick, Lincoln College, Oxford, is preparing a book on the relationship between the Pitt and Rockingham sections of the Whig Party. Mr. B. Donoghue, Nuffield College, is working on a study of English politics and the American Revolution.

Miss E. Gilberthorpe, Sheffield Library staff member, is doing research into the school founded by Burke in 1796 for the children of French emigrés at Tyler's Green House, near Penn, Buckinghamshire. Her work should supplement the recently published book by Margery Weiner, *The French Exiles, 1789-1815* (London: John Murray, 1960), which includes a section on Burke's relationship with the French emigrés living in London. Miss Weiner contended that of the 16,000 nobles who fled France, most were a serious and dedicated band of idealists. This thesis is challenged by the reviewer of her book in the *Times Literary Supplement*, August 19, 1960, p. 527. Her spirited reply (September 2, p. 561) is based upon Burke's letter to Philip Francis, who read the *Reflections* in manuscript and took strong exception to Burke's defense of chivalry, charging him with sentimentality. Miss Weiner's argument indicates that the conflicting viewpoints toward the value of a nobility, in sustaining a system of polished manners in civil society, is still a lively issue. Undoubtedly, Miss Gilberthorpe's and Miss Weiner's studies should be read in the light of the excellent work of Ralph W. Greenlaw, Jr., whose unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, "The French Nobility on the Eve of the Revolution: A Study of its Aims and Atti-

tudes, 1787-89" (Princeton University, 1952) is basic for an understanding of this important subject.

Professor Alfred Cobban has published a new edition of *Edmund Burke and the Revolt Against the Eighteenth Century*, with a new introduction. Professor James T. Boulton writes that he is comparing the pamphleteering efforts of Junius and Dr. Johnson with those of the early Burke. Junius' *Letters*, Johnson's *The False Alarm*, and Burke's *Present Discontents* will provide him with a wealth of materials toward his forthcoming study of Burke's rhetorical techniques.

Burke's relationship to France is receiving renewed attention from several scholars. Early this year Professor C. P. Courtney, lecturer in French at Sheffield University, completed a Ph.D. thesis, "The Influence of Montesquieu on Burke," under the supervision of Lucy Sutherland, at Oxford. Dr. Courtney is more familiar than any other Burke scholar with French MS collections relating to Burke. Recently, he discovered a new Burke letter in the manuscript division of the Amsterdam University Library. M. Robert Lacour-Gayet of Paris is writing a book on Calonne's relations with Burke; he has discovered a previously unlisted letter of Calonne to Burke.

In a feature review article, the *Times Literary Supplement*, June 17, 1960, pp. 377-378, devoted eight half columns to Burke, and in reviewing the recently published volumes of the *Correspondence*, and books by T.H.D. Mahoney and F. P. Canavan, noted that Burke is "in the centre of the philosophical/political arena of the mid-twentieth century."

The Burke Revival in Austria

During the past decade there has been a marked revival of interest in Burke's political philosophy in Austria, particularly among conservative political thinkers and scholars. In a recent article by Johann Christian Allmayer-Beck, "Der Konservatismus in Osterreich," Burke was called "a great classic of conservatism in Austria, though he never set his foot on the soil of this country." Frederick Gentz' translation of Burke's *Reflections* continues to be widely read in Austria. Articles on Burke have been appearing in leading Austrian magazines, such as the *Salzburger Nachrichten*, edited by Dr. René Marcic, professor of law at the University of Vienna. The monarchist weekly, *Die Krone*, has published a series of articles on the importance of Burke's thought for a sound understanding of central

European politics and has had extensive analytical reviews of such recent studies as Peter Stanlis' *Edmund Burke and the Natural Law*. Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind* has recently been published in German and is being widely read in Austria by university students.

The work in progress by Dr. Thomas Chaimowicz, of Salzburg, shows the practical political nature of the renewed Austrian interest in Burke. Dr. Chaimowicz has completed a manuscript of four long essays on Burke's political philosophy and practice, which he hopes to publish in the near future. The first essay is centered in Burke's conception of the statesman as "the philosopher in action." It consists of an analysis of Burke's basic political principles in the light of the historical conditions now existing in Austria. Dr. Chaimowicz writes of this essay: "It deals with the fact that most modern nations live under constitutions drawn up by theoreticians without practical knowledge, and are governed by pragmatists without a theoretical basis for their actions. This will be found true of the constitutional, political and economic activities of many political leaders, and it accounts for some of the major disasters of recent history." The second essay, centered in Burke's conception of "the Commonwealth of Europe," emphasizes "the importance of the classical tradition as the common basis of Western thought . . . from Cicero's 'Res Publica' to Burke's 'Commonwealth of Europe.'" This tradition, writes Dr. Chaimowicz, is very much alive in Austria, and is among the strongest reasons for the recent revival of interest in Burke: "The way of life, the habits of Austrians, are very conservative, in the sound sense of that word; respectful of tradition, yet looking into the future with the spirit of unbroken faith and optimism." In the course of the centuries the rule of the House of Hapsburg has built up "the framework of an empire," in which many nationalities lived side by side under one

rule of law and one imperial sovereignty. Dr. Chaimowicz' third essay makes use of Burke's conceptions of historical continuity and the constitution, and examines the constitutional changes which monarchical government underwent under the pressures of democratic movements. The fourth essay extends these points and examines them in the light of some of Burke's political prophecies. These essays, together with other work in progress on Burke in Austria, should command the respectful interest of American and British Burke scholars during the next few years.

Two New Burke Anthologies

In May 1960 Professor Walter J. Bate, Harvard University, published *Selected Writings of Edmund Burke*, in a Modern Library edition. The excellent thirty-seven page historical introduction is followed by 536 pages of judicious selections of Burke's writings on America, Ireland, economic reform, India, and France. In September 1960 appeared *The Philosophy of Edmund Burke*, edited by Professors Louis I. Bredvold and Ralph G. Ross, published by the University of Michigan Press. This unusual anthology, which contains the essence of Burke's thought, is arranged according to the great themes and principles of Burke's political philosophy, and is ideal for a "history of ideas" approach to literature and political science.

A Burke Newsletter Announcement

The *Burke Newsletter* will resume publication as an independent quarterly in June, 1961. Individual and library subscriptions of \$1.00 should be sent to Dr. Peter J. Stanlis, Department of English, University of Detroit. First year subscribers will receive copies of the first seven numbers of the *Burke Newsletter* which have appeared in *Modern Age*. These numbers will be bound in a hard cover notebook which is suitable for holding all future numbers of the newsletter.

Sonic Broomstick

If the season for ghosts were explicit. . .
but space and light, twin phantoms,
linger now and tomorrow, uncontrolled
sitting on bracken and fern, on prairie grass spindles
sprawling over snowfield and crater.

The hunt is on, no weapons barred.
Beware, you crows creaking upward,
of witches on sonic broomsticks
steering for stars.
There's emptiness abroad and desperate guessing.

If the country of conquest were declared. . .
but these wraiths mist in and out of humans
tumbling formulas for freedom in barrel-staved brains.
The search leads out to the brink of starlight
while the ghosts ride inside of the searchers.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

David J. Dallin is the well-known author of *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin*, *Russia and Post-War Europe*, and other works on Russia.

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Thomas Molnar, professor of French at Brooklyn College, is a frequent contributor to *Modern Age*.

Clare Boothe Luce was United States Ambassador to Italy from 1953 to 1957. Ex-Congresswoman, Miss Luce is also a well-known playwright.

Robert V. Jones, an attorney, is author of *The Challenge of Liberty*.

Robert Beum, professor of English at the University of Nebraska, is author of *Orpheus and Other Poems*.

Marion Montgomery has published poems, stories, and articles in a number of periodicals; he teaches English at the University of Georgia.

Our book reviews are contributed by *Ross J. S. Hoffman* of Fordham University; *Harry Elmer Barnes*, dean of America's "revisionist" historians; *John A. Recenga* of Marquette University; *Dean Peerman* of *The Christian Century*; *David Ray* of Cornell University; *Walter Sullivan* of Vanderbilt University; and *Reginald L. Cook* of Bread Loaf School of English in Vermont.

The poets in this issue are *Richard Kelly* of Long Island, New York and *Bernice Ames* of Los Angeles, California.

